sand patients or wounded, in the different towns in the conquered territory -for to that immense number had the rapidity of the marches, and the multiplicity of the combats, swelled the sick-list. Having amply provided for his own army, Napoleon despatched several millions by the route of Genoa for the service of the Directory, and one million over the Alps to Moreau, to relieve the pressing wants of the army of the Upper Rhine.

has always been decided, ere long drive their inconsiderable opponents over the Alps, and cut off, without the possibility of escape, the corps in the south of the peninsula. He therefore at once resigned his command, accompanying it with the observation, that one bad general is better than two good ones. The Directory, however, unable to dispense with the services of their youthful officer, immediately reinstated him, and abandoned their project, which was indeed in itself so absurd that it would have thrown great doubts on the military capacity of Carnot, the ministerat-war, if it had not in reality been suggested by the wish to extinguish the rising ambition of Napoleon.*

84. In less than ten days after the occupation of Milan, national guards in the Republican interest were organised in the whole of Lombardy; revolutionary authorities were everywhere established, and the country was rendered subservient to the military power of France. The garrison of two thousand men which Beaulieu had left in the citadel of Milan was closely invested, and the headquarters were moved to Lodi. But an event here thought-I say it with grief, you will lose the fairest opportunity that ever occurred of giving laws to that fine peninsula. In the position of the affairs of the Republic, it is indispensable that you possess a general who enjoys your confidence; if I do not do so, I shall not complain, and shall do my utmost to manifest my zeal in the service which you intrust to me. Every one has his own method of carrying on war: Kellermann has more experience, and may do it better than I; but, together, we would do nothing but mis

83. These great successes already began to inspire the French government with jealousy of their lieutenant; and they in consequence transmitted an order by which Kellermann, with twenty thousand men, was to command on the left bank of the Po, and cover the siege of Mantua, while Napoleon, with the remainder of the forces, was to march upon Rome and Naples. But he was both too proud to submit to any division of his authority, and too sagacious not to see that, by thus separating the forces, and leaving only a small army in the north of Italy, the Austrians would speedily recover themselves, regain the decisive ground in that quarter on which the fate of the peninsula * Napoleon on this occasion wrote to Carnot: "Kellermann could command the army as well as I-for no one is more convinced than I am of the courage and daring of the soldiers-but to unite us together would ruin everything. I will not serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe and it is better to have one bad general than two good ones. War is, like government, decided in a great degree by tact." To the Directory he observed: "It is in the highest degree impolitic to divide in two the Army of Italy, and not less adverse to the in-chief. Your resolution on this matter is of terests of the Republic to place at its head two different generals. The expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, is a very inconsiderable matter, and should be made by divisions in échelon, ready, at a moment's warning, to wheel about and face the Austrians on the Adige. To perform it with success, both armies must be under the command of one general. I have hitherto conducted the campaign without consulting any one; the results would have been very different if I had been obliged to reconcile my views with those of another. If you impose upon me vexations of every description; if I must refer all my steps to the commissaries of government; if they are authorised to change my movements, to send away my troops expect no further success. If you weaken your resources by dividing your forces-if you disturb in Italy the unity of military

more importance than the fifteen thousand men whom the Emperor has just sent to Beaulieu." But Buonaparte did not intrust this important matter merely to these arguments, strong as they were. Murat, who was still at Paris, received instructions to inform Barras that a million of francs were deposited at Genoa for his private use; and the influence of Josephine was employed with both him and Carnot to prevent the threatened division, and the result was that it was abandoned. "The Directory,' said Carnot, "has maturely considered your arguments; and the confidence which they have in your talents and republican zeal have decided the matter in your favour. Kellermann will remain at Chamberry, and you may adjourn the expedition to Rome as long as you please."-HARDENBERG, iii. 49, 351.

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livered up to plunder; while the unhappy peasants, pursued into the plain by the French dragoons, were cut down in great numbers. The pillage continued the whole day, and that opulent and flourishing town underwent all the horrors of war. But the terrible example crushed the insurrection over the whole of Lombardy, where tranquillity was speedily re-established, and hostages were taken from the principal families and despatched into France.

occurred which threatened great dan- | himself next day to the walls of Pavia, ger to the French army, and was only with six pieces of light artillery. The prevented from proving calamitous by grenadiers rushed forward to the gates, the decision and severity of its chief. which they forced open with hatchets : Opinions were much divided in Italy, while the artillery cleared the ramparts as in all states undergoing the crisis of the victorious troops broke into the a revolution, on the changes which were town, which the peasants precipitately going forward. The lower classes in abandoned to its fate. Napoleon, wishthe towns had been moved by the equal- ing to terrify the insurgents, ordered ity which the French everywhere pro- the magistrates and leaders of the reclaimed; but the peasantry in the coun-volt to be shot, and the city to be detry, less liable to the contagion of new principles, and more under the influence of the nobility and priests, were still firmly attached to the ancient régime, with which the Austrian authority was now identified. When men's minds were in this divided state, the prodigious contribution levied upon Milan, and the vast requisitions of provisions and horses which had been made for the use of the army, over the whole country districts, inflamed the rural population to the highest degree. The people of Lombardy did not consider themselves as conquered, nor expect to be treated as such; they had welcomed the French as deliverers, and now they found a severer yoke imposed upon them than that from which they had just escaped. Roused to indignation by such treatment, a general insurrection was rapidly organised over the whole of that beautiful district. An attack, in concert with a sortie from the garrison of the castle, was made on Milan; and though it failed, the insurgents were more successful at Pavia, where the people rose against the garrison, forced it to capitulate, admitted eight thousand armed peasants within the walls, and closed their gates against the French troops.

85. The danger was imminent: the tocsin sounded in all the parishes; the least retrograde movement would have augmented the evil, and compelled the retreat of the army, whose advanced posts were already on the Oglio. In these circumstances, prudence counselled temerity; and Napoleon advanced in person to crush the insurgents. Their vanguard was routed by Lannes, and a hundred of the peasants killed; but this severe example having failed in producing intimidation, he marched

86. In this act was displayed another feature of Napoleon's character, who, without being unnecessarily cruel, never hesitated to adopt the most sanguinary measures when requisite for his own purposes. Pillage and rapine, indeed, invariably follow the capture of a town carried by assault, and it is impossible to prevent it; but Napoleon in this instance authorised it by a general order, and shot the leading persons of the city in cold blood. It is in vain to appeal to the usages of war for a vindication of such cruelty: the inhabitants of Pavia were not subjects of France, who were not entitled to resist its authority; they were Austrian citizens, alike called on and bound to defend their country from attack, or rescue it as soon as possible from the invader's grasp. Nor can it be said they were not soldiers, and that simple citizens have no right to interfere with the contests of hostile armies; the words of Napoleon himself furnish his own condemnation.-"It is the first duty," said the Emperor, in his proclamation to the peasantry of France, on March 5, 1814, "of every citizen to take up arms in defence of his country. Let the peasantry everywhere organise themselves in bands, with such weapons as they can find; let them fall upon the flanks and rear of the invaders; and

the aristocracy of Venice; that certain ruin, either from foreign violence or domestic revolution, was to be expected from their success; that the haughty tone already assumed by the conqueror already showed that he looked upon all the continental possessions of the republic as his own, and was only waiting for an opportunity to seize them for the French nation; and, therefore, that the sole course left was to throw themselves into the arms of Austria, the na

let a consuming fire envelop the presumptuous host which has dared to violate the territory of the great nation." 87. Having by this severity stifled the spirit of insurrection in his rear, Napoleon continued his march, and on the 28th entered the great city of Brescia, situated in the neutral territory of Venice. Meanwhile, Beaulieu experienced the usual fate of a retiring army, that of being weakened by the detachments necessary to garrison the fortified places which it leaves uncov-tural ally of all regular governments. ered in its retreat. He threw twenty battalions of his best troops into Mantua, and took up a defensive position along the line of the Mincio. There he was assailed on the following day by Napoleon, who, after forcing the bridge of Borghetto, in front of his position, attacked his rearguard at Valleggio with all his cavalry, and made prisoners, in spite of the bravest efforts of the Austrian horse, twelve hundred men, and took five pieces of cannon. Upon this Beaulieu retired up the valley of the Adige, and took post at the strong position of Calliano in the Italian Tyrol.

88. When the French army entered the Venetian territory, and it had become evident that the flames of war were approaching its capital, it was warmly discussed in the Venetian senate what course the republic should pursue in the perilous circumstances that had occurred. Peschiera had been occupied by the Austrians, but, being abandoned by them, was instantly seized by the French, who insisted that, though a Venetian fortress, yet, having been taken possession of by one of the belligerent powers, it had now become the fair conquest of the other; and, at the same time, Napoleon threatened the republic with all the vengeance of France, if the Count de Lille, afterwards Louis XVIII., who had resided for some years at Verona, was not immediately compelled to leave their territories. The Republican forces, under Massena, were advancing towards Verona, and it was necessary to take a decided course. On the one hand it was urged, that France had now proclaimed principles subversive of all regular governments, and in an especial manner inimical to

On the other, it was contended that they must beware lest they mistook a temporary irruption of the Republicans for a permanent settlement; that Italy had in every age been the tomb of the French armies; that the forces of the present invader, how successful soever they had hitherto been, were unequal to a permanent occupation of the Peninsula, and would in the end yield to the persevering efforts of the Germans; that Austria, therefore, the natural enemy of Venice, and the power which coveted, would in the end attempt to seize, its territorial possessions; that their forces were now expelled from Lombardy, and could not resume the offensive for two months, a period which would suffice to the French general to destroy the republic; that interest, therefore, equally with prudence, prescribed that they should attach themselves to the cause of France, obtain thereby a barrier against the ambition of their powerful neighbour, and receive in recompense for their services part of the Italian dominions of the Austrian empire. That in so doing they must, it is true, to a certain degree modify their form of government; but that was no more than the spirit of the age required, and was absolutely indispensable to secure the preservation of their continental possessions. third party, few in numbers but resolute in purpose, contended, that the only safe course was that of an armed neutrality; that the forces of the state should be instantly raised to fifty thousand men, and either of the belligerent powers which should violate their territory be threatened with the whole vengeance of the republic.

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89. Had the Venetians possessed the But, instead of following these direcfirmness of the Roman senate, they tions, Napoleon from the first used the would have adopted the first course; most insulting and rigorous language had they been inspired by the spirit of to the Venetian commissioners. "Vethe Athenian democracy, they would nice," said he, "by daring to give an have followed the second; had they asylum to the Count de Lille, a prebeen animated by the courage of the tender to the throne of France, has deSwiss confederacy, they might have clared war against the Republic. I taken the third. In any case the re- know not why I should not reduce Vepublic would probably have been saved; rona to ashes-a town which had the for it is impossible to consider the long presumption to esteem itself the capiand equal struggle which ensued round tal of France." He declared to them Mantua, between France and Austria, that he would carry that threat into without being convinced that a con- execution that very night, if an immesiderable body, even of Italian troops, diate surrender did not take place. The might then have turned the balance. The perfidy of his views against the RepubVenetian government possessed a coun- lic of St Mark, even at this early period, try inhabited by three millions of souls; was fully evinced in his secret despatch the capital was beyond the reach of at- to the Directory on 7th June. "If tack; their army could easily be raised your object," said he, "is to extract to fifty thousand men; thirteen regi- five or six millions out of Venice, I ments of Sclavonians in their service have secured for you a pretence for a were good troops; their fleet ruled the rupture. You may demand it as an Adriatic. But Venice was worn out indemnity for the combat of Borghetto, and corrupted; its nobles, drowned in which I was obliged to sustain to take pleasure, were destitute of energy; its Peschiera. If you have more decided peasantry, accustomed to peace, were views, we must take care not to let that unequal to war; its defence, intrusted subject of quarrel drop; tell me what wholly to mercenary troops, rested on you wish, and be assured I will seize a tottering foundation. They adopted the most fitting opportunity of carryin consequence the most timid course, ing it into execution, according to cirwhich, in presence of danger, is gener- cumstances; for we must take care not ally the most perilous. They made no to have all the world on our hands at warlike preparations; they added nei- once. The truth of the affair of Peschither to their army or navy; they laid era is, that the Venetians were cruelly in no stores of provisions, but merely deceived by the Austrians, who desent commissioners to the French gen-manded a passage for fifty men, and eral to deprecate his hostility, and en- then seized the town." deavour to secure his good-will. The consequence was what might have been anticipated from conduct so unworthy of the ancient fame of Venice. The commissioners were disregarded; the war was carried on in the Venetian territories, and at its close the republic was swept from among the nations.

90. In adopting this course, Napoleon exceeded the instructions of his government; and, indeed, on him alone appears to rest the atrocious perfidy and dissimulation exercised in the sequel towards that state. The directions of the Directory were as follows: "Venice should be treated as a neutral, but not a friendly power; it has done nothing to merit the latter character."

91. Massena entered the magnificent city of Verona, the frontier city of the Venetian dominions, situated on the Adige, and a military position of the highest importance for future operations, in the beginning of June. Its position at the entrance of the great valley of the Adige, and on the high-road from the Tyrol into Lombardy, rendered it the advanced post of the French army, in covering the siege of Mantua. He occupied, at the same time, Porto-Legnago, a fortified town on the Adige, which, along with Verona, strengthened that stream, whose short and rapid course from the Alps to the Po formed the best military frontier of Italy. There he received the commissioners

of Venice, who vainly came to depre- | the ulterior measures which he should cate the victor's wrath, and induce pursue. An army of forty-five thouhim to retire from the territories of the sand men, which had so rapidly overrepublic. With such terror did his run the north of Italy, could not venmenaces inspire them, that the Vene- ture to penetrate into Germany by tian government concluded a treaty, the Tyrol-the mountains of which by which they agreed to furnish sup- were occupied by Beaulieu's forces, plies of every sort for the army, and aided by a warlike peasantry—and at secretly pay for them; and the com- the same time carry on the blockade of missioners, overawed by the command- Mantua, for which at least fifteen thouing air and stern menaces of Napoleon, sand men would be required. Morewrote to the senate, "This young man over, the southern powers of Italy were will one day have an important influ- not yet subdued; and though little forence on the destinies of his country." midable in a military point of view, they might prove highly dangerous to the blockading force, if the bulk of the Republican troops were engaged in the defiles of the Tyrol, while the French armies on the Rhine were not yet in a condition to give them any assistance. Influenced by these considerations, he resolved to take advantage of the pause in military operations which the blockade of Mantua and retreat of Beaulieu afforded, to clear his rear of enemies, and establish the French influence to the south of the Apennines.

92. The French general was now firmly established on the line of the Adige, the possession of which he always deemed of so much importance, and to the neglect of which he ascribed all the disasters of the succeeding campaigns of the French in Italy. Nothing remained but to make himself master of Mantua; and the immense efforts made by both parties to gain or keep possession of that place prove the vast importance of fortresses in modern war. Placed in the middle of unhealthy marshes, which are traversed only by five chaussées, strong in its situation, as well as from the fortifications which surround it, this town is truly the bulwark of Austria and Italy, without the possession of which the conquest of Lombardy must be deemed insecure, and that of the Hereditary States cannot be attempted. The entrances of two only of the chaussées which approached it were defended by fortifications at that time; so that by placing troops at these points, and drawing a cordon round the others, it was an easy matter to blockade the place, even with a body of troops inferior to those besieged. Serrurier sat down before this fortress, in the middle of June, with ten thousand men; and with this inconsiderable force, skilfully disposed at the entrance of the highways which crossed the lake, and round its shores, he contrived to keep in check a garrison of fourteen thousand soldiers, of whom, it is true, more than a third encumbered the hospitals of the place. As the siege of this important fortress required a considerable time, Napoleon had leisure to deliberate concerning

93. The King of Naples, alarmed at the retreat of the German troops, and fearful of having the whole forces of the Republic upon his own hands, upon the first appearance of their advance to the south solicited an armistice, which the French commander readily granted. This was immediately followed by the secession of the Neapolitan cavalry, two thousand four hundred strong, from the Imperial army. Encouraged by this defection, Napoleon resolved instantly to proceed against the Ecclesiastical and Tuscan states, in order to extinguish the hostility, which was daily becoming more inveterate, to the south of the Apennines. The excitement was extreme in all the cities of Lombardy; and every hour rendered more marked the separation between the aristocratic and democratic parties. The ardent spirits in Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Parma, and all the great towns of that fertile district, were in full revolutionary action, and a large proportion of their citizens seemed resolved to throw off the patrician influence under which they had so long continued, and establish republics on the