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critical temper in hearing ; a sectarian attachment to our own church or party; a morbid passion for religious excitement; a diminution in the strength of our natural affections and attachments; and an indifference to missionary exertions and objects of general benevolence;- these are some of the sure indications that the deteriorating influence of selfishness has begun to operate within us. But " the wisdom that is from “ above, is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be en“ treated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, « and without hypocrisy."
Mr. Cottle's strictures are written in an excellent spirit, and we give him full credit for being reluctant to lend a wider publicity to the horrid expressions which he cites. His book forms altogether an important but revolting document. Mr. Birt's tract is a mild and argumentative exposure of the defective character of Dr. Hawker's theology. We have seen no publication more proper to be put into the hands of any serious person who is in danger of being beguiled by Antinomian subtlety:
Art. IV. 1. Memoirs of India, comprising a brief Geographical Ac
count of the East Indies ; a succinct History of Hindostan. By
R. G. Wallace, Esq. 8vo. pp. 504. London. 1824. 2. Historical Essay on the Rise, Progress, and probable Results of
the British Dominions in India. By John Baptist Say. Svó. PP.
36. London. 1824. 3. Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India, during
the Mabratta War of 1817, 1818, and 1819. By Lieut. Col. Valentine Blacker. 4to. pp. 527. With a Volume of Maps and
Plans. London. 1821. OUR attention has of late been much taken up with works
relating to our Indian possessions, and we have, in our recent Numbers, brought down to the present period, the general summary of information respecting those extensive and important regions. Other publications on the same general subject have since come to hand, which, though they do not enable us to continue the series of historical facts to a later date, will afford us à desirable opportunity of adverting to a few points, which we have, of necessity, either left untouched, or illustrated from imperfect documents.
We regret exceedingly that we were induced to form our estimate of the general state of India on the work of Mr. Prin..> sep, rather than on that of Colonel Blacker. The latter is ines comparably the superior writer; he thinks for himself, and though he gives his opinions in a cautious manner, they are from that very circumstance entitled to the more regard. He
Is a military man, evidently well versed in the various branches of his profession, and his book may serve, if we may be allowed the phrase, as a sort of clinical lecture on the conduct of an Indian campaign. Mr. Prinsep is, as we observed in our review of his volume,' a courtly writer,' and talks of our achievements much in the style of the Government Gazette. But Col. Blacker writes with discrimination and independence : careful of reputation, he yet does not hesitate to criticise with firmness, though with fairness. From the extreme complica-' tion of the details connected with the complete history of the Pindarry and Mahratta war, his book requires much attention in the reading; it is not adapted for the window-seat, nor for an after-dinner lounge ; but, by those who will give it a regular perusal, it will be found full of interest and instruction. Its value is much enhanced by the volume of clear and admirably executed maps and plans.
In our review of Mr. Prinsep's book, in the October Number, our attention was chiefly directed to the three most conspicuous features of the singular contest which originated in the neces. sity for putting down the predatory system that had been so extensively organised by the Pindarries, and of which the leading powers of India had availed themselves to make one. more desperate effort against the galling yoke of a foreign power. The attacks made on the respective residencies of Poonali and Nagpoor, and the decisive battle of Mehidpoor, . were distinctly described by us, and though we could add some interesting particulars from Colonel Blacker's details, we shall only advert to them incidentally. The great victory of the campaign seems to have been niainly achieved by the intrepidity of Sir John Malcolm. The 'well-contested action' of Meheidpoor, says Mr. Wallace, • continued from noon till three o'clock, during which time the enemy's cavalry pressed upon the reserve, and several times attacked the baggage, but the Mysore auxiliaries behaved with great spirit, *T and met their charges in every direction. Seventy pieces of cannon were taken, together with the whole of the enemy's camp'equipagc, 'i and the plain was strewed with upwards of 3000 of their killed and ? wounded. The success of this battle was, in a great neasure, owing to the chivalrous conduct of Sir John Malcolm, who led the most }; desperate of the attacks on the left, and cheered the troops by the most fearless personal exposure. His noble and commanding figure was seen by the whole line to outstride their ardour, and his lofty plume, often waved by his right hand, was a banner of union to the line. Great in his political character, and renowned as an elegant writer, this-scientific soldier has, on various occasions, displayed an unsurpassed intrepidity, and a coolness of judgment in the hour of danger, VOL. XXII. N.S.
which promise future increase of glory, if opportunity be afforded to the exercise of the great talents which he possesses as a statesman, philosopher, and warrior.' pp. 283, 4.
There are, however, two or three points on which we made little or no comment; and the first to which we shall refer, is the conduct-we will not say unjustifiable, but we must take leave to say, that we have not yet seen any adequate justification-of Sir Thomas Hislop, commander in chief of the army of the Deccan, towards the Killedar, or commandant, of the fort of Talnier. Colonel Blacker's account is more precise and distinct than that of Mr. Wallace, but they agree in the main particulars, and we much prefer the feeling in which the latter animadverts on the transaction.
• Sir Thomas, when within a march of Talnier, had received intimation that the Killedar of that place intended to resist the occupation of his fort by British troops, although he had received the order of his sovereign to surrender it, and, upon the approach of the advanced guard, some guns, and a number of matchlocks, were fired from the walls. The fort was surrounded by deep ravines, and quite inaccessible to reconnoissance by cavalry. It was, however, closely approached by the engineers covered by light infantry; and the Killedar having returned no answer to an attempt at negotiation, the field-pieces were brought into position, and the defences of the gateway demolished to such a degree, that Sir Thomas determined upon storming it, in the hope of at least making a lodgment within. For this purpose a column of attack was formed and pushed forward to the gate. The Killedar, being alarmed at these preparations, sent out a flag of truce and solicited terms ; upon which he was desired to open his gates and surrender himself and his garrison unconditionally. After some little delay, the two outer gates were opened, and the head of the column entered. At the third gate the Killedar came out through the wicket, and surrendered himself to the adjutant-general, Colonel Conway. A party of grenadiers was then pushed forward through the wicket, and still further through another gate, but they were at length stopped by the fifth entrance being shut. The Arabs within were clamorous to have some terms mentioned, before they delivered themselves up to the mercy of Europeans ; but after some delay, the wicket of this gate was also opened from within, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray, Major Gordon, and two or three other officers entered it, followed by ten or twelve grenadiers of the Royal Scots, upon which they were attacked by the Arabs, and, before aid could be afforded, cut down. Major Gordon and Captain M'Gregor were stabbed to the heart, and Colonel Murray and two other officers wounded in several places with daggers. The gates being burst open, the storming party entered the fort, and the Arabs retreated to the stone buildings, where they continued to defend themselves until all the garrison, about 300 Arabs and Hindoos, were put to the sword. “, severe example,"
says Sir Thomas Hislop, in his report to the governor-general, “ in. deed, but absolutely necessary, and one which I have no doubt will produce the most salutary effects on the future operations in this province. The Killedar I ordered to be hanged on one of the bastions, immediately after the place fell. Whether he was accessary or not to the subsequent treachery of his men, his execution was a punishment justly due to his rebellion in the first instance, particularly after the warning he had received in the morning.”' pp 291—3.
Well may Mr. Wallace exclaim— The coldness of this language freezes the heart ;' and we perfectly agree with him, that the conduct of the garrison is probably to be attributed more to the precipitate and imprudent' manner in which our officers entered the wicket, than to premeditated intention. We have no wish to pass judgement on a case of which all the circumstances are, possibly, not before us; but of the transaction, as stated, there can, we think, be but one opinion. Sir Thomas Hislop appears to stand high in the estimation of his fellow soldiers. Lord Hastings, on another occasion, praises his ' temper and forbearance;' and Colonel Blacker eulogizes his unassuming character.'
The two most important subjects of consideration which present themselves in connexion with our Indian empire, are, first, its security, and, secondly, the responsibility it entails on its possessors. It is idle to treat, in any
than as of difficulty equal to its importance, the question of suitable policy and effective government; at the same time that it is selfish in the extreme, to consider the matter of occupancy as nothing more than a problem in general politics. The 16th chapter of Sir John Malcolm's admirable Memoir of Central India, contains a brief but able and interesting inquiry into the nature and probable permanency of our establishment in India. From the moment that the English authorities adopted the system of Dupleix, and interfered, for their own ends, in the quarrels of the native princes, their plans became those of aggression and aggrandizement. For a long series of years, the question of government was merged in that of conquest and military ascendancy; but, when our possessions became of truly Asiatic dimensions, and the great Indian powers were, one after another, blotted out of the map, it was necessary to inquire whether the old regime should be, as far as possible, preserved and perpetuated, or what new influence should be substituted in its place. Lord Wellesley first, we believe, adopted and applied the plan of subsidiary alliances. Insulating, as far as practicable, the major states, and maintaining on one frontier a commanding force, he pressed on the other with a cordon of minor principalities, dependent for their existence on their strict alliance with the Supreme Government. This plan is still adhered to, with the addition of the maintenance of a controling force at the capitals of such potentates as may still retain enough of political power and influence to make them formidable. It is quite obvious, that such a scheme of government as this, must involve jealousies, antipathies, remonstrances, and struggles, without end. No monarch is disposed to acquiesce in a state of virtual thraldom., consequent on the presence of a foreign garrison in the heart of his dominions; and hence the necessity of increasing vigilance, undeviating caution, and unrelaxing preparation.
We have been reluctantly compelled,' observes Sir John Malcolm, by events far beyond our power to control, to assume the du. ties of Lord Paramount of that great continent; and it is now confessed by all, that our dominion can rest upon no secure basis but the general tranquillity of India. Our present condition is one of apparent repose, but full of danger. With the means we had at our command, the work of force was comparatively easy; the liberality of our government gave grace to conquest, and men were for the moment satisfied to be at the feet of generous and humane conquerors. Wearied with a state of continued warfare and anarchy, they hardly regretted even the loss of power; halcyon days were anticipated, and men prostrated themselves in hopes of elevation. All these im. pressions, made by the combined effects of power, humanity, and fortune, were improved to the utmost by the character of our first
The agents of government were generally individuals who had acquired a name in the scene in which they were employed: they were unfettered by rules, and their acts were adapted to soothe the passions, and accord with the habits and prejudices, of those whom they had to conciliate or to reduce to obedience. But there are many causes which operate to make a period like this, one of short duration : and the change to a colder system of policy, and the introduction of our laws and regulations into countries immediately dependent upon us, naturally excite agitation and alarm. It is the hour in which men awake from a dream. Disgust and discontent succeed to terror and admiration; and the princes, the chiefs, and all who had enjoyed rank or influence, see nothing but a system dooming them to immediate decline and ultimate annihilation. This view of the subject applies only to the countries under our immediate sway. That government of influence and control which our condition forces us to exercise over many of our allies and dependents, presents more serious difficulties.'
Such a state of things as that so strongly and yet so correctly exhibited in this extract, is, obviously, one of extreme difficulty and delicacy. It would be easy enough to gall the dependent powers into a state of mutiny, and then to amalgamate them into the mighty mass of appropriated territory; but