Of the Right in regard to Air. Actions to restrain. Acquiescence. English people?" Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 322, adopted in Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. N. S. 133, and Crump v. Lambert, 3 Eq. 413; Bellamy v. Wells, 63 L. T. 635; see Jenkins v. Jackson, 60 L. T. 105). What would be a nuisance in one locality might not be so in another (Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. Div. 852). Where a man, by an act on his own land, such as burning bricks, causes so much annoyance to another in the enjoyment of a neighbouring tenement, as to amount prima facie to a cause of action, it is no answer that the act was done in a proper and convenient spot, and was a reasonable use of the land (Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 66, overruling Hole v. Barlow, 4 C. B. N. S. 334). See Shotts Iron Co. v. Inglis, 7 App. Cas. 528; Cavey v. Ledbitter, 13 C. B. N. S. 470; Luscombe v. Steer, 15 W. R. 1191; and St. Helen's Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. C. 642, where Lord Westbury distinguishes the cases where material injury is done to property, and those where personal discomfort is produced. As to the defence of reasonable user, see the views expressed on the one hand in Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692; Reinhardt v. Mentasti, 42 Ch. D. 68; and A.-G. v. Cole, 1901, 1 Ch. 205; and on the other hand in Gaunt v. Fynney, 8 Ch. 8; Ball v. Ray, 1b. 467; and Sanders Clark v. Grosvenor Mansions, 1900, 2 Ch. 373. An injunction was granted to restrain brick burning (Beardmore v. Tredwell, 3 Giff. 683; Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 315; Boreham v. Hall, 1870, W. N. 57; Roberts v. Clarke, 18 L. T. 49); and the emission of noxious vapours (Imperial Gas Co. v. Broadbent, 7 H. L. C. 600). The fact of the plaintiff having come to the nuisance, does not disentitle him to relief (Tipping v. St. Helen's Co., 1 Ch. 66). As to how far the delicate nature of the plaintiff's trade can be taken into consideration, see Cooke v. Forbes, 5 Eq. 166; Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88. The plaintiff must prove damage, visible, substantial, and actual (Salvin v. North Brancepeth Co., 9 Ch. 709). As to restraining alleged future nuisances, see Rapley v. Smart, 1894, W. N. 2; A.-G. v. Manchester, 1893, 2 Ch. 87. A weekly tenant can obtain an injunction (Jones v. Chappell, 20 Eq. 539), and tenants were added as co-plaintiffs by amendment at the trial (House Property Co. v. H. P. Horsenail Co., 29 Ch. D. 190). As to joining as co-plaintiffs the occupiers of several houses affected by the nuisance, see Truman v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co., 29 Ch. Div. 89; Umfreville v. Johnson, 10 Ch. 580; Hudson v. Maddison, 12 Sim. 416. A reversioner can sue (Shelfer v. City of London Electric Co., 1895, 1 Ch. 287). As to liability of occupiers, see White v. Jameson, 18 Eq. 303; Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692; Jenkins v. Jackson, 60 L. T. 105. The acts of two or more persons may taken together constitute such a nuisance that the court in separate actions will restrain each of them from doing the acts constituting the nuisance, although the act of one taken alone would not amount to nuisance (Lambton v. Mellish, 1894, 3 Ch. 163, where there were several actions; Blair v. Deakin, 57 L. T. 522, where there was one action against one such person). Under the old practice such an injunction was granted in one action against several independent persons (Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R. 8 Ch. 650). Whether under the present practice one action for an injunction can be maintained against several acting independently is doubtful (Sadler v. G. W. R. Co., 1896, A. C. 450). But damages cannot be recovered in one action against separate tortfeasors (Ib.). Acquiescence in the erection of noxious works while they produce little injury does not warrant the subsequent extension of them to an extent productive of great damage (Bankart v. Houghton, 27 Beav. 425). See also, as to the effect of acquiescence in such a case, Williams v. Jersey, Cr. & Phil. 91; Savile v. Kilner, 26 L. T. 276; Sanders v. Manley, 1878. W. N. 181. Where a nuisance ceases after writ, but before trial, an injunction may still be granted (Chester Chapter v. Smelting Corporation, 1901, W. N. 179; correcting Dunning v. Grosvenor Dairies, 1900, W. N. 265). LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AND SUITS. I. LAND OR RENT. PAGE The Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, ss. 1-39, 43, 44 110 ... 172 II. MONEY CHARGED ON LAND, LEGACIES, AND ARREARS OF The Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, ss. 40—42 ... The Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, ss. 8, 10 190 191 206 211 III. ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST EXECUTORS IN RESPECT OF INJURIES The Civil Procedure Act, 1833, s. 2 214 IV. SPECIALTIES, AND CERTAIN OTHER DEBTS AND PENALTIES. The Civil Procedure Act, 1833, ss. 3-7 ... 215 V. SIMPLE CONTRACT DEBTS AND CERTAIN PERSONAL ACTIONS. 222 ... ... 233 The Statute of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828, ss. 1, 3, 4 VI. THE MERCANTILE LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1856, ss. 9-17... 244 (Qualifying II., IV., and V.) VII. THE TRUSTEE ACT, 1888, ss. 1, 8, 12 247 ... VIII. COURTS OF EQUITY AND THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION c. 27, s. 1. Meaning of the words in the act. "Land.” I. LIMITATION OF TIME FOR THE RECOVERY OF LAND OR RENT. THE REAL PROPERTY LIMITATION ACT, 1833. 3 & 4 WILL. IV. c. 27, ss. 1-39, 43, 44. An Act for the Limitation of Actions and Suits relating to Real 1. Interpretation clause, s. 1...110. 2. Period of limitation fixed, and when right first accrues, ss. 2-15...122. 3. Savings in case of disabilities, ss. 16—19...152. 4. Concurrent rights, s. 20...156. 5. Operation of the statute in case of estates tail, ss. 21-23...157. 7. Limitation of time between mortgagor and mortgagee, s. 28, and 8. Limitation of time as to church property and advowsons, ss. 29 -33...175. 9. Final extinction of right, s. 34...179. 10. Receipt of rent deemed receipt of profits, s. 35...181. 11. Abolition of real and mixed actions, &c., ss. 36-39...181. 12. Limits of act, ss. 43, 44...183. 1.-Interpretation Clause. 3 & 4 Will. 4, BE it enacted, that the words and expressions hereinafter mentioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more confined or a different meaning, shall in this act, except where the nature of the provision or the context of the act shall exclude such construction, be interpreted as follows; (that is to say,) the word "land" (a) shall extend to manors, messuages, and all other corporeal hereditaments whatsoever (b), and also to tithes (c) (other than tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole) (d), and also to any share, estate or interest in them or any of them, whether the same shall be a freehold or chattel interest (e), and whether freehold or copyhold, or held according to any other tenure; and the word "rent" (f) shall extend to all heriots (g), and to all services and suits for which a distress may be made (h), and to all annuities and periodical sums of money charged upon or payable out of any land (i) (except moduses or compositions (4) belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole); and the person through whom another person is said to claim shall mean any person by, through or under or by the act of whom, the person so claiming became entitled to the estate or interest claimed, as heir, issue in tail (1), tenant by the curtesy of England, tenant in dower, successor, special or general occupant, executor, administrator, legatee, husband, assignee, appointee (m), "Rent." Person through whom another claims. devisee or otherwise, and also any person who was entitled to 3 & 4 Will. 4, an estate or interest to which the person so claiming, or some c. 27, s. 1. person through whom he claims, became entitled as lord by escheat (n); and the word "person" shall extend to a body "Person." politic, corporate or collegiate, and to a class of creditors or other persons, as well as an individual (o); and every word Number and importing the singular number only shall extend and be applied gender. to several persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male. (1) Construction of Statutes of Limitation generally...111. (2) Meaning of the word Land"...111. (3) Meaning of the word "Rent," and of Rents generally...113. (4) Meaning of "Person through whom another claims "...118. (5) Meaning of "Person"...119. (6) Claims by and against the Crown, and of Presumption of Grants by the Crown, of Enrolments, and of Statutes...119. (1) The object of all statutes of limitation is to prevent claims at great dis- Construction tances of time when evidences are lost, and in all well-regulated countries of statutes of the question of possession is held to be an important point of policy limitation (Dundee Harbour v. Dougall, 1 Macq. H. L. C. 321, per Lord St. Leonards), generally. The several statutes of limitations being all in pari materiâ ought to receive an uniform construction notwithstanding a slight variation in phrase, the object and intention being the same (Murray v. East India Co., 5 B. & Ald. 206, 215, per Abbott, C. J.) All these acts being, as they were emphatically termed by Lord Kenyon, statutes of repose, are to be liberally and beneficially expounded (per Dallas, C. J., in Tolson v. Kaye, 6 Moore, 55S; 3 Bro. & B. 217). See the maxims "Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium" (Broom's Legal Maxims, 328, 6th ed.) and " Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt" (Broom, 672, 7th ed.). (2) (a) The right to dower is within the word "land" (Marshall v. Smith, "LAND," 5 Giff. 40). But not turnpike tolls; and consequently more than six meaning of years' arrears of interest may be recovered on a mortgage of turnpike word. tolls notwithstanding the 42nd section of the act (Mellish v. Brooks, 3 Beav. 22). (b) Hereditament is a very comprehensive term, including whatever Hereditamay be inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal or mixed ments. (Co. Litt. 6a; 3 Rep. 2; Shep. Touch. 91). Hereditaments are of two sorts corporeal, consisting wholly of substantial and permanent objects; all of which may be comprehended under the general denomination of land (Co. Litt. 4; 2 Bl. Com. 17); and incorporeal, which are rights issuing out of a thing corporate (whether real or personal) or concerning, or annexed to, or exercisable within the same (1b. 20). Many of the latter are not within this act, but the periods of limitation for several incorporeal rights are prescribed by the Prescription Act, 1832 (ante, pp. 1-20). (c) The word "tithes " has an ambiguous meaning, signifying either the Tithes. estate in the tithes or the chattel itself, the fruits of the estate. Tithes (other than tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole) are included in the word "land," which in its proper sense applies only to cases in which there are two parties, each claiming an estate in the land adverse to each other. It has been held, that the statute does not prevent the tithe-owner from recovering tithes as chattels from the occupier, although none had been set out for twenty years, but that the 3 & 4 Will. 4, Tithe rentcharge. Arrears of tithes. Corporations. operation of the statute is confined to cases where there are two parties, each claiming an adverse estate in the tithes. Therefore a person who has received no tithes for the statutory period cannot recover the possession of them from another, who has for the same period received those tithes from the terre-tenant (Ely v. Cash, 15 M. & W. 617; Ely v. Bliss, 2 D. M. & G. 459; see Shannon v. Hodder, 2 Ir. L. R. 223). The effect of time as between tithe-owner and occupier is determined by the Tithe Act, 1832 (see Salkeld v. Johnston, 1 Mac. & G. 242, where Lord Cottenham expressed his opinion that under that act the proof of the enjoyment of the discharge claimed for the prescribed time is a sufficient answer to a demand for tithes: see S. C., 2 Ex. 256; 2 C. B. 749). The cases on the construction of that act are collected, Shelford on Tithes, 391-398, 3rd ed., and Supplement, 47-86; and see Leach's Tithe Acts, 6th ed. As regards payments for tithe imposed in London by 37 Hen. 8, c. 12, an action for their recovery was brought by a lay impropriator, and the defendant pleaded the Tithe Act, 1832. Held by House of Lords, affirming the Court of Appeal (52 L. T. 532), who had reversed Kay, J. (lb. 530), that these payments were not within that act, which only applies to tithes in kind (Payne v. Esdaile, 13 App. Cas. 613). The defence of non-payment apart from statute was also held bad in House of Lords (1b.), affirming Kay, J. (53 L. T. 21). Lastly, the defendant relied on the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, which the Court of Appeal held did not apply (54 L. T. 705). This was reversed by House of Lords, who held that these payments fell within the words "periodical sums of money charged upon land" (Payne v. Esdaile, 13 App. Cas. 613). The Tithes, moduses or compositions, belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole, are excepted from the operation of the present act. time for recovering lands belonging to such a corporation is prescribed by sect. 29, post, p. 175. Tithe rent-charge not belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole is within the meaning of the word "rent" in sect. 2, and the right thereto will be extinguished by non-payment for the statutory period (Irish Land Commission v. Grant, 10 App. Cas. 14). In the case of a tithe rent-charge belonging to a spiritual corporation sole, and which arose under the Tithe Rent-charge (Ireland) Act, 1838, the House of Lords held on the construction of the last-mentioned act that it was not a "composition" within the meaning of sect. 1 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, and accordingly fell within the general operation of the act (Ib.; see Conolly v. Gorman, 1898, 1 I. R. 20). As to the recovery of arrears of tithes and tithe rent-charge, see note to sect. 42, post, p. 201. (d) Spiritual corporations are those of which not only the members composing it are spiritual persons, but of which the object of the institution is also spiritual, such as bishops, some deans, and prebendaries, all archdeacons, parsons, and vicars, which are sole corporations; deans and chapters at present, and formerly prior and convent, abbot and monks, and the like, bodies aggregate (Co. Litt. 150 a; 1 Bl. Com. 471; 1 Kyd on Corporations, 22). Eleemosynary corporations are such as are constituted for the perpetual distribution of the free-alms or bounty of the founder of them to such persons as he has directed (1 Bl. Com. 471). These are of two general descriptions; hospitals for the maintenance and relief of poor and impotent persons, and colleges for the promotion of learning, and the support of persons engaged in literary pursuits, of which the greater number are within the universities, and form component parts of these larger corporations; and others are out of the universities, and not necessarily connected with them. Between hospitals having a common seal, and colleges in the universities or out of them, there is no difference in legal consideration, the difference is only in degree; for where in an hospital the master and poor are incorporated, it is a college having a |