glory enough for one life, if that life did not attain to its conception of the height of fame it had pictured for itself. For it is well known that Chief Justice Chase had always courted a judicial position, in which he hoped to shine in the eyes of his fellow-countrymen. His case was not an isolated one of a man who aspires to greatness in a certain walk in life, and never attains his ideal.

But so long as the Government of the United States shall last, so long will last the fame of Salmon P. Chase, its Secretary of the Treasury, who founded our fiscal system, the best known to the civilized world, in our day, and the Secretary who came into office and found an empty Treasury, and a government without credit, but filled its emptiness to a plethoric fullness, and built up the credit of the government to colossal proportions, with the abundance of brains, patriotism, and genius with which he was endowed, and which he generously contributed to his country in her hour of great need.

W. D. LUCKENBACH.

DISTRICTING BY CONGRESS.-There is no doubt that the Constitution gives technical authority for such a proceeding. The question, therefore, appears to be not one of authority, but of expediency and a due regard for certain foundation principles which underlie the American system of government. ***Nothing is more certain than that some means ought to be devised for the prevention of this sort of political thievery [gerrymandering] because it outrages public sentiment and makes the ballot-box a contrivance for defeating instead of carrying out the will of the people.

The main question is: Do circumstances warrant or does the spirit of American institutions justify a redistricting of the States by Congress? There seems to be a disposition on the part of leading newspapers to think the matter over. Very few of them have announced an opinion; some of them shun the subject altogether. It is quite right that it be not approached impetuously. The new departure, if made at all, must be made because it will better carry out the idea of self-government and more perfectly protect the rights of all the people. By this test it must stand or fall in the estimation of good citizens of whatever party.-Rochester Democrat.

WHO is there that would consent to be knowingly mistaken, with whatever company he might share his errors?—S. Aug. letter 82, $23.

The death of Justice Samuel F. Miller, of the United States Supreme Court, removes the oldest member of that body in point of service, and, with the exception of Justice Field, the last of the appointees of President Lincoln on the reorganization of the court at the outbreak of the civil war and the death of Chief Justice Taney. And it takes away one who has been generally regarded as perhaps the ablest expounder of constitutional law identified with the court since the days of Chief Justice John Marshall. And this is to be said of him, remembering that in the questions arising out of the civil war a period of constitutional development set in of nearly as great concern to the shaping of our government as the great formative period immediately following the adoption of the Constitution. Miller will never be iden

tified with this former period as Marshall was with the latter; but when the history of constitutional interpretation for the quarter of a century succeeding the rebellion comes to be written, the most influential of all the minds engaged will probably be regarded as that of Samuel F. Miller.

His political antecedents greatly helped to this result. He came to the bench a strong Republican, a student of the Hamilton school, an admirer of the nationalistic ardor of Henry Clay, and withal a pronounced Federalist in his notions of the scope of the powers of the national government. And he came at a time when the temper of the nation and of the bench was in harmony with these views, and political conditions offered the widest opportunity for stamping them on the frame of government. But the respon

sibility of the judge seems to have at once tempered these political leanings with a broad conservatism, which in later years brought him, and assisted largely in bringing the court, into pretty close accord with the strict constructionist view.

This first became prominently manifested in the famous Louisiana slaughter-house cases, when the court, Miller giving the opinion, held that in no essential way had the three war amendments altered the relations of the States and the Federal government. Could Louisiana grant a monopoly of a business in the face of the 14th amendment, which said that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"? The statesmen of the reconstruction period held that Louisiana could not; but that this amendment reached way down and took from the States many, if

not all, of the powers incident to their autonomy. But the Supreme Court decided otherwise; and in an opinion which marked a great turning-point in the general drift toward the effacement of the reserved rights of the States, held that the powers of the States in the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and propertyhad not been essentially altered or curtailed by the war amendments save only in the particular cases cited, relative to the exslaves. We see in those amendments, said the court, no purpose to destroy the main features of our system-no purpose to tamper with that even balance between state autonomy and national supremacy upon which hang the stability and strength of our popular government.

Speaking three years ago before the students of the Ann Arbor Law School, Justice Miller remarked that there were strong intimations at the time this celebrated opinion was given that it would be subjected to the hostile review of the Congress; but it was not, and it has stood to govern the judgments of the court ever since, and has been almost unanimously acquiesced in by the people. Later in the same year Justice Miller, speaking at the Constitutional Centennial at Philadelphia, took occasion again, as he had at Ann Arbor, to emphasize his State rights views, saying, among other things: "The just and equal observance of the rights of the States and of the general government, as defined by the present Constitution, is as necessary to the permanent prosperity of our country and to its existence for another century as it has been for the one whose close we are now celebrating."

Although writing many of the most important opinions, and largely influencing the judgments of the court through his twentyeight years of service, this must remain his most conspicuous service—that, at a time when the balance struck by the Constitution between the powers of the States and the nation was in danger of being swept away by momentary popular feeling, Justice Miller gave his weighty judgment, even against his possible political prejudices, for the preservation of the essentials of the old system. He was a disciple of Marshall, and could quote no authority, to him more weighty, than the great Chief Justice. In many ways Miller resembled him. He had much of that capacity to seize upon the vital points in controversy, and that instinctive command of the general principles concerned which characterized Marshall.

It is curious to note that Justice Miller had never studied, or even thought of the law, until he was thirty years old; and when

Lincoln found him an active lawyer and politician in Iowa in 1862 he had never presided over a court. But it proved one of the happiest of the martyred President's selections for high office.Springfield Republican.

THE FARMERS' ALLIANCE have been consistent, and started to learn by experience that which they might have avoided, by electing judges without any legal education. If this should result in the abolition of an elective judiciary, the result to the country would be more than beneficial. For it is an open secret amongst lawyers that elected judges are frequently the product of personal claims on local political leaders, and at all times the result of political influence. In such a system, ability is of no weight until the political leaders think it a worthy move to please the independent voters. More than this, the judicial pap must run in certain directions, until the appointments in the hands of the judges have included the necessary party dependents. Admitting to the fullest extent that a politician is a better person for a judge to appoint, than a brother or a nephew, or some other relative, still the administration of justice ought to be removed from the turmoil of politics in at least those portions which affect citizens of all parties, so that the happy condition of a Philadelphia tipstaff ought to be general: he was not personally interested in the result of the last election. (The same judges are usually nominated by both parties in Philadelphia.) Errors may be made in the appointment of judges, and even bad men might be intentionally chosen by the Governor and even confirmed by a corrupt Legislature, but that is not the argument for an elective judiciary, which emphatically lives in a glass house. Let the Farmers' Alliance continue until the elective judiciary is given a full trial and not the minimized evils now prevalent, until the popular feeling will be so aroused as to demand assurances that competent as well as honest men shall always be preferred. In one aspect of the matter, it is far better to have a judge who knows no law, as the Alliance candidates are thought to be, than a political lawyer whose legal knowledge is small enough to be dangerous to the community. Perhaps the Alliance may yet be a factor in raising the educational standard of the bar.

CAPUT CRETUM.-Therefore it is commonly and justly said of a man whom false compliments have made proud, "his head has grown."-S. Aug. letter xxiii. A. D. 396.

LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

By C. STUART PATTERSON, Dean of the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania.

Reported by Emlen Hare MilLER, of the Philadelphia Bar.

(Continued from the November number, page 673.)

Let us re-enumerate the political structures which in this country preceded the Constitution.

When the Revolutionary War first broke out, each of the colonies had a provisional government, while to a Congress were entrusted general powers. The Articles of Confederation knit more closely together the mass of States. They vested the whole administrative power, whether executive or legislative, in one chamber. An ability to coerce, however, was wanting. Authority was given without the means of carrying it out. `Legislative acts on the most important subjects could only be passed upon the approval of nine States. A committee appointed by Congress formed the sole executive. Under the Articles of Confederation, there was no federal judiciary as we now comprehend the term. It was simply provided that the United States in Congress assembled should be the last resort on appeal in all disputes between two or more States concerning boundaries, jurisdiction, etc. admiralty causes, there was provision for a limited exercise of federal judicial power. Courts were to be appointed by Congress, for the prosecution of piracies and felonies on the high seas, and to hear appeals in cases of captures.

The restraints upon the States under the Articles, were mainly such as affected them in their foreign relations; in short, the Confederation was practically an alliance for international purposes only.

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

This preamble grants no powers; it is vague and general. Could any authority be drawn from it, the subsequent provisions would be useless. It is held that since the Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, and since the words "United States" occur in various places throughout the instrument in the sense of a body politic, and not a body corporate, the meaning is here that