Smith should arrive, which could not at the shortest be in less than a week. Moreover, though the Mahrattas were at present confident in a great numerical superiority, an advance to the attack in despite of their numbers would confound them, and raise the spirits of our own people. At the same time, if we could obtain but a partial success in the plain, it would dishearten the enemy, and prevent him from attempting any thing against our position.

The fighting commenced a few minutes after Mr. Elphinstone had reached the brigade by the Kirkee bridge. The enemy shewed immense bodies of horse on our front, and opened a heavy cannonade from many guns, but chiefly from a distance. The fire was returned from the four six-pounders of the brigade, two of which were placed on each flank of the Europeans. In the mean time, the Mahrattas attempted to push bodies of horse round our flank, in which manœuvre they partly succeeded. A spirited charge was then made in close column by one of Gokla's battalions, commanded by Pinto, a Portuguese officer. It was directed against the left of our line, where the first battalion of the seventh was posted. The battalion was driven back after a sharp contest, with the loss of Pinto and many other men; but the first battalion of the seventh, in its eagerness to follow up the success, for the purpose of capturing the guns of the repulsed, became separated from the general line of the brigade. Our battalion was in considerable danger, the horse having got round both its flanks; but Colonel Burr hastening to the post with a part of the European regiment, while the two guns on its left were served with great effect, was enabled to restore the day, bring back the battalion into line, and afterwards form it (en potence), at right angles with the line, to check any further ill consequence from the enemy's out-flanking us. Major Ford had by this time brought up his battalions on the right, which had a similar effect on that flank. Prinsep, pp. 244-246.

This was the only instance in which the Mahrattas came to close quarters with us. At night-fall, our troops returned to Kirkee. Our loss is stated at 18 killed and 57 wounded. The enemy left 500 on the field. Bajee Row, seeing fresh horse coming in from Seroor, gave us no further molestation, but encamped his army on the spot of our former cantonment. In the mean while, General Smith, finding all communication intercepted, marched with his division towards Poonah. He had no regular cavalry with him, the second of the Madras not having joined, and only 500 of the horse auxiliaries altogether. He was surrounded on his march, on every side, and lost part of his baggage. On the 13th, he arrived at Poonah, and the next day was fixed for the attack on the enemy's camp. The Peishwa's army opposed the passage of the river, which was effected in good order, and Colonel Milne took up his ground for the night on the enemy's right flank. Before day-light next morning, the combined attack was commenced; but the

camp was deserted: the Peishwa and his army had quietly retired during the night, leaving the tents standing. He carried off all his guns except one of an enormous size, which he was obliged to leave behind him. The city surrendered during the day, and on the 19th, General Smith prepared for the pursuit of the fugitive Peishwa.

Appoo Saib, the Nagpoor Rajah, gave us similar employment. No sooner were the hostile designs of Bajee Row known at Nagpoor, than he came at once to the resolution of making common cause with the head of the Mahratta enterprise, nor did the news of the affair at Poonah abate his preparations. He was, however, long vacillating from one side to the other. But, in the public interviews between the Rajah and our resident Mr. Jenkins, there was the accustomed cordiality. Appoo Saib even affected to blame Bajee Row for his treachery. But, upon the night of the 24th of November, Mr. Jenkins was informed that a khilat (a dress of honour) had arrived for the Rajah from Poonah, and that his highness intended to go in state to his camp the next day, to be formally invested with it, and to assume the juree putka (golden streamer), an emblem of high command in the Mahratta armies, which, with the title of Senuputtee, the Peishwa had conferred upon him. Remonstrance was of no avail, and Mr. Jenkins called in the brigade from its cantonment, about three miles west of the city, to post it in the best attitude for defence of the Residency. On the 26th, symptoms of hostility became still more manifest; large masses of the Rajah's cavalry began shewing themselves on all sides, and every gun was wheeled out of the arsenal, and brought to bear upon some part of our position. Our force at Nagpoor consisted of two battalions of native infantry, (but both had been reduced by sickness,) with the two companies forming the President's escort, three troops of Bengal cavalry, and a detachment of artillery with four sixpounders, the whole under the command of Lieut. Col. Scott.

The Residency,' says Mr. Prinsep, lies to the west of the city of Nagpoor, and is separated from it by a small ridge running north and south, having two hills at its extremities, called the Seetabuldee hills, about 380 yards apart. That to the north was the higher, but the smaller of the two; upon it were posted 300 men of the 24th N. I., with one of the six-pounders under the command of Captain Sadler. The 20th and the escort were stationed on the larger hill, with the rest of the 24th and of the artillery; and the three troops of cavalry in the grounds of the Residency, with some light infantry to keep off the hovering horse of the enemy, but under orders not to advance into the plain against them. The women and valuables were lodged at the Residency.

At sunset of the 26th of November, as our picquets were placing, they were fired upon by the Rajah's Arab infantry. Immediately afterwards, his artillery opened on our position, and was answered by us from the hills. Our men were much exposed, particularly those on the smaller hill, whose summit was not broad enough to afford any protection. There was also a bazar to the north-east of this hill, that approached close to its foot; here were posted the Rajah's Arab infantry, which kept up a galling fire from under cover of the huts and houses, which cut up our people most severely. The firing did not cease with the day-light, but continued with little intermission till about two in the morning, by which time we had sustained a very heavy loss, particularly on the smaller hill, where some assaults were attempted and repulsed with difficulty. Captain Sadler was killed in the defence of this important point.

' After two o'clock, there was an intermission of the enemy's fire for some hours, with only now and then an occasional shot. Our troops availed themselves of it, to strengthen their position, and make up fresh cartridges. This was an awful moment for those who were at leisure to calculate upon the prospects of the morrow. We had already suffered much; and if the attack were renewed with tolerable perseverance, it was quite manifest that our troops, however well they might behave, must in the end be overpowered; and this seemed to be their design. From the unavoidable haste with which the position on the Seetabuldee hills had been occupied, as well as the want of entrenching tools, no artificial defences had been added to the natural strength of the place. This omission was now remedied in the best manner the time would allow, by placing along the exposed brow of the hills, especially of the smaller one, sacks of flour and wheat, or any thing capable of affording cover to the men. It was also deemed proper to confine the defence of the latter to the summit, many men having been lost from being placed in exposed situations on the declivity. The 24th were also relieved early in the morning by a detachment from the 20th, and by the escort, to whom was entrusted the defence of this important post, the key of the whole position.

At day-break, the fire recommenced with more fury than before, additional guns having been brought to bear during the night. The enemy fought with increasing confidence, and closed upon us during the forenoon. The Arabs were particularly conspicuous for their courage, and to them had been entrusted the assault of the smaller hill. Goles of horse also shewed themselves near the grounds of the Residency, so as to oblige Captain Fitzgerald, who commanded the cavalry, to retire further within, in order to prevent any sudden coupde-main in that quarter. About ten in the morning, the accidental explosion of a tumbril on the smaller hill, occasioned some confusion, and so much injured the screw of the gun, as to render it for some minutes unserviceable. The Arabs saw their opportunity, and rushed forward with loud cries to storm the hill. Our men were disconcerted, and the smallness of the total force having made it impossible to have a support ready for such an extremity, the hill was carried before the gun and the wounded could be brought off: the latter

were put to the sword. The Arabs immediately turned the gun against our post on the larger hill, and with it, aided by two of their own, opened a destructive fire on our remaining position. The first shot killed Mr. Neven, the surgeon, and Lieut. Clarke of the 20th. The fire was so destructive, as to distress greatly the troops on the Jarger hill. The Arabs, too flushed with their success, advanced in great numbers along the ridge, while the main body of the enemy in the plain to the south were closing fast. The prospect was most discouraging, and to add to the difficulty of the crisis, an alarm had spread among the Seapoy families and followers, and their shrieks not a little damped the courage of the native troops. They would scarcely have sustained a general assault, which the enemy seemed evidently to meditate.' Prinsep. pp. 252-255.

Captain Fitzgerald, who had kept himself in reserve in the Residency grounds, till a couple of guns were actually brought to bear upon him, saw that the case was of the last extremity, and he resolved therefore to charge the gole that was nearest, to capture, if possible, the guns that annoyed him. He himself led the column, and as soon as 30 or 40 men had got over the nullah (stream) in front of the Residency, advanced at once upon the enemy, who retired as he advanced, till he had passed the guns, when they made a demonstration of surrounding his small party, upon which he called a halt. The rest of the cavalry had judiciously stopped as they reached the guns, which they instantly turned on the Mahrattas, kept them at a distance by a brisk fire, and captured two more guns, which they spiked, dragging the others back to the Residency. Our men now felt their spirits reviving, and recommenced their firing, watching the opportunity of recovering their smaller gun from the Arabs, which fortunately soon occurred, the explosion of a tumbril having put them into a temporary confusion. Instantly, a party darted from the larger hill, drove the Arabs from the post with the bayonet, and recovered not only our own gun, but captured two others. The tide had now turned. The troops of the enemy gave way on every side, and a brilliant charge was made on them by Cornet Smith, which finally dispersed them, and put us in possession of all their guns. Thus ended a trying and most disproportionate contest, the fatigues and anxieties of which lasted more than eighteen hours. We had not altogether more than 13 or 1400 fighting men; whereas the Rajah had upwards of 10,000 infantry, and an equal number of horse! We lost 333, a fourth part of those engaged.

18

We have been thus particular in the detail of these two affairs so glorious to the British arms, because the effect they produced, gave the Mahrattas a distrust of themselves, which VOL. XXII. N.S. 2 F

was highly favourable to the views of Lord Hastings. Finding their utmost resources baffled by mere detachments, they gave way to despondency, and both Bajee Row and Appoo Saib were sensible of their error when it was too late. The former remained a proscribed and friendless fugitive. Appoo Saib endeavoured to atone for his treachery by the promptitude of his submission; but in vain. A formidable force immediately collected at Nagpoor, and General Doveton, after a long and harassing march, succeeded in enforcing upon the Rajah such terms as would reduce him to a state of entire dependence. His instant surrender being demanded, after some hesitation, he delivered himself up; but the artillery not having been surrendered according to the terms of the treaty, and some new treachery being clearly detected, his camp and artillery were taken by storm, with fifty elephants and all his camp equipage. The city was surrounded, and General Doveton sent for a sufficient battering-train to commence his operations against it, when the Arabs proposed to march out with their families, baggage, and arms, a proposition which was instantly accepted. Thus, our military operations against the Bhoosla state were brought to a conclusion within a month from the commencement of hostilities. The deposition of Appoo Saib was deemed indispensable as a punishment for his defection at so critical a period, and from a long uniform experience, that he could no longer be entrusted even with the semblance of authority; a member of a remote branch of his family was, therefore, placed on the Guttee in his stead.

There are, we are aware, reasoners who are disposed to call into question these summary acts of power, and to examine them by the test of abstract justice. But Bajee Row and Appoo Saib are justly chargeable with a breach of hospitality and a violation of the law of nations, in their attack upon the sacred character of the Residents, which ought to have been respected and held inviolable. With regard to the treachery of secret previous preparation, if we allow a native power the abstract right of deserting our alliance at all, we must concede to him this right also, for, without the one, he could not exercise the other. It is an article in all our subsidiary alliances, that a military force shall be stationed at the capital. Open preparations for war would necessarily be anticipated, and the design frustrated by calling the Resident's force into immediate action against the person of the prince. The treachery, therefore, of the Mahratta chiefs consisted in the mere act of defection; for it is of the essence of the contract, that, although accepted by the native powers for probably a mere present advantage, or to avoid a temporary evil, the con