Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational? What place does morality have in the kind of life it makes most sense to lead? How are we to understand claims to objectivity in moral judgments and in judgments of rationality? When we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with whole communities, how can we understand our disagreement and cope with it? |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 76
... least uneasiness to an Indian or person wholly unknown to me . ' Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater , and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter " ( 1739 , bk ...
... least , even if one does in fact want them . These people use the word ' rational ' in a way Hume finds unintelli- gible . It would be good to see if we can interpret what they could mean . Any difficult analysis will be controversial ...
... least if you each can expect the other to keep 13. The prisoner's dilemma is attributed to A. W. Tucker ; see Luce and Raiffa ( 1957 , 95-97 ) . Nozick ( 1969 ) introduces twins , and points out that doing so makes the problem into an ...
... least , is unprob- lematical . The problems seem to lie with the substantive rationality of goals . Instrumental rationality seems just a matter of beliefs about con- sequences , and of doing the thing whose consequences one most wants ...
... least of all do I want to be a person who would be willing to tolerate them on his hands . " Then the person is rational in his preferences , on Brandt's account . Brandt , I take it , does not regard this conclusion as a virtue of his ...
Contents
3 | |
23 | |
36 | |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
References | 329 |
Index | 339 |