ticks should never have been disjoined, since they are considered by Aristotle himself as forming essential parts of one and the same work; which, as it was the last and principal object of his studies, is of all his performances the longest, the best connected, and comparatively the most interesting. The two treatises combined constitute what he calls his "Practical Philosophy," "His Philosophy concerning Human affairs;" an epithet to which, in comparison with other works of the same kind, they will be found peculiarly entitled. "In the Ethicks," continues this able translator, "the reader will see a full and satisfactory delineation of the moral nature of man, and of the discipline and exercise best adapted to its improvement. The philosopher speaks with commanding authority to the heart and affections, through the irresistible conviction of the understanding. His morality is neither on the one hand too indulgent, nor on the other impracticable. His lessons are not cramped by the narrow, nor perverted by the wild spirit of system; they are clear inductions, flowing naturally and spontaneously from a copious and pure source of well-digested experience."

So strongly do we desire to recommend this work to the studious perusal of our young inquirers after knowledge, that they must pardon a further extract from the judicious observations of the learned translator, as it affords additional testimony of the merit of this production.

"The most profound, as well as the most elegant of all modern writers on the subject of political ethicks, the immortal Grotius, in his treatise on the laws of war and peace, observes that Aristotle holds the first rank among philosophers, whether we estimate him by

the perspicuity of his method, the acuteness of his distinctions, or the weight and solidity of his arguments. This criticism is fully justified," continues the doctor,* "by the book before us, in which our author treats of the nature of moral virtue; shews by what means it is acquired; proves by an accurate induction that it consists in the habit of mediocrity, and lays down three practical rules for its attainment. This part of his work will bear that trial which he regards as the test of excellence; it requires not any addition, and it will not admit of retrenchment. The objections made to it, as falling short of the purity and sublimity of christian morality, will equally apply to all the discoveries of human reason, when compared with that divine light which coming into the world, gives or offers light to every man in it.' But the criticks who make objections to Aristotle, would urge them with less confidence, if they attended to two remarks, on which our author often insists; first, that practical matters admit not of scientifick or logical accuracy; secondly, that the virtues of which he is in quest, are all of them merely relative to the condition and exigencies of man in political society; being those habits acquired by our own exertion, in which, when confirmed, we shall uniformly act our parts on the theatre of the world, usefully, agreeably, and gracefully. In Aristotle's philosophy man is the judge of man; in christianity, the judge of man is God. Philosophy confines itself to the perishing interests of the present world: christianity, looking beyond those interests, takes a loftier aim, inspires the mind with nobler motives, and promises to adorn

*Gillies' introduction to 2d book of Aristotle's Ethicks,

it with perfections worthy of its inestimably valuable rewards. Yet to the man of piety it may be a matter of edification, to compare the virtue of philosophical firmness with the grace of christian patience; and to observe how nearly the rules discovered by reason and experience, as most conducive to the happiness of our present state, coincide with those precepts which are given in the Gospel, in order to fit us for a better.”

(Note 6.) BEATTIE'S ELEMENTS. It is but seldom we see so much useful knowledge in so small a compass. The subjects treated are numerous, and of the first importance, and all in an elementary and uncommonly perspicuous manner. A second perusal of this little work need scarce be recommended, as we believe few of its readers will be content with one reading.

(Note 7.) PALEY'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. The theory of moral obligation is necessarily a preliminary study to that of municipal and international law. The student should, therefore, well comprehend the principles on which the vast body of human institutions is built, the end at which they aim, and the nature of that necessity imposed upon us, of conforming to their injunctions. In obedience to this consideration, we desire strongly to recommend the selection we have made under this title; as these topicks are set forth and illustrated in these works with more ability and learning than in any with which we are acquainted. This work of Dr. Paley is deservedly very popular. His arrangement is very methodical and lucid, and his conclusions are deduced from the great cardinal principles of morals, in a style at once clear and logical. No work on this subject is more highly distinguished by good sense.

(Note 8.) REID'S ESSAYS. The philosophy of the mind is so intimately connected with the philosophy of the rules by which that mind is under a moral sanction to be regulated, that the psychological authors here recommended will not appear out of place; besides which, the chapters selected as worthy particular attention, are, for the most part, on topicks which are the proper concern of the lawyer. The essays of Reid, Locke, and Stewart, are inestimable to the student, who to familiarity with the science in the erection of which they have all been master workmen, is ambitious to add the talents of profound and severe investigation, of just reasoning, and happy illustration. Of all writers, ancient and modern, none has been so rational on the subject of metaphysicks as Dr. Reid; and there is more substance and good sense in the few volumes published by him and his disciple Stewart, than are to be found any where else, in perhaps ten times the compass. We therefore urgently recommend every tyro in law to acquaint himself intimately with the metaphysical works of Locke, Reid, and Stewart, as they can scarcely fail to fashion his mind to patient inquiry, and to furnish it with principles of universal application in the science of law.

(Note 9.) BURLAMAQUI'S INSTITUTES. This has at all times been a very admired and popular work, not indeed as a very original production, but as an excellent commentary on the works of those great masters of natural and political law, Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, &c. The great merit of this production consists in its uniformly ascending to the original principles of the science of morals and politicks, and gradually unfolding the subject in a forcible, clear, and me

thodical manner. The style is sententious, and the definitions perspicuous and satisfactory. The connexion between morals and jurisprudence is often dwelt on in a pleasing and useful manner. This little production is very generally placed in the hands of the student; we advise that it should be attentively read, but never be considered as a substitute for that inestimable work [on the natural law by Mr. Rutherforth, which we think decidedly preferable to any other production on that topick, with which we are acquainted. There is an English translation of Burlamaqui by Thomas Nugent, in 1748. Burlamaqui was born at Geneva in 1694; was appointed professor of law in 1720, and subsequently counsellor of state.

This

(Note 10.) RUTHERFORTH'S INSTITUTES. book has an undoubted claim to be considered much more than its very able author has modestly termed it, a commentary on the work of Grotius. The reader will find every important question and topick discussed in the great treatise of that author, compressed into the lectures of his elegant commentator without the formality of a regular comment, his decisions compared with those of other casuists, and his occasional errours detected and corrected, in a style and method not so concise as to be obscure, nor so diffuse as to fatigue the attention of the reader. Indeed we conceive the logical clearness with which this very sensible work is written, to impart to it an interest unusual in treatises of its abstract nature; and to give it on the whole a decided preference to any other work on that subject, with which we are acquainted. Hieneccius, Hutchinson, Cumberland, Wolf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, &c, are more usually placed in students' hands, and