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faving, the records of our religion have left to controverfy; but the fundamental nature of faith, is one of its most unquestionable leffons. Faith is not only neceffary to preferve us from the pains of hell; it is alfo requifite as a qualification for temporal bleffings. When any one applied to Jefus to be cured of any disease, he was first of all queftioned refpecting the implicitnefs of his faith; and, in Galilee, and other places, Chrift wrought not many miracles, becaufe of their unbelief*. Never were curfes poured out in a more copious ftream, or with a more ardent and unfparing zeal, than by the meek and holy Jefus upon those who opposed his pretenfions. The fhort and comprehenfive defcription bestowed upon the refractory to the end of time appears to be this, They have loved darknefs, rather than light, because their deeds are evil.

There is a vulgar error clofely connected with the subject of this effay, which, on account of its extenfive influence, deferves to be noticed;

* Matthew, Chap. VIII, ver. 13; Chap. IX, ver. 28, 29; Chap. XIII, ver. 58: Mark, Chap. V, ver. 36; Chap. IX, ver. 23; Chap. XI, ver. 23, 24: John, Chap. XI, ver. 40; Chap. XX, ver. 29.

+ Take as an example, Matthew, Chap. XXIII, ver. 33. John, Chap. III, ver, 19.

I mean, the demerit of inconfiftency. It is wonderful how great a fpace this topic occupies in the debates of the English parliament. The greateft luminary of the prefent houfe of commons, Mr. Fox, will fometimes occupy one half of a fpeech upon the moft interefting question, with a defence of his own confiftency.

It is fcarcely neceffary to remark, that an argument upon an interefting queftion, is always much degraded, when it is fuffered to involve with it a perfonal difcuffion.

Of perfonal difcuffions, that of confiftency is one of the moft frivolous.

Inconfiftency is as unfortunate a teft of a man's infincerity, as can be imagined.

If by inconfiftency we understand fome contradiction between one branch of a man's creed and another, this is undoubtedly a defect. It proves that he is imperfect, not that he is difhoneft.

But, if by inconfiftency we understand, that he does not believe now what he once believed, that his character is changed, and his conduct regulated by different principles, this is fcarcely any argument of prefent defect. Yet this is the fort of inconfiftency, the charge of which is most frequently and vehemently repelled.

It is obvious that the man, who, in adjusting accounts

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accounts with his own mind, is influenced as to the opinions he shall now receive, by the confideration of what it was that he formerly believed, is fo far a vitiated character. He ought to be ready to receive the truth, however unlike it may be to his former habits of thinking.

But we are entitled to go further than this, and to affirm that inconfiftency, in the sense last explained, is glorious, inftead of being fhameful. Who is it that is likely, through Shakespear's feven ages of man, to think always alike? The flave of prejudice, or the flave of idleness. The active and independent mind, the genuine lover of and enquirer after truth, will inevitably pafs through certain revolutions of opinion.

It may be alleged in behalf of those who are eager in the vindication of the unalterableness of their opinions and principles, that great firefs is laid upon this point by the vulgar.

But then, on the other hand, it is to be remarked that, when great and illuftrious characters lend their aid to the prejudices of the vulgar, they add much to the vigour of prejudice, and are fo far the enemies, not the friends, of the improvement and happiness of mankind.

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ESSAY X.

OF POLITENESS.

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SECT. I.

T has been no unfrequent profeffion among men of a bold temper, and who are smitten with a love for the fublimer virtues, that they are enemies to politeness.

One of the greatest misfortunes incident to morality, as well as to a majority of fciences, flows from the ambiguity of words.

By politeness many persons underfland artificial manners, the very purpose of which is to ftand between the feelings of the heart and the external behaviour. The word immediately conjures up to their mind a corrupt and vicious mode of fociety, and they conceive it to mean a set of rules, founded in no just reason, and oftentatiously practifed by those who are familiar with them, for no purpose more expressly, than to confound and keep at a distance those who, by the accident of their birth or fortune, are ignorant of them.

In this fenfe no doubt politeness is worthy of our decifive difapprobation, and in this fenfe it is to be regretted that there is vaftly too much politenefs in the world.

Urbanity is a term that has met with a better fortune among our contemporaries, than politenefs. Yet, if we have recourse to their etymology, politeness is certainly not lefs appropriate and laudable. As it defcends to us from the Greek, its nature is precisely coincident; as it comes to us through the medium of the Latin word, which fignifies to polifh, to make smooth, agreeable to the eye, and pleasant to the touch, it is fufficiently adapted to that circumstance in morals which may admit of a fubftantial vindication.

Morality, or the exercise of beneficence, confifts of two principal parts, which may be denominated the greater morality, and the less. Those actions of a man's life, adapted to purposes of beneficence, which are fraught with energy, and cannot be practised but in an exalted temper of mind, belong to the greater morality; fuch as faving a fellow being from death, raising him from deep diftrefs, conferring on him a memprable advantage, or exerting one's felf for the ervice of multitudes. There are other actions, in which a man may confult the tranfitory feeling

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