Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational? What place does morality have in the kind of life it makes most sense to lead? How are we to understand claims to objectivity in moral judgments and in judgments of rationality? When we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with whole communities, how can we understand our disagreement and cope with it? |
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A Theory of Normative Judgment Allan Gibbard. Gauthier maintains that reason demands maximally satisfying one's own desires, but under constraints that would be agreed to in certain ideal conditions (1986, esp. chap. 6). Thomas Nagel ...
... demands of reason , and " reason issues inexorable com- mands without promising anything to the inclinations " ( 1785 , 405 ) . Sidgwick said the good is happiness , and that " as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally ...
... demands no more than a formal coherence of preferences , in a way that can be expressed by a set of axioms.8 8. Hume ( 1739 , bk . 2 , part 3 , sec . 3 ) thinks that reason , strictly understood , yields only beliefs , chiefly about ...
... demands that anyone give weight to his own future happiness . It makes this demand , she thinks , even on a person who is now indifferent to the future . Now whether or not she is right , if her thought is intelligible , if it is ...
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Contents
3 | |
23 | |
36 | |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
References | 329 |
Index | 339 |