Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational? What place does morality have in the kind of life it makes most sense to lead? How are we to understand claims to objectivity in moral judgments and in judgments of rationality? When we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with whole communities, how can we understand our disagreement and cope with it? |
From inside the book
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... ideal conditions (1986, esp. chap. 6). Thomas Nagel argues for pure impartiality between oneself and others. “In any situation in which there is reason for one person to promote some end, we must be able to discover an end which there ...
... ideal conditions ( 1986 , esp . chap . 6 ) . Thomas Nagel argues for pure impartiality between oneself and others . " In any situation in which there is reason for one person to promote some end , we must be able to discover an end ...
... ideal state we might reach if we had considered everything fully and achieved entirely consistent judgments . Now , I do not accept this fully as a characterization of the moral theorist's goal ( see Chapter 9 ) . Still , if it is even ...
... ideal , even if every time we try we must settle for something less . Good evolutionary treatments of human life will be indirect . Not much genetic change , it is generally thought , has occurred in the couple of hundred generations ...
... ideal of rationality " as controlling the evolution of a scheme of translation . Kripke ( 1982 , 37 ) says , " The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative , not descriptive . " McDowell ( 1984 , 336 ) quotes this ...
Contents
3 | |
23 | |
36 | |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
References | 329 |
Index | 339 |