The General Order of the Court of Common Pleas, dated the 24th The General Order of the Court of Common Pleas, dated the 13th 10. These rules shall take effect from and after the 31st December, 1882. For the old rules and the practice cases decided upon them, see Shelf. R. Stat. 8th ed. 400 et seq. And as to the fees payable in respect of acknowledgments, see the order as to court fees made in January, 1883, Shelf. R. P. Stat. 9th ed. 310. Rules. III. THE MARRIED WOMEN'S REVERSIONARY INTERESTS 20 & 21 VICT. c. 57. An Act to enable Married Women to dispose of Reversionary Be it enacted as follows: 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, s. 1. Married women may estate, and out of such 1. After the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, it shall be lawful for every married woman by deed to dispose of (d) every future or reversionary dispose of interest, whether vested or contingent, of such married woman, reversionary or her husband in her right, in any personal estate whatsoever, interests in to which she shall be entitled under any instrument made after estate, and personal the said thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred release powers and fifty-seven (e) (except such a settlement as after mentioned), over such and also to release or extinguish any power (f) which may be also their vested in or limited or reserved to her in regard to any such rights to a personal estate, as fully and effectually as she could do if she sett were a feme sole, and also to release and extinguish her right estate in or equity to a settlement out of any personal estate to which possession. she, or her husband in her right, may be entitled in possession under any such instrument as aforesaid, save and except that no such disposition, release or extinguishment shall be valid unless the husband concur in the deed by which the same shall be effected, nor unless the deed be acknowledged by her as hereinafter directed: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any reversionary interest to which she shall become entitled by virtue of any deed, will or instrument, by which she shall be restrained from alienating or affecting the same. (d) For a married woman's power of disposition over reversionary inte- Married rests in personalty settled to her separate use, see the note to Fines and woman unable Recoveries Act, s. 78, ante, p. 320. As regards her reversionary interests to dispose of in personalty not settled to her separate use, it was well established before reversionary 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, s. 1. choses in action not settled to her separate use, except under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57. Cases under section. Powers. Deeds to be by married women in the present act, that a husband could not assign or release his wife's reversionary choses in action so as to bind her surviving (Honner v. Morton, 3 Russ. 65); and the fact of her joining in the assignment made no difference (Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1; Cresswell v. Dewell, 4 Giff. 460; see Winter v. Easum, 2 D. J. & S. 272; Bolitho v. Hillyar, 34 Beav. 180; Rogers v. Ancaster, 14 Beav. 445; Hore v. Becher, 12 Sim. 465; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, L. R. 2 P. C. 87). Nor could a married woman by election part with her reversionary choses in action (Williams v. Mayne, I. R. 1 Eq. 519; see Harle v. Jarman, 1895, 2 Ch. 419). A husband and wife could not effectually dispose of the life interest of the wife in a fund not settled to her separate use beyond the duration of the coverture (Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 M. & C. 37; Re Godfrey, I. R. 1 Eq. 533). A husband and son, having surrendered and released their respective interests in a fund to the wife, for the express purpose of enabling her to assign it to the son, the court refused to establish a merger to defeat its own protection of married women (Whittle v. Henning, 2 Phill. C. C. 731; Story v. Tonge, 7 Bear. 91; Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 Beav. 496; see, however, 14 Sim. 592-599; Bishop v. Colebrooke, 16 Sim. 39; and see Re Davenport, Turner v. King, 1895, 1 Ch. 361, a case since the M. W. P. Act, 1882, and dealing with separate property). An assignment under this act ought not to be regarded as that of the husband and wife according to their respective interests (Re Batchelor, Sloper v. Oliver, 16 Eq. 485). Where the property assigned consisted of a wife's reversionary interest under a will, the assignment prevented the executors from exercising any right of retainer over the interest assigned in respect of a debt due from the husband to the testator (Re Batchelor, sup. compare the effect on such retainer of the wife's equity to a settlement: Re Briant, Poulter v. Shackel, 39 Ch. D. 471). A policy of insurance effected by a married woman in her own name may be disposed of under this act (Witherby v. Rackham, 60 L. J. Ch. 511; 39 W. R. 393; see Re Turner, Turner v. Fitzroy, 66 L. T. 758). But mere possibilities or expectancies are not within this act (Allcard v. Walker, 1896, 2 Ch. 369). If the Infant Settlements Act (post, p. 726) applies to post-nuptial settlements, it does not enable a married woman to evade the formalities of this act (Seaton v. Seaton, 13 App. Cas. 70). An acknowledgment under this act by a married woman of an assignment was taken into consideration even where the act did not apply (Roberts v. Cooper, 1891, 2 Ch. 335). (e) An appointment of a reversionary interest in personalty by deed after 1857, under a special power in a deed dated before 1857, does not bring the interest within this act, even if the prior life interest is assigned at the same time (Re Butler, I. R. 3 Eq. 138); nor did the powers of the act apply where the reversionary interest arose under a will dated before 1857, but the testator had made a codicil (not confirming the will) since 1857 (Re Elcom, Layborn v. Grover Wright, 1894, 1 Ch. 303). But where a woman was entitled to a reversionary interest created before 1857, and after 1857 while unmarried re-settled that interest, the power of the act applied (Re Bennett, Capes v. Ferrand, 73 L. T. '17). (f) As to the various kinds of powers, their suspension and extinction, and as to the execution of powers by married women, see the note to Fines and Recoveries Act, s. 78, ante, p. 318). 2. Every deed to be executed in England or Wales by a maracknowledged ried woman for any of the purposes of this act shall be acknowledged by her, and be otherwise perfected, in the manner by the act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, prescribed for the acknowledgment and perfecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in land; and every deed to be executed in Ireland by a married woman for any of the purposes of the act shall be acknowledged the manner over land in by her and be otherwise perfected in the manner by the act 4 & 20 & 21 Vict. 5 Will. 4, c. 92, prescribed for the acknowledgment and per- c. 57, s. 2. fecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in land: interests in and all and singular the clauses and provisions in the said acts or powers concerning the disposition of lands by married women, including England or the provisions for dispensing with the concurrence of the hus- Wales; bands of married women, in the cases in the said acts mentioned In Ireland, shall extend and be applicable to such interests in personal as by 4 & 5 estate, and to such powers as may be disposed of, released, or extinguished by virtue of this act, as fully and effectually as if such interests or powers were interests in or powers over land. An order was made under this act, enabling a married woman, without the concurrence of her husband, to dispose of a reversionary interest in government stock (Re Rogers, L. R. 1 C. P. 47). If such an order be obtained by fraud or suppression of facts it will be set aside (Ex p. Cockerell, 4 C. P. D. 39). act not to 3. Provided always, that the powers of disposition given to a The powers married woman by this act shall not interfere with any power of disposition which independently of this act may be vested in or limited or given by this reserved to her, so as to prevent her from exercising such power interfere with in any case, except so far as by any disposition made by her any other under this act she may be prevented from so doing, in conse- powers. quence of such power having been suspended or extinguished by such disposition. settlements 4. Provided always, that the powers of disposition hereby Act not to given to a married woman shall not enable her to dispose of any extend to interest in personal estate settled upon her by any settlement or of married agreement for a settlement made on the occasion of her mar- women upon riage. marriage. An agreement in contemplation of marriage was executed by the husband and wife to settle a money fund of the wife's for her separate use -to return to the husband if he should survive. The court considered that the wife was to have the absolute interest in the event of her surviving, and that the case fell within the exception contained in this section (Clarke v. Green, 2 H. & M. 474). 5. This act shall not extend to Scotland. Not to extend to Scotland. IV. MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1870. Women. 33 & 34 VICT. c. 93. An Act to amend the Law relating to the Property of Married [9th August, 1870.] 33 & 34 Vict. WHEREAS it is desirable to amend the law of property and contract with respect to married women: c. 93, s. 1. Earnings of married women to be deemed their own property. Law before the section. Cases under the section. Sects. 2-6. Be it enacted as follows: 1. The wages and earnings of any married woman acquired or gained by her after the passing of this act in any employment, occupation, or trade in which she is engaged or which she carries on separately from her husband, and also any money or property so acquired by her through the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill, and all investments of such wages, earnings, money, or property, shall be deemed and taken to be property held and settled to her separate use, independent of any husband to whom she may be married, and her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for such wages, earnings, money, and property. This act has been repealed, saving all acts done and rights or liabilities acquired thereunder (M. W. P. Act, 1882, s. 22, post, p. 358). Under the law before this act a husband might in his own name recover his wife's wages (Dengate v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 7), or the profits of a business carried on by her (Savile v. Sweeny, 4 B. & Ad. 524). And payment to her of her own earnings was not good, unless she had her husband's authority to receive them (Offley v. Clay, 2 M. & G. 172). As to a married woman's separate trading before this act under her husband's agreement, see 2 Bright's Husband and Wife, 292; and under the custom of the city of London, see 2 Bright, 76. The question whether a trade was carried on by a married woman separately from her husband was held to be one of fact, to be determined on the circumstances of the case (Petty v. Anderson, 3 Bing. 170; Smallpiece v. Dawes, 7 C. & P. 40; Lovell v. Newton, 4 C. P. D. 7; Laporte v. Cortick, 31 L. T. 434; 23 W. R. 131; Whittaker v. Whittaker, 46 L. T. 802; 30 W. R. 787; Re Dearmer, James v. Dearmer, 53 L. T. 905). All the stock-in-trade and property connected with the trade was protected by this section, as well as the earnings (Ashworth v. Outram, 5 Ch. Div. 923). The earnings were equitable assets (Re Poole, Thompson v. Bennett, 6 Ch. D. 739). This section did not protect the earnings from an unlawful industry (Mason v. Mitchell, 34 L. J. Ex. 68). As to the liability of the husband in respect of a separate trade of his wife, see Re Shepherd (39 L. T. 652). And as to a married woman's bankruptcy, see the note to sect. 12, post, p. 339, and sect. 1, sub-s. 5, of the M. W. P. Act, 1882, post, pp. 342, 347. [By sect. 2, deposits in savings banks and government annuities in the name of a married woman were deemed to be her separate property, subject to a power for the court to order payment to the husband when his money had been used without his consent. By sect. 3, a married woman or woman about to be married might require any sum she was entitled to in the public funds to be placed in her name as a married woman entitled to her separate use, and while so entered it was to be deemed her separate property, subject to a power for the court to order transfer to the husband of investments made with his money without his consent. (For orders under this section, see Re Bartholomew, 23 L. T. 433; Re Butlin, Ib. 523; Re Tanner, 1874, W. N. 198; Howard v. Bank of England, 19 Eq. 295.) Sect. 4 contained similar provisions in regard to shares, debentures, &c. in joint stock companies (see R. v. Carnatic R. Co., L. R. & Q. B. 299; and as to previous law, Re Matthewman. 3 Eq. 788; Butler v. Cumpston, 7 Eq. 16; Dalton v. Midland R. Co., 13 C. B. 474). Sect. 5 contained similar provisions in regard to a woman's interest in industrial and other societies. Sect. 6 provided for the case of investments made in fraud of creditors. See, now, as to these matters, sects. 6-10 of the M. W. P. Act, 1882.] 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, s. 1. 7. Where any woman married after the passing of this act Personal shall, during her marriage become entitled to any personal pro- property not perty as next of kin or one of the next of kin of an intestate, exceeding 2007. coming or to any sum of money not exceeding two hundred pounds to a married under any deed or will, such property shall, subject and without woman to be prejudice to the trusts of any settlement affecting the same, belong to the woman for her separate use, and her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for the same. The words "become entitled" include the case of a reversionary legacy falling into possession (Lane v. Oakes, 30 L. T. 726; 22 W. R. 709). The limit of 2001. applies only to sums given by deed or will (Re Voss, King v. Foss, 13 Ch. D. 504). Where a married woman was entitled under the same will to a reversionary legacy and also to a share of residue, together exceeding 2007, they were held not within this section (Re Davies, Harrison v. Davis, 1897, 2 Ch. 204). Before this act, a legacy left to a married woman in general terms must have been paid to her husband (Palmer v. Trevor, 1 Vern. 261). Where, however, she had obtained a protection order under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 25, payment to herself was ordered (Re Kingsley, 6 W. R. 849; Re Rainsdon, 4 Drew. 446). The inaccuracy of the marginal note to this section should be observed. The marginal note forms no part of the act (Sutton v. S., 22 Ch. D. 511; Claydon v. Green, L. R. 3 C. P. 511; Re Venour, Venour v. Sillon, 2 Ch. D. 522; 4.-G. v. G. E. R. Co., 11 Ch. Div. 461, 465). But the preamble and title of an act may be referred to where the enacting words of the sections are not clear (Re Griffith, Carr v. Griffith, 12 Ch. D. 661; Re Harkness and Allsopp, 1896, 2 Ch. 361; Powell v. Kempton Co., 1897, 2Q. B. 265; A.-G. v. Margate Co., 1900, 1 Ch. 749). her own. married 8. Where any freehold, copyhold, or customaryhold property Freehold shall descend upon any woman married after the passing of this property act as heiress or co-heiress of an intestate, the rents and profits coming to a of such property shall, subject and without prejudice to the woman, rents trusts of any settlement affecting the same, belong to such and profits Woman for her separate use, and her receipts alone shall be a only to be good discharge for the same. This section does not enable a married woman to convey descended freeholds by an unacknowledged deed (Johnson v. Johnson, 35 ̊Ch. D. 345; see Re Voss, King v. Voss, 13 Ch. D. 504). her own. [Sect. 9 contained provisions for settling questions between husband and wife. See now sect. 17 of the M. W. P. Act, 1882.] 10. A married woman may effect a policy of insurance upon her own life or the life of her husband for her separate use, and the same and all benefit thereof, if expressed on the face of insurance. Married woman may effect policy |