torial cessions. The states thus in alliance with us engage to discontinue all political negotiation with the other powers of India, unless in concert with ourselves; to submit all claims or controversies to our arbitration, and above all, that, in cases of exigency, the whole resources of the allies should be under our command and direction. Of these, the Nizam was the most attached to the British Government, chiefly from a sense of weakness, and the conviction that he could not stand, if deprived of our protection. Not so the Peishwah. It was a hollow, insincere connexion, and the provident mind of Lord Wellesley had, so long ago as 1804, foreseen the rupture which, fourteen years afterwards, broke out between the British Government and Bajee Row. Over the three remaining powers, our ascendancy was firmly fixed. But there was another class of states under our protection, who paid no subsidy, and whom we were not under an obligation to protect by a specific force. These were the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, the Bundela chiefs, and the Sheikhs. The first of these viewed us with fear and distrust.

bas.

His whole conduct,' says Mr. Prinsep, has shewn him to be the most hostile in heart and disposition of all the princes of India. Feeling that his former success had made him the rallying point of disaffection from all quarters, he seemed evidently to court that dangerous pre-eminence, and to assume the attitude of one, that rather sought than avoided another occasion of trying his fortune against us Prinsep, p. 9.

The other protected chiefs were in general contented. But it would have been unreasonable to expect that so extended a system of alliance, composed of materials so various and discordant, should not be liable to constant interruption from the dispositions and caprices of the several members of the confederations. It required, therefore, the greatest forbearance towards all these different sentiments, and great providence and caution, to manage so vast a machine of policy with any kind of success.

With other states, we had no other connexion than that of amity. These were, the Scindiah, the Bhoosla, and the Holkar families. British residents were stationed at the courts of the former two; but the Holkar family did not require it, for, after the death of Jeswunt Row Holkar, the power which his personal ability had built up, was crumbling fast into decay. Up to 1814, the disposition of Scindiah was favourable. He found us punctual in our payment of the seven lack of rupees we had stipulated to pay both him and his chiefs; and feeling that as long as he abstained from the territories of our

actual allies, we left him to pursue his own schemes of plander or invasion, within the limits from which he had withdrawn, he had been sensible of no restraints from our superiority. The state of Holkar's court was similar. But still, amidst all this seeming concord, there was an unsoundness in the system; and its dissolution had been predicted by many, at the period when its foundations were first laid. For even before 1814, it had been manifest that the settlement of 1805, instead of having a tendency to wean the population of India from habits of military adventure, rather multiplied the inducements and the opportunities to engage in predatory warfare.

The minds of the authorities at home, to whom Lord Hastings submitted the growing mischief of the Pindarrees, were not sufficiently on a level with the exigency. In September 1816, instructions arrived from England, authorizing him to expel them from the territory they had usurped in Malwa and Saugor, and to enter into such negotiations with the neighbouring chieftains, as would prevent their re-establishment. The Marquis of Hastings saw the full extent of this portentous evil, and he saw also the remedies which it required.

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• The evil,' says Lieut. White, existed in the want of a supreme and controlling power, possessing a decided superiority in character and resources, which, interposing its authority, could organize a league of the different states, of whose confederation the primary object should be the preservation of the public tranquillity by uniting their efforts to crush the lawless banditti who were let loose. upon society. 2ndly. The entire dislocation of political society in central India, the perpetual contests for dominion which it exhibited, rendered it necessary, that there should be some definite boundary which would restrain the pretensions of the rival parties; and by offering the guarantee of their respective possessions, and binding each member of the league to respect their mutual territories, there appeared a fair prospect of restoring tranquillity to these troubled regions. The commanding attitude of the British government naturally pointed it out as the only power which could organize the league, or which had sufficient authority to enforce the decrees of this Asiatic congress. Such were the views entertained by Lord Hastings, as indispensable to the erection of a permanent political system in central India. The breaking up of the Mussulman empire, and the decline of the power of the Scindiah and Holkar, had removed every efficient check, and rendered central India a vast theatre of anarchy and misrule. Possessing no government which could control the malignant and predatory character of its population, there existed an imperious call that Britain should step forward and protect the rights of out. raged humanity.' White, pp. 215, 16.

We are disposed to concur in the wisdom of Lord Hastings's

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policy. Had the other plan been prosecuted, what would have resulted? Driven out of Malwa, they would have found an asylum with Holkah and Scindiah. The nature of the evil was such, that nothing short of its complete extirpation could be remedial of it. It was, therefore, announced to the Mahratta states, that the period was arrived, when it was incumbent upon them either to join in the league for the extirpation of the common foe, or to incur the hostility of the British Government. It was also intimated to the independent states of Rajapootana and Bhopaul, that they would be included in the league, on the consideration of paying a moderate sum to the British Government, as the price of protection. But we confess that, according to our notions of political morality, there are some parts of the policy which are of ambiguous justice. Considering the avowed connexion between Scindiah and Holkar and the Pindarree leaders, it was not unjust that they should be called upon to unite in their suppression. The case, we think, was different with the other states. All compulsory aid is at best feebleness. It could be justified only on the principle that these powers could not withstand the Pindarrees, and that their resources would be employed against us. But this is improbable. The safety of the Pindarrees was in perpetual flight. They could not organize a systematic resistance. If they once halted, they were lost.

The whole disposable force of the three Presidencies was ordered into the field, and presented a magnificent spectacle of British resources. Not fewer than 100,000 regular troops and 20,000 irregulars were destined to act against the Pindarrees. On the side of Hindostan, four divisions, under the personal command of Lord Hastings, were directed to act offensively, while two divisions were reserved for the protection of the frontier; four others were ready for operations on the Madras and Bombay frontier, and one was reserved for the defence of our territory. Advancing simultaneously and on an extended base, this powerful force was enabled to sweep the whole of Central India, to hem in the Pindarrees within the different divisions, and to render their destruction inevitable. On the 16th of October 1817, Lord Hastings assumed the command of the grand army, and immediately advanced against Scindiah's capital. This chieftain had not only manifested extreme reluctance to co-operate with the British, but had given support and encouragement to the Pindarrees. The appearance of a powerful British army compelled him to join the confederation; and he agreed to furnish 5000 horse, to be at the disposal of the British Government, and under the command of a British officer, in furtherance of the common

object. As a security for the fulfilment of his engagements, he ceded to us the forts of Asseer-gur and Hindia during the war. The measures of the Governor-General were crowned with equal success in his negotiations with Ameer-Khan, who agreed to disband his army on condition of having secured to him the integrity of his dominions which he held under a grant of Holkar. Thus, the important district of Rajah-pootana was liberated from 30,000 spoilers, educated and disciplined to depredation, some of whom adopted more innocent pursuits, either becoming occupiers of lands ceded to them for that purpose, or enlisting into our own service.

While the British operations were going on with unexampled success against the Pindarrees, events happened which threw a sudden gloom over our prospects, and were pregnant with the utmost peril to the British power in India;-the unexpected revolt of the Peishwa at Poonah, and the defection of the Nagpoor Rajah. The predisposing causes to this disaffection were various. Cherishing a rooted aversion to our ascendancy, they looked at the immense force which we had collected, and saw, or thought they saw in it, the signal of their own extinction. Under these erroneous impressions, the Peishwah proceeded to excite a general confederacy against us. The hollow friendship of Scindiah, Holkar, and the Nagpoor Rajah interposed but slight impediments to the execution of this project. They were eager to enter into the league; but their jealousies and disunions rendered it a loose and infirm compact. As it generally happens in these cases, they acted without plan or concert. Instead of reserving their preparations for the season when alone they could be effectual, when our forces were scattered into their cantonments, and might have been surprised, they opened their hostilities at a period when we had the most powerful armies in the field, and when the strongest of the Mahrattas, Scindia, was compelled to yield to our overwhelming superiority. The Peishwah Bajee Row's intentions of heading the league, had long been evident to Mr. Elphinstone, our resident at that court. Towards the end of October, Mah ratta troops began to collect at Poona. They encamped close round the cantonment of our subsidiary brigade, whose situ ation, calculated for the defence of the city from external attack, was particularly open to surprise, when menaced by an enemy from within and without. Their situation grew every day more alarming. Each successive corps encroached upon their cantonment, and the horsemen rode blustering and pranc ing about, as is usual with Indian troops when their designs are unfriendly. Mr. Elphinstone had observed these appearances, and having remonstrated ineffectually with Bajee Row, he re

solved to move the brigade to Kirkee, and despatched letters for the European detachment, which, by a forced march, reached Kirkee on the 1st of November.

The city of Poona stands on the right bank of the Moota-moola river, which runs from east to west, taking its name from the two streams which unite to the north-west of the town. Just at the point of the confluence, stood the British Residency, separated from the city by the Moota, while the Moola came down with a sweep from the north. This latter river was fordable opposite to the Residency; and about a mile up the stream, there was a good bridge over it, above which the river took a semicircular reach to the north. At the western extremity of the semicircle, lies the village of Kirkee, between which and the river to the east, is an admirable position for a brigade to occupy, protected by the river in the rear and on the left, and supported on the right flank by the village. The original cantonment was on the right bank of the Moota-moola east of the city, and close upon it, so that both the city and the Moota lav between the brigade and the Residency. By moving the troops to Kirkee, the Residency lay, on the contrary, between them and the enemy, forming an advanced position towards the city. Major Ford's battalions were cantoned at Dhapoora, a few miles distant to the west.' Prinsep. p. 240. "Every day produced more decisive symptoms of hostility. Mr. Elphinstone, therefore, thought it right to increase his force by the light battalion that had been ordered to Seroor by General Smith, as soon as he had heard of the disaffection which was going on at Poona. The news of its approach reached Bajee Row on the 5th, and his army was instantly in motion. The Resident lost no time in proceeding to the brigade. He was no sooner gone, than the Peishwa joined his army, which lay a little south-west of Poona, and immediately advanced on the Residency, took possession of the houses, which were plundered and burnt, and among these, the books and papers of Mr. Elphinstone, an irreparable loss.

The position at Kirkee was admirably adapted to purposes of defence, but it was agreed by the Resident and Colonel Burr, that the brigade should advance and fight its battle in the plain between Kirkee and the city. The plan was highly judicious; for it was uncertain how far the seapoys had been proof against the late attempts to seduce them, and it was desirable therefore, to risk something for the sake of inspiring them with additional confidence in themselves and their cause; whereas to coop them up in a defensive position, exposed to the taunts and insults of the Mahratta cavalry, would have had a most disheartening effect, and must have increased the desertions by giving the enemy a shew of superiority. The enemy were besides well provided with artillery, which would have enabled them to give great annoyance to the position, and to wear out the spirits of the men by a succession of casualties, before General