Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational? What place does morality have in the kind of life it makes most sense to lead? How are we to understand claims to objectivity in moral judgments and in judgments of rationality? When we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with whole communities, how can we understand our disagreement and cope with it? |
From inside the book
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A Theory of Normative Judgment Allan Gibbard. Gauthier maintains that reason demands maximally satisfying one's own desires, but under constraints that would be agreed to in certain ideal conditions (1986, esp. chap. 6). Thomas Nagel ...
... one's own happiness in particular ( 1907 , 383 ) . He thought also , though , that an egoist could evade this claim , and that in a " recognized conflict between duty and self - interest , practical rea- son " would be " divided against ...
... one's acceptance of norms that permit it . This formula applies to almost any- thing that can be appraised as rational or irrational — persons aside . It applies to the rationality of actions , and it applies to the rationality of ...
... one's acceptance of norms that permit the thing in question . There is a spe- cial normative element in talk of what it makes sense to do , to think , and to feel , and that element resides in a special state of mind . This may seem ...
... one's ultimate ends cannot be assessed as rational or irrational . Rationality lies in adopting appropriate means , in an uncertain world , to whatever substantive goals one may have . Instrumental rationality here means rationality in ...
Contents
3 | |
23 | |
36 | |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
References | 329 |
Index | 339 |