aspirations of these peoples, it became necessary to establish them upon a basis enabling them to exist and to play their part in support of an anti-German policy, even if that basis carried with it infringements of some of the tenets enunicated during the war. Equally well, the Allied attitude towards Roumania and, to a less extent, towards Poland, follows as a natural consequence; for, as these countries are requisite as part of the antiPrussian barrier, it was probably advisable to reward them in a way not strictly justified by the avowed objects for which the war was fought.

Whilst it only came into existence in the late summer, and after the signature of the larger treaties now under consideration, reference should be made here to the Little Entente, intended as an Allied bulwark in Central and Eastern Europe. This arrangement, though perhaps for the moment more or less still-born, may yet be of considerable significance in its relation to Germany, to Russia, and to the Balkanised States. Here we find that Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia have signed a definite alliance, which, though defensive in nature, is aimed directly at Hungary.* Over and above this alliance, Roumania is believed to have gone so far as to arrive at some sort of an understanding with one or both of these countries-an understanding supposed, at least in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, to include a condition that the return of a Habsburg to Hungary is to be considered as a casus belli. When I was in Central Europe just before Christmas, the delay, following these arrangements, seemed to be due to the fact that if the actual Alliance is to be enlarged beyond its original limits of CzechoSlovakia and Jugo-Slavia, then it should include not only Roumania, but also Poland, and perhaps Greece as well. Such an enlargement had its difficulties; for, whilst nobody can forecast the future development of events in Greece, until quite recently the relations between CzechoSlovakia and Poland were such as to place obstacles in the way of these two countries arriving at an arrangement destined to commit either party to a war for the

* The terms of this Alliance, signed on Aug. 14, 1920, were published in the Gazette de Prague' for Nov. 13 1920, and in 'The Contemporary Review for January 1921.

benefit of the other. During the last few weeks, however, France, who has always encouraged the new Entente, seems to have had a renewed success in that direction; for the Franco-Polish Agreement* and the Roumano-Polish Military Convention would appear to further the construction of this diplomatic edifice from a slightly different angle.

Coming to a detailed discussion of the situations prevailing in each of the Balkan countries, we find that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, usually called Jugo-Slavia, has an approximate area of 90,000 square miles, and an approximate population of nearly 13,000,000 souls. It is, therefore, the second largest State to fall within the confines of this article. Occupying the north-west corner of, and extending beyond, the strict confines of the Balkans, the new Triune Kingdom came into existence as a result of the decision of a representative National Assembly, held in Zagreb in October 1918, which declared the independence of the Southern Slavs from the Dual Monarchy, and as a consequence of a subsequent proclamation, issued by a Congress held at Neustad in November 1918, to the effect that a union had taken place between the formerly Austro-Hungarian Provinces and Serbia, and that Prince Alexander had been appointed Regent of the new State. The situation created by these events was subsequently recognised in documentary form by the Treaties made between the Allies and Austria and Hungary, and Jugo-Slavia received further areas of territory from Bulgaria.

Once the principle of the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy is accepted, and as the question of Macedonia, which was Serbian before the war, forms no part of the present discussion, I think, with certain comparatively minor exceptions, that the inclusion within Jugo-Slavia of her present territories is fair and satisfactory. Speaking generally, and for the moment ignoring Montenegro, that inclusion results from the declared wishes of the inhabitants, and constitutes an adequate reward for Serbia in that most of the Slavs domiciled in this part of Europe have joined hands and because she has secured access to the Adriatic. As to the

* For the text of this Agreement see 'The Times,' Feb. 22, 1921.

exceptions, firstly, on the north and in connexion with the district lying to the north and east of the Rivers Drave and Danube, it is open to argument that, whilst this was claimed by the Jugo-Slavs on historical, racial, and strategic grounds, it might well have been wiser to leave it for division between Roumania and Hungary. The great, outstanding advantages of the adoption of such a course would have been that the Danube, the Drave, and the Teiss form natural frontiers in this locality. Their acceptance as such by the Allies might, therefore, have avoided some of the evils of the three party division of an area the present allocation of which is hardly natural. On the other hand, the disadvantages of such a settlement would have been that Belgrade must have remained a frontier capital, and that a further Slav population would have been doomed to partition between Roumania and Hungary. And, secondly, on the east, although it was natural for the Serbians to desire to make Bulgaria pay the price of her war policy, there were not sufficient arguments in favour of the changes made in the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier by the Treaty of Neuilly. Indeed, with the exception of the Strumnitza area, which commanded the Vardar Valley Railway, those changes, considered merely on strategical grounds, are so unimportant to Jugo-Slavia as never to compensate her for the renewed feelings of hostility which they have created in Bulgaria.

Since the conclusion of the above-mentioned arrangements there have occurred two events connected with the foreign relations of Jugo-Slavia. Firstly, the Klagenfurt plebescite, held in October last, and under the Treaty of Saint Germain, terminated entirely to the disadvantage of the Triune Kingdom; for, as the inhabitants of the first or southern zone voted in favour of Austria, no vote has been or will be taken in the second zone. The Treaty of Rapallo * appears finally to terminate the Adriatic question, the settlement of which, as we know from the published Correspondence,† had been causing so much anxiety to Europe for more

* This Treaty was signed on Nov. 12, 1920. So far, its full text has not been published in English.

+ 'Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question.' Miscellaneous No. 2, 1920, Cmd. 586.

than two years. Presumably intended to destroy the fatal Treaty of London of April 1915, and recognised by the Allies so far as its territorial dispositions are concerned, the Rapallo arrangement effects a compromise between the rival claims of the two parties; for, whilst Italy abandons her aspirations in Dalmatia-except at Zara and in some of the islands-Jugo-Slavia has made a great sacrifice in connexion with Fiume.

Although the Government of Belgrade considers that the destiny of Montenegro was decided by the vote of a so-called National Assembly held at Podgoritza, in November 1918, and although serious opposition upon this subject is likely to be terminated by the death of King Nicholas on March 1 last, brief reference must be made to this highly disputatious question before proceeding to a discussion of the internal affairs of the new Kingdom. So much has, however, been written upon the subject and so few reliable details are available, that I propose to confine myself to some general remarks upon a matter which has been badly handled by all concerned. When I was in Montenegro in the autumn of 1913, I found there was already a definite movement in favour of union with Serbia. This state of things, coupled with what was and is the decided mystery concerning various events which took place during the war, undoubtedly created most favourable ground for pressing home the Serbian claim, both abroad and in Montenegro. Whilst, therefore, I feel strongly that the Belgrade Government has taken up a foolish and unjustifiable attitude towards the problem, I do not believe, even before the death of the King, that any considerable section of Montenegrin public opinion was opposed to some form of union. If this be so, and my impression is confirmed by the Memorandum of Major H. Temperley,* by the report of Mr Bryce,t and by the result of the election held by the Constituent Assembly last November, then the question is one of detail rather than of principle. Upon this point I think that a large number of people objected, and probably still object, to the compulsory termination of their independence and to the

* Miscellaneous No. 1 (1921), Cmd. 1123.

† Miscellaneous No. 2 (1921), Cmd. 1124.

arbitrary abrogation of their national entity. If this be the case, then the future largely depends upon the manner in which the Constituent Assembly accomplishes its task at Belgrade; for, whatever may have happened during the last few years, and as the Montenegrins surely do not wish to see the return of either of King Nicholas' sons, the promulgation of a Liberal Charter would undoubtedly have the advantage of converting all but a negligible minority of the Montenegrin people into faithful supporters of the Jugo-Slav cause.

Turning to the internal position and particularly to the economic and political situations, which are very closely allied, there are naturally still great difficulties to be overcome. From the former standpoint, one of the principal problems is concerned with the fact that whilst the Serbian has always been used to pay a comparatively high price for manufactured articles, of necessity imported from abroad, the people of the ceded territories have been accustomed to acquire what were to them home-produced goods upon more reasonable terms. Consequently, as there must now be the same tariffs throughout the Kingdom, the natural financial disadvantages to be suffered by the former inhabitants of Austria-Hungary will require careful explanation and handling. Politically speaking, too, considering that Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia each possessed various degrees of autonomy under the old régime, and that administrative autonomy is still in the hands of the local governments of each of these districts, who dispense the pre-war laws, it is obvious that any present or future attempt to create a Greater Serbia or to rob the people of privileges which they have enjoyed in the past, would be fatal to the destiny of the country. On the other hand, I was equally struck by two facts which speak well for the future. Firstly, the Prince Regent, Prince Alexander, is a material asset and a binding force in the country; for he is not only popular in Serbia and throughout the army, but the visits which His Royal Highness paid to his new possessions last year created a very favourable impression among practically all classes of the inhabitants. And secondly, I found nobody in Croatia or Slovenia (where I saw representative men of the various political