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In conclusion, we believe that such a bankrupt act—that is, such an one as is hereinbefore urged and advocated—is now pending before the United States Senate, having been already passed by the House of Representatives, and is known as the “ Torrey Bankrupt Act." Were this the only measure of the kind pending in the Senate, we would feel assured of its speedy enactment into law, but there is pending a measure known as the “Lowell Bankrupt Act," which has been twice passed by that body within the two years immediately preceding the present time, but each time it has been strangled in the Democratic House, because it was the policy of that party not to enact any legislation which would inure to the dignity and importance of the United States Government. The differences embodied in the two measures are not fundamental, for both measures embody the same principles, and they are those that have been held forth and advocated in this article as essential to a measure of that kind; but they differ only in detail or practice with simplicity, utility, and inexpensiveness, in favor of “The Torrey Bankrupt Act,” as we think.

Would it not be well to pass “ The Torrey Bankrupt Act," as in the event of the Senate doing so, the necessity of the House concurring in the action of the Senate would be obviated, as the bill has already been passed by the House, and leaving to future Con. gresses the amendment of the measure in particulars where experience would show such amendments were necessary.

The recent political revolution with which the country has been affected can have no effect upon the Senate with reference to its action upon the measure, as its provisions did not enter into any of the issues upon which, as it is alleged, the people passed judge ment. It is a question that is removed from the ordinary field of partisan politics and relegated to the jurisprudence of the country, affecting the morals of the commercial class of the country, a class which no nation can afford to have affected with a moral taint, least of all, to have on its statute books a condition of things such as has been demonstrated herein before, by offering a premium on fraud to its commercial class.



STIRRED up with the same movement, mud exhales a horrible stench, and ointment emits a fragrant odor.-Civ. Dci., T. 8.


quiry into the fundamentals of American Constitutional law. By Christopher G. Tiedeman, author of The Limitations of Police Power, etc., etc. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1890.

The ordinary reader, who does not care to pursue a philosophical course of reasoning to reach the author's estimation of our Constitution, will do well to follow the advice of the late Professor Hadley, of Yale College, whose lectures on Roman law, as well as his Greek grammar, are well known to scholars. That learned and studious man said that he always read the latest novels-in fact, any man could do so by pursuing his plan of reading the last chapter, and if that proved interesting, then the first, and if that was pleasing, then others as far as the interest lasted. So with this book. The last chapter treats of the value of written constitutions as a real exposition of the author's views that American constitutional law is largely made up of the popular will for the time being, without any great change in the written constitution. The author is too much of a lawyer to place the entire blame upon the courts, and yet is too much of a politician to admit that the Constitution was deliberately written in general language, to be construed from time to time by all three of the departments of the national government, as well as every other person in a position of sufficient power for that purpose. That is, Mr. Tiedeman is a believer in the brute-force theory of government as a reaction from the theoretically more perfect theory of the popular will as the foundation of authority.

This little book of 165 pages is chiefly valuable for its suggestiveness. Its own statements are too loose, and that way too inaccurate to attract more than temporary attention. For instance, the country has recently been sitting in judgment upon what the Farmers' Alliance of Minnesota have denominated the invasion of the sovereign State of California, by Justice Field, of the United States Supreme Court, and Deputy Marshal Naegle. Now, Justice Field was traveling from one session of his court to another, and the attendance of the Deputy Marshal involved the right of the United States to secure the peaceable attendance of the judges, and, perhaps, also, the suitors and witnesses at the sessions of the United States courts. Ordinarily, the State keeps the peace, but the failure of the State officials to do anything toward allaying the fears for the safety of Justice Field, developed the question of the right of the United States to secure the peaceful session of its courts without State aid. There is nothing in the Constitution which gives such right in so many words, though there is no doubt of the popular sentiment on the subject. Mr. Tiedeman does construe the Tenth Amendment (providing that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people), so that the powers prohibited to the States, and which legitimately fall within the scope of governmental authority, may be exercised by the United States, as well as those expressly or impliedly delegated by the Constitution ; but in no part of his book is there any direct discussion of the President's power to execute. the laws. This is the most important topic for discussion at present, and one which ought to have been the first in a book like this. But that would be a new path for constitutional writers, who all seem to fear new paths.

The author's position upon the right of the government to enforce obedience can be gathered from a sentence—“Lynch law, in a community not possessed of a properly-organized government, is as much law as the enactment of an American Legislature or the acts of Parliament.” Consequently, Mr. Tiedeman not only denies the social contract, so dear to Huxley and some other visionaries in the domain of law, but declares that might makes a ruler, and not the consent of the governed. That there may be po doubt of his position, the author finally declares that “if one cannot vote in the elections of the country, he cannot be said to have given his consent to the enactment and enforcement of the laws." The author constantly fails to see that revolution is at any time “legal," because punished as a crime if unsuccessful. This is curious, for his pages are devoted to teaching that the popular will, for the time being, really makes the law, notwithstanding written constitutions and penal enactments. So much so that the judges seem to be the only brake upon popular energy. All such writers necessarily ignore what the deeper thinkers call the moral being of the nation, a thing which must exist so long as men must bear each other's burdens. In this country no one bears his own, much less his neighbor's burdens in silence when he conceives a change beneficial. Agitation, command over popular impulses and similar individual qualities of constant use in the political, as well as the moral or religious arena, deny the author's supposition that this government does not depend upon the consent of the governedeven the women and the children and the aliens who do not vote. It is an exceedingly superficial view to think the "blocks of five"

and the political bosses are more powerful than the people. There is no danger in any political boss who attempts to rule without securing sufficient henchmen. These henchmen need not be voters at all, and certainly do not count in the political game, per capita. If Mr. Tiedeman cannot admit popular sovereignty, let him at least admit that all government depends upon the influence of certain men over their fellows, so that, without fear of brute force, the servient will ordinarily obey the rulers and their enactments.

CONSOLIDATED INDEX of subjects treated upon in the Law Text-Book Series.

Philadelphia : The Blackstone Publishing Company, 1890. Law sheep, $2,00; leatherette, $1.50.

There is a preface to this book which quite paralyzes a reviewer, for it begins with a confident assertion that “ but few, if any, words are required to set forth or explain its utility" to the owner of the Text-Book Series. That is true ; and even the fact that every other page is blank, for “ manuscript notes," is mentioned at the other end of this preface. In the usual language of the reviewer, this index is invaluable to the fortunate possessor of the thirty-six volumes now composing the series; it is one index instead of thirty-six.

The compiler was a great devotee to completeness and has inserted many titles which are useful for quick reference; thus, besides the formal titles only to be learned by much experience with the failings of digesters, there are—“ Abandoning Babies," in the plural—“ Breach of. Promise," as well as “ Breach of Promise to Marry," which recalls the awful condition of a staid elderly gentleman who was threatened by a female tenant with an action for breach of promise to keep a house in good condition—" Box" as well as the securities to be kept therein—" Ingratitude "_" Irish Witnesses,” with reference to Taylor on Evidence, pages 76, 447, 470, 1076, 1077, 1111, 1112—" Man Traps," with reference to Smith on Negligence and not to breach of promise—“Medical Man ” as well as “ Doctor "—and many other titles which appear to have been adopted in place of an elaborate logical classification of heads, sub-titles, and other details of the complete digests issued in the various parts of the country. There is no doubt that this index is of great value to the user of a series which has not been sufficiently appreciated by the profession. At a time when handy and cheap editions of every other kind of standard work are in demand, it is no credit to the Bar that a similar service for law text-books is so imperfectly appreciated. The great difficulty is the foolish desire for the latest text-book, instead of the standard work and the latest digest.

LAWYERS' REPORTS ANNOTATED. Book VII. Rochester, N. Y.: The Lawyers'

Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1890.

The curious and unauthorized division of Pennsylvania laws into Statutes and Public Laws appears again in the Table of Citations of this volume, with the useless result of duplication in this instance. In the division of the Acts of Congress into Statutes and Statutes at Large, there is every reason, of course, for the books are different, though the contents are the same; but there is no such difference in Pennsylvania, and the publishers ought not to forget the danger of error in one particular being improperly attributed to other parts of their book. The same improper division, though without any erroneous result, appears in separating the Kansas Bill of Rights from the other Constitutional citations, such division is not creditable editing.

The note to the New York case on page 852 may well be compared with the annotation in the October AMERICAN LAW REGISTER on the liability of a bank collecting a draft.

The case of State of Iowa v. Creeden was decided in October, 1889, six months before the Original Package Case, and cannot be considered good law; it was a curious selection to make. The same is true of State of Kansas v. Fulker, decided in January, 1890; it is an echo of the overruled License Cases.

The liability of a public charitable corporation is discussed in a Michigan case (page 170), but no general principle established ; in this particular there is nothing better than Mr. McMurtrie's contribution in the April AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

The Cable Car case from Missouri, with the few cases referred to in the note, is of the character which must commend such a series of selected cases as this. The principles are not new, but the purchaser of such books is not seeking for anything but authorities in the cheapest form and moderate bulk. Any selection of doubtful cases is therefore aside from the plan of the work. It would be impossible to name all the cases properly selected—it may be conceded that the volume is only open to criticism in the few cases such as have been mentioned above. There is nothing else to write about the volume which has not already been commended in the preceding volumes.

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