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was held that the old law was thereby revived, and that an administrator 63 & 64 Vict. had committed a devastavit by paying a simple contract debt before a c. 26, s. 2. judgment debt, though he had no notice of the latter (Fuller v. Redman (No. 1), 26 Beav. 600). This decision led to the passing of sects. 3 and 4 of the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1860, which provided that without registration and re-registration no judgment should have any preference against heirs, executors, or administrators in their administration of estates. And under sect. 3 it was held that an unregistered judgment was not entitled to any priority over simple contract debts (Van Gheluive v. Nerinckx, 21 Ch. D. 189; Re Turner, Turner v. Waller, 12 W. R. 337; 33 L. J. Ch. 232; Kemp v. Waddingham, L. R. 1 Q. B. 358; see Evans v. Williams, 2 Dr. & Sm. 224). Registration, however, was not necessary to give priority in the case of judgments against executors and administrators (Jennings v. Rigby, 33 Beav. 198; Re Williams, 15 Eq. 270).

By sub-sect. 3 of the present section no entry is to be made in the Register of Judgments kept under sect. 19 of the Judgments Act, 1838 (see R. S. C., Ord. 61, r. 1), except under an order of the court; and by sect. 5 of the present act, sects. 3 and 4 of the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1860, have been repealed. In the result, it would seem that the old law has been revived, and that payment by an executor or administrator out of legal assets of a simple contract debt before a judgment debt, even where he had no notice of the latter, may be a devastavit (see Fuller v. Redman (No. 1), 26 Beav. 600). Consider Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 38, sub-s. 2 (a); which, however, does not seem to apply in the present case.

Vict. c. 51.

3. Section six of the Land Charges Registration and Searches Amendments Act, 1888, shall apply to every writ and order affecting land of 51 & 52 issued or made by any court for the purpose of enforcing a judgment, whether obtained on behalf of the Crown or otherwise, and whether obtained before or after the commencement of this act, and to every delivery in execution or other proceeding taken in pursuance of any such writ or order, or in obedience thereto.

to certain

4. From and after the passing of this act the Middlesex 7 Anne, c. 20, Registry Act, 1708, shall not apply to any instrument made not to apply after the passing of this act and capable of registration under charges. this act or the Land Charges Registration and Searches Act,

1888.

By sect. 6 of the Land Registry (Middlesex Deeds) Act, 1891, it is provided that it shall not be necessary for the validity of any judgment, statute or recognizance that it should be registered under the Middlesex Registry Act, 1708.

5. As from the commencement of this act the enactments Repeal. specified in the schedule to this act are hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the third column of that schedule.

6.-(1.) This act shall not extend to Scotland or Ireland. (2.) This act shall, except as otherwise expressly provided, come into operation on the first day of July one thousand nine hundred and one.

Extent, com

mencement, short title,

and construction.

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(3.) This act may be cited as the Land Charges Act, 1900, and shall be construed as one with the Land Charges Registration and Searches Act, 1888.

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2 & 3 Vict. The Judgments Act, 1839.. Sections two, three, five, six, eight,

c. 11.

and nine, and section four, except
so far as it applies to lis pendens.

3 & 4 Vict. The Judgments Act, 1840.. Section two.

c. 82.

18 & 19 Vict. The Judgments Act, 1855.. Section two, from "But no judg

c. 15.

ment" to the end of the section;
section three, except so far as it
relates to lis pendens; and sec-
tions four to eight.

23 & 24 Vict. The Law of Property Amend- Sections one to five.

c. 38.

ment Act, 1860.

27 & 28 Vict. The Judgments Act, 1864.. Sections one, two, and three, and,

c. 112.

in section four, the words "and
whose writ or other process of
execution shall be duly regis-
tered."

28 & 29 Vict. The Crown Suits, &c. Act, Sections forty-eight and forty-nine.

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CONVEYANCING STATUTES.

I. THE REAL PROPERTY ACT, 1845 ...

II. THE SATISFIED TERMS ACT, 1845...

III. THE LAW OF PROPERTY AMENDMENT ACT, 1859, ss. 1-3, 1013, 21, 24, 25, 27-29, 33

PAGE

515

522

525

536

537

...

IV. THE LAW OF PROPERTY AMENDMENT ACT, 1860, ss. 6, 7, 15... V. LORD CRANWORTH'S ACT AS TO TRUSTEES AND MORTGAGEES, ss. 1-7, 10-24, 31-35

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VI. THE VENDOR AND PURCHASER ACT, 1874, ss. 1-3, 4, 5, 7-10 544
VII. THE CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACTS, 1881, 1882,

1892

I. THE REAL PROPERTY ACT, 1845.

8 & 9 VICT. c. 106.

An Act to amend the Law of Real Property.

552

515

[4th August, 1845.]

c. 106.

[Sect. 1 repealed so much of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, as abolished 8 & 9 Vict. contingent remainders. As to these remainders, see now sect. 8, post, p. 520, and the Contingent Remainders Act, 1877, post, p. 521.]

2. After the said first day of October, one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, all corporeal tenements and hereditaments shall, as regards the conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant as well as in livery.

The immediate freehold of corporeal tenements to

lie in grant as well as

A remainder, reversion, and incorporeal hereditaments were not the in livery. subjects of a feoffment, for a feoffment operates on the possession which the owners of such estates had not to convey; hence remainders, reversions and incorporeal hereditaments were said to lie in grant, which was the mode of conveyance at the common law of those estates which did not lie

in livery or of which livery could not be given. The object proposed by Object of this section was to impart to corporeal hereditaments, that is, to heredita- this section. ments which lie in livery only, the capacity of being transferred by deed. Prior to the passing of 4 & 5 Vict. c. 21, the usual mode of conveying 4 & 5 Vict. corporeal hereditaments was by lease for a year and re-lease, the lease c. 21. being executed for the purpose of giving to the purchaser that seisin without which the re-lease would have been ineffectual. The lease was rendered unnecessary by 4 & 5 Vict. c. 21. This section in effect substituted a grant for a re-lease (see Williams on Real Property, pp. 189, 196, 14th ed.).

8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2.

Conv. Act, 1881. Immediate freehold.

Feoffments, partitions,

exchanges,

ments and surrenders required (sub

exceptions

to be by deed.

The word "grant" is not required in a deed of grant (Conv. Act, 1881, s. 49, post).

By the term immediate freehold is meant the first of all the estates of freehold; for example, when A. is tenant for life, remainder to B. for life, in tail or in fee, B. has an estate of freehold, but A. has the immediate freehold (1 Preston's Convey. 48).

The latter part of the section relating to stamp duties was repealed by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, s. 6, and is accordingly omitted.

3. A feoffment, made after the said first day of October, one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, other than a feoffment leases, assign made under a custom by an infant (a), shall be void at law, unless evidenced by deed, and a partition and an exchange (b) of any tenements or hereditaments not being copyhold, and a ject to certain lease, required by law to be in writing (c), of any tenements or hereditaments, and an assignment of a chattel interest, not being copyhold, in any tenements or hereditaments (d), and a surrender in writing (e) of an interest in any tenements or hereditaments, not being a copyhold interest, and not being an interest which might by law have been created without writing, made after the said first day of October, one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, shall also be void at law, unless made by deed: provided always, that the said enactment so far as the same relates to a release (f) or a surrender shall not extend to Ireland.

Partition.

Exchange.

Leases.

(4) By the custom of gavelkind an infant on attaining the age of fifteen years may alien lands by feoffment, livery of seisin being made in person and not by attorney (Robinson on Gavelkind, 248–250, 3rd ed.; see Re Maskell and Goldfinch, 1895, 2 Ch. 525).

(b) At common law coparceners might have made partition of things lying in livery or grant by parol without deed, and tenants in common might have made partition of things lying in livery by parol without deed, if they afterwards perfected the partition by livery of seisin (Litt. s. 250; Co. Litt. 169 a). So, too, joint tenants for years might have made partition by parol without deed (Co. Litt. 187 a). But joint tenants of freeholds, whether corporeal or incorporeal, and tenants in common of incorporeal hereditaments, could not have made partition without deed (Co.ˆ Litt. 169 a). Since the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), a writing was in all cases necessary, but a deed was required only in cases in which it was necessary before that statute (1 Martin's Conv. by Davidson, 417, 418; 1 Byth. Conv. by Jarman, 193). As to the partitions of copyholds, see the Copyhold Act, 1894, s. 87; Jope v. Marshead, 6 Beav. 213; Dillon v. Coppin, 4 Beav. 217, n.; Bolton v. Ward, 4 Hare, 530.

An exchange since the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), must, if it relate to land for a larger interest than a term of three years, be in writing, and if the things whereof the exchange is made lie in grant, i.e., if they consist of reversions, rents or other incorporeal hereditaments, or if they lie in several counties, it must be by deed (Co. Litt. 51 b).

(c) By the Statute of Frauds every lease of corporeal hereditaments for a term exceeding three years from the making thereof, and for a less term where the rent did not amount to two-thirds of the value, was required to be in writing (29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 1, 2). But as a lease for years of corporeal hereditaments might be created by a writing not under seal, questions frequently arose whether an instrument relating to the creation of such an interest was an actual demise or an agreement for a future demise (see 5 Davidson's Conv. 7-13, 3rd ed.; 1 Platt on Leases, 579-611).

The result of the present section was that in all cases where writing had been previously required a lease was void at law unless made

8 & 9 Vict.

c. 106, s. 3.

by deed. Even at law, however, the courts held (overruling Stratton Result of prePettit, 16 C. B. 420) that an instrument void as a lease might sent section.

V.

be good as an agreement (Bond v. Rosling, 1 Best & Sm. 371; 30 L. J. Q. B. 227; see Rollason v. Leon, 7 H. & N. 73; Adams v. Hagger, 4 Q. B. Div. 480); so that an action could be brought against the intended tenant either for not accepting a lease (Ib.), or for not complying with a stipulation contained in the agreement (Martin v. Smith, L. R. 9 Ex. 50; Adams v. Clutterbuck, 10 Q. B. D. 403); or against the intended landlord for having no title to grant a lease (Stranks v. St. John, I. R. 2 C. P. 376). And in equity specific performance could be obtained of an agreement which was void at law as a lease (Parker v. Taswell, 2 De G. & J. 559). As regards the estate taken by a person entering under an instrument void under this act as a lease, it was settled at law (before the Jud. Act, 1873) that he held as tenant from year to year upon the terms of the instrument, so far as applicable to such a tenancy; the tenancy being determinable, during the term mentioned in the instrument, by the usual half-year's notice, but expiring without notice at the end of such term (Tress. Savage, 4 El. & Bl. 36; see Lee v. Smith, 9 Exch. 662; Wood v. Beard, L. R. 2 Ex. 1). 37). Since the Jud. Act, 1873, it has been held tenant holding under an agreement for a lease of which specific performance would be decreed, holds on the same terms and has the same rights and liabilities as if a lease had been granted (Walsh v. Lonsdale, 21 9; Swain v. Ayres, 21 Q. B. Div. 289; Lowther v. Heaver, 41 Ch. Div 264; Manchester Co. v. Coombs, 1901, 2 Ch. 617; see Warren v. Murraz 2, 1894, 2 Q. B. 648). But in such a case, if the value of the property exceed 5001., the county court, having no jurisdiction to order specific 2 Q. B. 255); performance, cannot order payment of rent (Foster v. Reeves, 1892,

that a

Ch. D.

This

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provision as to leases did not apply to agreements for the lease of

tolls under the Turnpike Roads Act, 1822, s. 57 (Shepherd v. Hodsman, 18

Q. B. 316).

By&8 Vict. c. 76, s. 4 (in force from and after the 31st of December, Cases of 1844, and repealed by the present Act from the 1st of October, 1845), agreements it was enacted, that no lease in writing of any freehold, copyhold or lease to let under hold land should be valid, unless the same should be made by deed, but 7 & 8 Vict. that any agreement in writing to let any such lands should be valid and c. 76, s. 4. take effect as an agreement to execute a lease (see Burton v. Revell, 16 M. & W. 307; Arden v. Sullivan, 19 L. J. Q. B. 268).

4lease of incorporeal hereditaments must be under seal (Gardiner v. Williamson, 2 B. & Ad. 336; see Bird v. Higginson, 3 Ad. & El. 83;

Holford

v. Pritchard, 3 Exch. 793).

be by deed or note in writing, signed by the party assigning or his agent (2) The Statute of Frauds required that all assignments of leases should Assignments. (29 Čar. 2, c. 3, s. 3).

Where

the remainder of his term, the parol lease was held not to be an assignment but to bind the parties, who intended to create the relation of landlord and tenant, and to pass the interest by lease (Pollock v. Stacey, 9 Q. B. 1035; see Debenham v. Digby, 21 W. R. 359).

a person holding for a term of less than a year let by parol for

deed or note in writing duly signed (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 3). This section (e) The Statute of Frauds required that every surrender should be by Surrenders. refers to a surrender in writing, and does not include a surrender by operation of law. As to what is a surrender by operation of law, see Lyon v. Read (13 M. & W. 305, 306); Kingston's case (2 Smith, L. C. 917, 9th ed.);

Wallis

and cases, ante, p. 281.
Hands (1893, 2 Ch. 75); Knight v. Williams (1901, 1 Ch. 257);

V.

() The word "release" appears to be inserted by mistake instead of

lease."

be by deed (Gilman v. Crowley, 7 I. C. L. R. (N. S.) 557).

Every lease in Ireland required by law to be in writing must

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