Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational? What place does morality have in the kind of life it makes most sense to lead? How are we to understand claims to objectivity in moral judgments and in judgments of rationality? When we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with whole communities, how can we understand our disagreement and cope with it? |
From inside the book
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... irrational. Narrowly moral judgments are not feelings but judgments of what moral feelings it is rational to have. Feelings, we think, can be apt or not, and moral judgments are judgments of when guilt and resentment are apt. Saying ...
... irrational, right or wrong. In this book, however, I take up substantive normative questions only cursorily, and only at a high level of abstraction. I do have substantive hopes for the analysis, but they are indirect. The analysis will ...
... irrational ? That is the puzzle of the book , and my hope is that from working on it , we can learn things worth learning about ourselves and about our questions . In part the question how to live is moral — perhaps in whole . What kind ...
... irrational . Narrowly moral judgments are not feelings but judgments of what moral feelings it is rational to have . Feelings , we think , can be apt or not , and moral judgments are judgments of when guilt and resentment are apt ...
... irrational , and it is puzzling how this can be . The analysis offers an answer . " To call something rational is to ... irrational is not 5. The phrase ' it makes sense to ' strikes my ear as carrying the right kind of endorse- ment ...
Contents
3 | |
23 | |
36 | |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
References | 329 |
Index | 339 |