of moneys 23. Every receiver appointed as aforesaid shall pay and 23 & 24 Vict. apply all the money received by him in the first place in dis- c. 145, s. 23. charge of all taxes, rates and assessments whatsoever, and in Application payment of his commission as aforesaid, and of the premiums on received by the insurances, if any, and in the next place in payment of all him. the interest accruing due in respect of any principal money then charged on the property over which he is receiver, or on any part thereof, and, subject as aforesaid, shall pay all the residue of such money to the person for the time being entitled to the property subject to the charge, his executors, administrators or assigns. 24. The powers and provisions contained in this part of this This part to act relate only to mortgages or charges made to secure money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, or to secure an existing or future debt. [Part III. of the present act (sects. 25 to 30), which contained provisions as to the investment of trust funds and the appointment and powers of trustees and executors, has been repealed by sect. 71 of the Conv. Act, 1881, but new provisions dealing respectively with the same subject-matter as the repealed sections will be found in the Trustee Act, 1893, ss. 1, 10, 20, 21, and in sect. 43 of the Conv. Act, 1881. The new provisions are in every case retrospective, and may be cumulative (see Re Lloyd, 1888, W. N. 20). Part III. of the present act has accordingly been omitted.] relate to charges by way of mortgage only. PART IV. General Provisions. execute 31. For the purposes of this act, a person shall be deemed to Tenants for be entitled to the possession or to the receipt of the rents and life, &c. may income of land or personal property, although his estate may powers, notbe charged or incumbered, either by himself or by any former withstanding owner, or otherwise howsoever to any extent; but the estates incumbrances. or interests of the parties entitled to any such charge or incumbrance shall not be affected by the acts of the person entitled to the possession or to the receipt of the rents and income as aforesaid, unless they shall concur therein. PART IV. of the present act has been repealed by sect. 64 of the S. L. A. 1881, but has been retained in connection with Parts I. and II. (see note ante, p. 537). may be 32. None of the powers or incidents hereby conferred or Powers, &c. annexed to particular offices, estates, or circumstances, shall hereby given take effect or be exerciseable if it is declared in the deed, will, negatived by or other instrument creating such offices, estates, or circum- express declastances that they shall not take effect; and where there is no such declaration, then if any variations or limitations of any of ration. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 32. No persons other than under the settlement, &c. to be affected. the powers or incidents hereby conferred or annexed are contained in such deed, will, or other instrument, such powers or incidents shall be exerciseable or shall take effect only subject to such variations or limitations. 33. Nothing in this act contained shall be deemed to emthose entitled power any trustees or other persons to deal with or affect the estates or rights of any persons soever, except to the extent to which they might have dealt with or affected the estates or rights of such persons if the deed, will, or other instrument under which such trustees or other persons are empowered to act had contained express powers for such trustees or other persons so to deal with or affect such estates or rights. Commence ment of act. Extent of act. 34. The provisions contained in this act shall, except as hereinbefore otherwise provided, extend only to persons entitled or acting under a deed, will, codicil, or other instrument executed after the passing of this act, or under a will or codicil confirmed or revived by a codicil executed after that date. 35. This act shall not extend to Scotland. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 1. Forty years substituted for sixty VI. THE VENDOR AND PURCHASER ACT, 1874. 37 & 38 VICT. c. 78, ss. 1-3, 4, 5, 7—10. 1. In the completion of any contract of sale of land made after the thirty-first day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four, and subject to any stipulation to the contrary in the contract, forty years shall be substituted as the years as the period of commencement of title which a purchaser may require in place of sixty years, the present period of such commencement; nevertheless earlier title than forty years may be required in cases similar to those in which earlier title than sixty years may now be required. root of title. Rules for regulating obligations In the case of a sale of leaseholds the deed creating the term, even where dated more than forty years before contract, must be abstracted and produced; but dealings prior to the necessary commencement of title need not be abstracted, unless under special circumstances (Williams v. Spargo, 1893, W. N. 100; see Re Stamford and Knight, 1900, 1 Ch. 287). If the title is a possessory one, forty years' possession must be proved (Jacobs v. Revell, 1900, 2 Ch. 858). 2. In the completion of any such contract as aforesaid, and subject to any stipulation to the contrary in the contract, the obligations and rights of vendor and purchaser shall be lated by the following rules; that is to say, First. Under a contract to grant or assign a term of years, and rights of whether derived or to be derived out of a freehold or lease- vendor and purchaser. hold estate, the intended lessee or assign shall not be entitled to call for the title to the freehold; Second. Recitals, statements, and descriptions of facts, matters, and parties contained in deeds, instruments, acts of Parliament, or statutory declarations, twenty years old at the date of the contract, shall, unless and except so far as they shall be proved to be inaccurate, be taken to be sufficient evidence of the truth of such facts, matters, and descriptions; Third. The inability of the vendor to furnish the purchaser with a legal covenant to produce and furnish copies of documents of title shall not be an objection to title in case the purchaser will, on the completion of the contract, have an equitable right to the production of such documents; Fourth. Such covenants for production as the purchaser can and shall require shall be furnished at his expense, and the vendor shall bear the expense of perusal and execution on behalf of and by himself, and on behalf of and by necessary parties other than the purchaser; Fifth. Where the vendor retains any part of an estate to which any documents of title relate he shall be entitled to retain such documents. The first rule controls the right of a litigant in an action for specific performance to production of deeds, where there is merely a general denial of the title of the other party; but the rule does not prevent the title being shown to be bad aliunde (Jones v. Watts, 43 Ch. Div. 574). An agreement to grant a right of way for a term is within the rule (S. C.). The rule does not prevent a lessee being affected with constructive notice of his lessor's title (Patman v. Harland, 17 Ch. D. 353). In connection with this rule, see Conv. Act, 1881, s. 3 (1), post, p. 554, and s. 13 (1), post, p. 568. Under the second rule, it was held that a recital in a deed more than twenty years old that the vendor was seised in fee simple prevented a purchaser from demanding any abstract of prior title (Bolton v. School Board for London, 7 Ch. D. 766). So a recital that a sale was made in pursuance of a trust for sale precluded a requisition as to whether it was a valid exercise of that trust (Re Marsh and Granville, 24 Ch. D. 11). Under the fifth rule it was held, where a mortgage comprised land and policies, and the mortgagee sold the land and retained the policies, that the purchaser was entitled to have the mortgage deed, the rule referring only to a retainer of land (Re Williams and Newcastle, 1897, 2 Ch. 144). Trustees may sell or buy subject to this section (Trustee Act, 1893, s. 15, post). As to covenants for production, see Conv. Act, 1881, s. 9, post, p. 583. [Sect. 3 has been replaced by sect. 15 of the Trustee Act, 1893.] 4. The legal personal representative of a mortgagee of a free- Legal perhold estate, or of a copyhold estate to which the mortgagee shall sonal repre sentative may 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 4. convey legal estate of mortgaged property. Bare legal estate in fee have been admitted, may, on payment of all sums secured by the mortgage, convey or surrender the mortgaged estate, whether the mortgage be in form an assurance subject to redemption, or an assurance upon trust. This section has been repealed by the Conv. Act, 1881, s. 30 (2), post, p. 585. 5. Upon the death of a bare trustee of any corporeal or incorporeal hereditament of which such trustee was seised in simple to vest fee simple, such hereditament shall vest like chattel real in administrator. the legal personal representative from time to time of such trustee. in executor or Married woman who is a bare trustee, may convey, &c. Protection and priority by legal estates and tacking not Sect. 5 was, as to England, repealed and re-enacted in a limited form by the Land Transfer Act, 1875, s. 48. The last-named section has been repealed by the Conv. Act, 1881, s. 30 (2); which see, post, p. 585. Sect. 5 has been repealed, as to Ireland, by the Conv. Act, 1881, s. 73, post, p. 605. As to what was a bare trustee within the section, see Christie v. Ovington (1 Ch. D. 279); Re Cunningham and Frayling (1891, 2 Ch. 567); Morgan v. Swansea Authority (9 Ch. D. 582). 6. When any freehold or copyhold hereditament shall be vested in a married woman as a bare trustee, she may convey or surrender the same as if she were a feme sole. A married woman who was a trustee for sale was held (after order for sale and payment of purchase-money into court) to be a bare trustee within this section (Re Docura, Docura v. Faith, 29 Ch. D. 693). See now sect. 16 of the Trustee Act, 1893 (post), and cases there quoted. 7. After the commencement of this act, no priority or protection shall be given or allowed to any estate, right, or interest in land by reason of such estate, right, or interest being protected by or tacked to any legal or other estate or interest in to be allowed. such land; and full effect shall be given in every court to this provision, although the person claiming such priority or protection as aforesaid shall claim as a purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice: Provided always, that this section shall not take away from any estate, right, title, or interest any priority or protection which but for this section would have been given or allowed thereto as against any estate or interest existing before the commencement of this act. Non-registra- Middlesex, certain cases. This section was repealed as to England by the Land Transfer Act, 1875, s. 129; and as to Ireland by the Conv. Act, 1881, s. 73. See Robinson v. Trevor, 12 Q. B. D. 423. 8. Where the will of a testator devising land in Middlesex or Yorkshire has not been registered within the period allowed by law in that behalf, an assurance of such land to a purchaser or mortgagee by the devisee or by someone deriving title under him shall, if registered before, take precedence of and prevail 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 8. over any assurance from the testator's heir-at-law. Wills must be registered in Middlesex within six months from the death (7 Anne, c. 20, ss. 1 and 8; see the Land Registry (Middlesex Deed) Act, 1891; Re Cooper, Cooper v. Vesey, 20 Ch. Div. 611). As to Yorkshire, see now the Yorkshire Regis. Act, 1884, ss. 4 and 14; and before that act, 8 Geo. II. c. 6, and 6 Anne, c. 35; Chadwick v. Turner, 1 Ch. 310. may obtain to requisitions 9. A vendor or purchaser of real or leasehold estate in Vendor or England, or their representatives respectively, may at any purchaser time or times and from time to time apply in a summary decision of way to a judge of the Court of Chancery in England in judge in chambers, in respect of any requisitions or objections, or any chambers as claim for compensation, or any other question arising out of or objections, or connected with the contract, (not being a question affecting or compensathe existence or validity of the contract,) and the judge shall tion, &c. make such order upon the application as to him shall appear just, and shall order how and by whom all or any of the costs of and incident to the application shall be borne and paid. A vendor or purchaser of real or leasehold estate in Ireland, or their representatives respectively, may in like manner and for the same purpose apply to a judge of the Court of Chancery in Ireland, and the judge shall make such order upon the application as to him shall appear just, and shall order how and by whom all or any of the costs of and incident to the application shall be borne and paid. In an action for specific performance of a contract as to real estate an Cases under ordinary form of relief is as follows:-The court (1) makes a declaration this section. establishing the contract; (2) directs a reference as to title; and (3) gives directions consequent on the result of the reference (Seton, 6th ed. 2206, 2226, 2239). Questions between lessor and lessee arising on a contract to grant a lease have been treated as falling within the act (Re Lander and Bagley, 1892, 3 Ch. 41; see Re Anderton and Milner, 45 Ch. D. 476; Re Stephenson and Cox, 36 S. J. 287). A question as to a voluntary gift, which was held not to be within the act, was yet determined under it, counsel admitting a contract for nominal consideration (Re Salisbury, 23 W. R. 824). According to the words of this section the parties cannot, upon an application under it, question either the existence or the validity of the contract, e.g., on the ground of fraud (Re Hargreaves and Thompson, 32 Ch. Div. 459; see Re Davis and Cavey, 40 Ch. D. 608; Re Sandbach and Edmondson, 1891, 1 Ch. 102). But it is only the existence and validity of the contract, in its inception, which cannot be questioned; and therefore questions as to rescission can be dealt with (Re Jackson and Woodburn, 37 Ch. D. 47). Questions of construction arising on the contract as it stands should be decided, although grounds may exist for an action for rescission (Re Hughes and Ashley, 1900, 2 Ch. 595; Re Wallis and Barnard, 1899, 2 Ch. 515; see Re Lander and Bagley, 1892, 3 Ch. 50, where a question of construction was decided, the result of the decision being to show that there was a valid subsisting agreement). An application under this section cannot be treated as if an action had been brought (Re Hargreaves and Thompson, 32 Ch. D. 456). But whatever could be done in chambers upon reference as to title where the contract had been established can be done (Re Burroughs, Lynn and |