3 & 4 Will. 4, nor a claim in a writ (Rhymney R. Co. v. Rhymney Iron Co., 25 Q. B. Div. c. 27, s. 42. 146; see Wilks v. Wood, 1892, 1 Q. B. 687); nor a statement in a tradesman's bill-head that interest will be charged after a certain time (Re Lloyd Edwards, Williams v. Trench, 61 L. J. Ch. 22; 65 L. T. 453). Where a written notice as to interest was given under this section, and the defendants paid the principal due into court, the court ordered payment of subsequent interest in addition (Hull Co. v. N. E. R. Co., 5 M. & G. 872). An action for damages for minerals wrongfully taken is not within sect. 29 (Phillips v. Homfray, 1892, 1 Ch. 465). Sect. 29. Rate. Rate of interest in equity. Interest in equity. As to the arrears of interest given on damages for a maritime collision, see The Kong Magnus, 1891, P. 223. When the rate of interest is not expressed, the rate is a question for the court (Gibbs v. Fremont, 11 Exch. 25, where 25 per cent. was allowed). The rule was to recommend the jury to give 5 per cent. (Re Roberts, 14 Ch. Div. 52; see Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus, 1892, A. C. 166); but the court will follow the current rate at the time (L. C. & D. R. Co. v. S. E. R. Co., 1892, 1 Ch. 120, 137; see Wainwright's case, 62 L. T. 30, where 4 per cent. was given). The rate usually allowed on bills of exchange is 5 per cent. (Byles, 16th ed. 443; see Lawrence v. Willcocks, 1892, 1 Q. B. 696). Judgment debts carry interest at 4 per cent. (Judgments Act, 1838, s. 17, post, where see note; and see R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 16; Ord. 55, r. 62); and on the recovery of judgment on a covenant the covenant is merged in the judgment (Ex p. Fewings, 25 Ch. Div. 338; Re European Co., 4 Ch. Div. 33). But a mortgagee may on the construction of his deed be entitled to retain his security until paid interest at a rate higher than 4 per cent. (Economic Society v. Usborne, 1902, A. C. 147; see Popple v. Sylvester, 22 Ch. D. 98; Arbuthnot v. Bunsilall, 62 L. T. 234). Where judgment is signed in default of appearance on a claim for a liquidated demand, the rate of interest not being specified, the rate up to judgment is 5 per cent. (R. S. C. Ord. 13, rr. 3 and 4). In equity a purchaser paid interest on his purchase-money at 4 per cent. (Calcraft v. Roebuck, 1 Ves. Jun. 221); and a deposit was ordered to be returned with interest at 4 per cent. (Re Marshall and Salt, 1900, 2 Ch. 206). Executors of a surety retained out of a legacy bequeathed by him to the principal debtor the amounts paid by their testator with interest at 4 per cent. (Re Watson, Turner v. Watson, 1896, 1 Ch. 937). Children brought advances into hotchpot with interest at the same rate (Re Rees, 17 Ch. D. 701). That rate represented the average interest payable in respect of trust investments (Re Lambert, Middleton v. Moore, 1897, 2 Ch, 180). But since 1894 the rate in the Chancery Division has been reduced (except as regards debts) from 4 per cent. to 3 per cent.; at which lastmentioned rate interest has been charged on advances (Re Lambert, supra; see, however, Re Hargreaves, Hargreaves v. Hargreaves, 1902, W. N. 18); and on shares in a partition action (Re Dracup, Field v. Dracup, 1894, 1 Ch. 59); and in applying the rule in Re Chesterfield's Trusts (Re Goodenough, Marland v. Williams, 1895, 2 Ch. 537; see Re Cleveland, Hay v. Woolmer, ib. 542; Rowlls v. Bebb, 1900, 2 Ch. 118). As to the rate to be adopted in applying Howe v. Dartmouth, see Re Nicholson, 1895, W. N. 106. As to the rate between cestui que trust and trustee, see post, p. 209. The earlier cases in equity as to interest are collected, C. P. Coop. 209 -250, n. The Court of Chancery followed the law in dealing with legal claims (Booth v. Leycester, 3 M. & C. 459). But it usually decreed interest in cases of purely equitable demands, e.g., suits for equitable waste, or against trustees who misapplied trust moneys (L. C. & D. R. Co. v. S. E. R. Co., 1892, 1 Ch. 142; see further Hyde v. Price, 8 Sim. 578; Re Powell, 10 Hare, 134; Martyn v. Blake, 3 Dru. & War. 125; Mansfield v. Ogle, 4 De G. & J. 38; Spartali v. Constantinidi, 20 W. R. 823). Interest was given as damages for non-payment of money (Marsh v. Jones, 40 Ch. Div. 563). On setting aside a sale by a trustee to himself interest was not charged on rents (Silkstone Co. v. Edey, 1900, 1 Ch. 167). It is against the practice of a court of equity to allow anything in the nature of compound interest (Re Magheramorne, Hogg v. Hogg, 1901, W. N. 152). As to the interest allowed on portions, see Balfour v. Cooper, 23 Ch. Div. 3 & 4 Will. 4, 472; Lewin, 10th ed. 471. c. 27, s. 42. between trustee and c. q. t. As regards interest between trustee and c. q. t., the true principle has been said to be, that a trustee must be charged with such interest as he Interest either has received, or ought to have received, or which he may fairly be presumed to have received (4.-G. v. Alford, 4 D. M. & G. 851). Thus a trustee who kept moneys in his hands and used them as his own has been charged at the rate of 5 per cent. (Jones v. Foxall, 15 Beav. 388; Williams v. Powell, Ib. 461; Burdick v. Garrick, 5 Ch. 233; Re Jones, Jones v. Searle, 49 L. T. 91; Re Davis, D. v. D., 1902, W. N. 81; see Vyse v. Foster, 8 Ch. 329; and compare Rule 11 of the rules under the Judicial Trustee Act, 1896). More recently 4 per cent. has been charged (Re Emmet, E. v. E., 17 Ch. D. 142). And where promoters were compelled to make good to the company a secret profit they were charged with interest at 3 per cent. (Re Olympia, Ltd., 1898, 2 Ch. 171; see, however, Gluckstein v. Barnes, 1900, Ă. Ĉ. 255). Where the trustee had not had the use of the money he was in recent cases charged only with 3 per cent. (Re Barclay, Barclay v. Andrew, 1899, 1 Ch. 674; Gilroy v. Stephen, 51 L. J. Ch. 834; 46 L. T. 761; see Re Stuart, Smith v. Stuart, 1897, 2 Ch. 593). Compound interest has been charged against a trustee where there was a direction to accumulate (Re Emmet, E. v. E., 17 Ch. D. 142; Re Barclay, sup.); where he had employed the money in trade (Jones v. Foxall, 15 Beav. 388; Williams v. Powell, Ib. 461; see Burdick v. Garrick, 5 Ch. 242); and where the c. q. t. was an infant, and the income was not required for maintenance. (Jones v. Foxall, sup.; Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 7 H. L. 346; Gilroy v. Stephen, 51 L. J. Ch. 834; 46 L. T. 761). See further Lewin, 10th ed. 380 et seq. As to interest between banker and customer, see Crosskill v. Bower, (32 Interest Beav. 86); Williamson v. Williamson (7 Eq. 542); and between principal between and agent (Turner v. Burkinshaw, 2 Ch. 488; Burdick v. Garrick, 5 Ch. banker and 233; G. W. R. Co. v. Cunliffe, 9 Ch. 525; Baring v. Stanton, 3 Ch. D. customer; 502). Where unconscionable bargains have been entered into with principal money lenders, the court will only allow the sums actually advanced to be and agent. recovered together with interest at 5 per cent. (Miller v. Cook, 10 Eq. 641; Tyler v. Yates, 6 Ch. 665; Aylesford v. Morris, 8 Ch. 484). There On securities. is no general rule as to the rate of interest the court will allow on repayment of money expressed to be the consideration of an absolute assignment, which is treated only as a security for such consideration money (Re Unsworth, 2 Dr. & Sm. 337; where 5 per cent. was allowed). Interest at the rate of 4 per cent. was allowed on a simple contract debt secured by deposit of deeds, where there had been no stipulation as to interest (Re Kerr, 8 Eq. 331). As to interest on charges, see Lippard v. Ricketts (14 Eq. 291); on mortgages, Thompson v. Drew (20 Beav. 49); Ashwell v. Staunton (30 Beav. 52); Re Roberts (14 Ch. Div. 49); and on mortgagee's costs, Eardley v. Knight (41 Ch. D. 537). Where an annuity Arrears of is in arrear" the established rule of the court (which, however, is only annuity. general and not inflexible) is, that interest cannot be recovered on the arrears (Martyn v. Blake, 3 Dru. & War. 125; Mansfield v. Ogle, 4 De G. & J. 41; Blogg v. Johnson, 2 Ch. 228; Wheatley v. Davies, 24 W. R. 818; Re Hiscoe, Hiscoe v. Waite, 1902, W. N. 49). As to the cases in which it has been given, see Seton, 6th ed. 1637. As to interest on arrears of salary, see Rishton v. Grissell (10 Eq. 393). Interest was on money allowed at 5 per cent. where default had been made in the performance due under of a covenant to pay money (Knapp v. Burnaby, 9 W. R. 765; Re Horner, covenant. Fooks v. Horner, 1896, 2 Ch. 188; see Re Roberts, Goodchap v. Roberts, 14 Ch. D. 49; Mellersh v. Brown, 45 Ch. D. 228). Where a bond does not specify a day for payment, it is payable on the day of date, and interest runs from that day (Farquhar v. Morris, 7 T. R. 124). Where a date is specified, see as to interest after that date, Cook v. Fowler (L. R. 7 H. L. 27); Re Dixon, Heynes v. Dixon (1900, 2 Ch. 561). It is the general rule Bonds. both at law (Brangwin v. Parrot, 2 W. Bl. 1190; White v. Sealey, 1 Dougl. 49), and in equity, to consider the penalty of the bond as the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 42. Interest in liquidation of a company. Computation of interest in administration actions. Specially indorsed writ. Interest in the case of appeals. Costs. limit of the debt or damages which can be recovered. But there are exceptions to this rule (see the earlier cases collected in C. P. Coop. 209230; and see Clarke v. Abingdon, 17 Ves. 106; Hughes v. Wynne, 1 M. & K. 20; Walter v. Meredith, 3 Y. & Coll. 264; Knipe v. Blair, 1900, 1 Ir. R. 372; and Mathews v. Keble, 3 Ch. 691, where the interest allowed, together with the principal, exceeded the penalty). As to deducting income tax on payments in respect of interest, see Crane v. Kilpin (6 Eq. 334). And as to calculation of interest and apportionment in questions between a tenant for life and remainderman, see Re Grabowski (6 Eq. 12); Cox v. Cox (8 Eq. 343); Maclaren v. Stainton (11 Eq. 382); Re Moore (54 L. J. Ch. 432); Re Foster, Lloyd v. Carr (45 Ch. D. 629); Re Hubbuck, Hart v. Stone (1896, 1 Ch. 754); Re Bird (1901, 1 Ch. 916); Re Alston, Alston v. Houston (1901, 2 Ch. 584). The rate allowed would probably now be 3 per cent. (see Re Goodenough, Marland v. Williams, 1895, 2 Ch. 537; Re Cleveland, Hay v. Wolmer, ib. 542). The Civil Procedure Act, 1833, s. 28, applies to calls made in winding up a company where the notice of call states that interest will be charged (Barrow's case, 3 Ch. 784). But provisions in articles as to interest on calls do not apply to calls made by liquidators (Re Welsh Flannel, &c. Co., 20 Eq. 360). As regards debts due from a company where under the act interest would be payable, it may be claimed in a winding-up (Times Assurance Co.'s case, 2 H. & M. 722). The rule in winding up an insolvent company is that creditors whose debts carry interest get dividends on what was due for principal and interest at the winding-up, but no subsequent interest except there be a surplus (Warrant Finance Co.'s case, 4 Ch. 643). As to the application of the rule where a creditor has security or a right of proof against another company, see Warrant Finance Co.'s case (No. 2) (5 Ch. 86); Quartermaine's case, 1892, 1 Ch. 639; and compare Ex p. Findlay (17 Ch. Div. 334). Creditors whose debts do not carry interest are not allowed interest in a winding-up (Re Hatfield Co., 11 W. R. 971). But a demand in writing for payment may be made under the act so as to entitle the creditor to interest (Re East of England Co., 4 Ch. 14; but see Re Herefordshire Co., 4 Eq. 250). As to the interest now allowed in the case of a company wound up by the court, see the general rules made pursuant to sect. 26 of the Companies Act, 1890, r. 104. In administration, where a debt of the deceased carries interest, interest is paid accordingly, and where it does not carry interest, interest is paid at the rate of 47. per cent. from the date of judgment out of assets remaining after satisfaction of the costs, debts, and interest in respect of debts carrying interest (R. S. C., Ord. 55, rr. 62, 63). Where the estate is insolvent, interest on a debt carrying interest is calculated up to judgment, and a dividend paid on that amount (Re Summers, Boswell v. Gurney, 13 Ch. D. 136; see Re London, &c. Hotels Co., 1892, 1 Ch. 639; Re Henley, 75 L. T. 307). As to what interest can be claimed on a writ specially indorsed under R. S. C., Ord. 3, r. 6, see Wilks v. Wood, 1892, 1 Q. B. 684; London Bank v. Clancarty, ib. 689; Lawrence v. Willcocks, ib. 696: Gold Ores Co. v. Parr, 1892, 2 Q. B. 14; Hamilton v. Brogden, 60 L. J. Ch. 88; see R. S. C., Ord. 14, r. 1 (b). Where execution has been delayed by appeal, interest will be allowed (R. S. C., Ord. 58, r. 19; see Civil Proc. Act, 1833, s. 30; Garland v. Carlisle, 5 Cl. & F. 355; Langridge v. Levy, 4 M. & W. 337; Hooper v. Lane, 6 H. L. C. 443; Tyne Commissioners v. General Steam Co., 15 W. R. 875). Where money is paid under an order which is subsequently reversed on appeal, it must be repaid with interest at 41. per cent. (Rodgers v. Comptoir D'Escompte, L. R. 3 P. C. 465; Merchant Banking Co. v. Maude, 18 Eq. 659). As to interest on costs, see note to Judgments Act, 1838, s. 17, post. THE REAL PROPERTY LIMITATION ACT, 1874. 37 & 38 VICT. c. 57, ss. 8 AND 10 (for the other sects. see ante, p. 184). § 8. Limitation of Actions for recovering Money charged on Land or Legacies...211. § 10. Time not enlarged by Express Trusts...213. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 8. land and end of twelve no nor acknow 8. No action or suit or other proceeding shall be brought to Money recover any sum of money secured by any mortgage, judgment, charged upon or lien, or otherwise charged upon or payable out of any land or legacies to be rent at law or in equity, or any legacy, but within twelve years deemed satisnext after a present right to receive the same shall have accrued fied at the to some person capable of giving a discharge for or release of years if the same, unless in the meantime some part of the principal interest paid money, or some interest thereon, shall have been paid, or some ledgment acknowledgment of the right thereto shall have been given in given in writing signed by the person by whom the same shall be pay- writing in the able, or his agent, to the person entitled thereto, or his agent; and in such case no such action or suit or proceeding shall be brought but within twelve years after such payment or acknowledgment, or the last of such payments or acknowledgments, if more than one, was given. By sect. 9 (ante, p. 189) the above section has been substituted for R. P. Lim. Act, 1833, s. 40, as to which see ante, p. 191 et seq. The present section is entirely prohibitory, and does not remove any bar which previously to its passing existed to the bringing of an action within twelve years (Firth v. Slingsby, 58 L. T. 483). Accordingly, an action to recover a simple contract debt from the debtor personally was barred by the Limitation Act, 1623, even where the debt was charged on land (Barnes v. Glenton, 1899, 1 Q. B. 885). meantime. The present section barred after twelve years the personal remedy of a Mortgages. mortgagee to obtain payment of his debt from his mortgagor, whether on a collateral bond given by him (Fearnside v. Flint, 22 Ch. D. 579), or on his covenant in the mortgage deed (Sutton v. Sutton, 22 Ch. D. 511). In the last-mentioned case Cotton, L.J., referred to Hunter v. Nockolds (1 Mac. & G. 640, ante, p. 202), in which Lord Cottenham had held that in actions on covenant or specialty, sect. 42 of R. P. Lim. Act, 1833, was controlled by sect. 3 of Civil Proc. Act, 1833 (post, p. 215). It might be right in the case of an act passed in 1833, to read it as explained by an act passed only three weeks later; but in the case of an act passed in 1874, there was no such necessity to explain it by an act passed in 1833 (22 Ch. Div. 519; see Re Frisby, 43 Ch. D. 110). The section, however, did not bar an action which was brought, not against the mortgagor himself, but against a surety who had covenanted for payment by the mortgage deed (Re Frisby, Alison v. Frisby, per Kay, J., and Bowen, L.J., Cotton, L.J., differing, 43 Ch. D. 106); or who had given a promissory note (Re Wolmershausen, 62 L. T. 541). And it has been held that an action on a bond given by a surety for a mortgagor to recover from the surety an indemnity against the non-payment by the mortgagor of the mortgage debt, is not within this section (Re Powers, Lindsell v. Phillips, 30 Ch. Div. 291). As to the application of the present section to the mortgage of a reversionary interest in personalty, see Re Lake (63 L. T. 416). The present section applies to judgments generally, not merely judg- Judgments. ments which operate as a charge on land (Hebblethwaite v. Peever, 1892, 1 Q. B. 124; Jay v. Johnstone, 1893, 1 Q. B. 189; Taylor v. Hollard, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 8. Liens. Other charges. Legacies. "Present right to receive." Part payment. Same hand to pay and receive. 1902, 1 K. B. 676). It barred after twelve years the right of a judgment creditor to obtain an adjudication in bankruptcy against the judgment debtor (Ex p. Tynte, 15 Ch. D. 125). As regards liens, in the case of a contract to sell a reversionary interest in stock, the purchaser was held entitled to enforce a lien for his deposit after a long lapse of time, no Statute of Limitations directly applying (Levy v. Stogdon, 1898, 1 Ch. 487; 1899, 1 Ch. 5). As to a vendor's lien, see ante, p. 192. The present section did not apply to an action on the personal covenant of a lessee in respect of a royalty (Darley v. Tennant, 53 L. T. 257). It barred, however, after twelve years the right to recover paving expenses inade a charge on land by statute (Hornsey Board v. Monarch Society, 24 Q. B. Div. 1); and also an action to recover interest on money paid for redeeming land tax, which by statute was charged on the land (Skene v. Cook, 1902, 1 K. B. 682). The section applies where money is charged on land, even where there is no personal liability on the part of the owner of the land to pay the money (Ib. 689). In the case of simple contract debts charged on land, the remedy against the land is not barred for twelve years (Re Stephens, Warburton v. Stephens, 43 Ch. D. 39; see Barnes v. Glenton, 1899, 1 Q. B. 891), although the personal remedy by action is barred in six (Barnes v. Glenton, 1899, 1 Q. B. 885; compare Hugill v. Wilkinson, 38 Ch. D. 480; Powell v. Brodhurst, 1901, 2 Ch. 167). The present section barred after twelve years the right to recover legacies or shares in residue which were not held by executors on express trusts (Re Rowe, Jacobs v. Hind, 61 L. T. 581; Re Davis, Evans v. Moore, 1891, Ch. 119; Re Barker, Buxton v. Campbell, 1892, 2 Ch. 491; see Rudd v. Rudd, 1895, 1 Ir. R. 15; Re Timmis, Nixon v. Smith, 1902, 1 Ch. 176). An action by a residuary legatee to recover loss which has arisen from the non-realization of such residue is not an action to recover a legacy within this section (Swain v. Bringeman, 1891, 3 Ch. 233; see Trustee Act, 1888, s. 8, post, p. 248). As to the words, "present right to receive," see Re Owen, 1894, 3 Ch. 220; and the cases collected under R. P. Lim. Act, 1833, s. 40, ante, p. 196. With regard to payments within this section, it has been said that a payment is made whenever there is a render of money to a person entitled to receive it by a person liable to pay it (Re Frisby, Alison v. Frisby, 43 Ch. D. 107). In the case of mortgages there must be a payment by the mortgagor, or by somebody bound to pay on his behalf, i.e., bound as between himself and the mortgagor (Bradshaw v. Widdrington, 1902, W. N. 107; see Harlock v. Ashberry, 19 Ch. Div. 539). Where a mortgagee received from an insurance company the surrender value of a policy on the mortgagor's life which had been included in a mortgage of reversionary interests in land, this was not a payment within the section so as to entitle the mortgagee to sue on the covenant (Re Clifden, Annaly v. Agar-Ellis, 1900, 1 Ch. 774). In cases within the section, payment of interest by one co-contractor or co-debtor will preserve the remedy against the other, sect. 14 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, not applying (Re Frisby, Alison v. Frisby, 43 Ch. D. 111; see Re Powers, 30 Ch. Div. 291; Baillie v. Irwin, 1897, 2 Ir. R. 614. See, further, the cases quoted under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 40, ante, p. 197; and under R. P. Lim. Act, 1837, ante, p. 174). Where the hand to pay and to receive was the same, payment of interest on a charge has been presumed (see the cases under R. P. Lim. Act, 1837, ante, p. 174; under R. P. Lim. Act, 1833, s. 40, ante, p. 194, and under Civil Proc. Act, 1833, s. 5, post, p. 220); as where the person entitled to interest on the charge was also tenant for life of the charged land, and owed a duty to the remainderman (Burrell v. Egremont, 7 Beav. 236); secus where payment of the money charged was claimed out of the chargor's personal estate under his covenant, and the devisee of the land was absolute owner, and owed no such duty (Re England, Steward v. England, 1895, 2 Ch. 107). The last decision was affirmed by the C. A., |