Philosophical Works, Volume 2The University Press, 1967 - Philosophy, Modern |
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Page 40
... usually em- ploys , —and those other expressions that give us the more bare and rigorous truth , though not that accommodated to the human mind . It is these latter that everyone should employ in philosophy , and it was my duty to use ...
... usually em- ploys , —and those other expressions that give us the more bare and rigorous truth , though not that accommodated to the human mind . It is these latter that everyone should employ in philosophy , and it was my duty to use ...
Page 360
... usually have the greatest trouble in making philosophy accord with theology . And I am still ready to do the same in regard to other questions , were there need ; and even likewise to show that there are many things in the ordinary ...
... usually have the greatest trouble in making philosophy accord with theology . And I am still ready to do the same in regard to other questions , were there need ; and even likewise to show that there are many things in the ordinary ...
Page 371
... usually no dispute . But if this evident truth so long looked for and expected , was at length set before us by an angel , would it not also be rejected for the sole reason that it would seem novel to those accustomed to the ...
... usually no dispute . But if this evident truth so long looked for and expected , was at length set before us by an angel , would it not also be rejected for the sole reason that it would seem novel to those accustomed to the ...
Contents
THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS | 1 |
Reply to the First Objections | 9 |
Second Set of Objections | 24 |
11 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
accidents admit affirm afterwards appear apprehend Archimedes Architect argument Aristotle ascribed assert Atheist attributes belongs brutes certainly Chiliagon clear and distinct clearly and distinctly comprehend conceived concept conclusion contained contrary critic deceived demonstrated deny derived Descartes Discourse on Method distinguished doubt dreaming efficient cause employ error essence eternal everything evident existence of God fact faculty false figure follow formal formal cause Further give greater hence human Ibid idea of God imagination infer infinite intellect judge judgment knowledge likewise major premise matter means Meditation merely metaphysical method mind motion Myriagon nature never nevertheless objective reality opinions perceive perfect philosophy Plato possess principles proof prove question reason refute renunciation reply seems sense sophism soul spirit sub fin sufficient syllogism theologians thing which thinks thinking substance thinking thing thought triangle true truth understand unless Whence whole wholly wish words