If of several persons, their selection may be jointly made by the nations concerned. Should no choice be agreed upon, each nation showing a distinct interest in the question at issue shall have the right to appoint one arbitrator on its own behalf.

ARTICLE IX.

Whenever the court shall consist of an even number of arbitrators, the nations concerned shall appoint an umpire, who shall decide all questions upon which the arbitrators may disagree. If the nations interested fail to agree in the selection of an umpire, such umpire shall be selected by the arbitrators already appointed.

ARTICLE X.

The appointment of an umpire, and his acceptance, shall take place before the arbitrators enter upon the hearing of the questions in dispute,

ARTICLE XI.

The umpire shall not act as a member of the court, but his duties and powers shall be limited to the decision of questions, whether principal or incidental, upon which the arbitrators shall be unable to agree.

ARTICLE XII.

Should an arbitrator or an umpire be prevented from serving by reason of death, resignation, or other cause, such arbitrator or umpire shall be replaced by a substitute to be selected in the same manner in which the original arbitrator or umpire shall have been chosen.

ARTICLE XIII.

The court shall hold its sessions at such place as the parties in interest may agree upon, and in case of disagreement or failure to name a place the court itself may determine the location.

ARTICLE XIV.

When the court shall consist of several arbitrators, a majority of the whole number may act notwithstanding the absence or withdrawal of the minority. In such case the majority shall continue in the performance of their duties until they shall have reached a final determination of the questions submitted for their consideration.

ARTICLE XV.

The decision of a majority of the whole number of arbitrators shall be final, both on the main and incidental issues, unless in the agreement to arbitrate it shall have been expressly provided that unanimity is essential.

ARTICLE XVI.

The general expenses of arbitration proceedings shall be paid in equal proportions by the Governments that are parties thereto; but expenses incurred by either party in the preparation and prosecution of its case shall be defrayed by it individually.

ARTICLE XVII.

Whenever disputes arise the nations involved shall appoint courts of arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the preceding articles. Only by the mutual and free consent of all of such nations may those provisions be disregarded, and courts of arbitration appointed under different arrangements.

ARTICLE XVIII.

This treaty shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of the exchange of ratifications. After the expiration of that period, it shall continue in operation until one of the contracting parties shall have notified all the others of its desire to determine it. In the event of such notice the treaty shall continue obligatory upon the party giving it for one year thereafter, but the withdrawal of one or more nations shall not invalidate the treaty with respect to the other nations concerned.

ARTICLE XIX.

This treaty shall be ratified by all the nations approving it, according to their respective constitutional methods; and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the city of Washington on or before the first day of May, A. D. 1891.

Any other nation may accept this treaty and become a party thereto, by signing a copy thereof and depositing the same with the Government of the United States; whereupon the said Government shall communicate this fact to the other contracting parties.

In testimony whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have hereunto affixed their signatures and seals.

Done in the city of Washington, in Spanish, and Portuguese, on this

copies, in English,

day of the month of

one thousand eight hundred and ninety.

II-RECOMMENDATION TO EUROPEAN POWERS.

The International American Conference resolves: That this Conference, having recommended arbitration for the settlement of disputes among the Republics of America, begs leave to express the wish that controversies between them and the nations of Europe may be settled in the same friendly manner.

It is further recommended that the government of each nation herein represented communicate this wish to all friendly powers.

III-THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST.

WHEREAS, The International American Conference feels that it would fall short of the most exalted conception of its mission were it to abstain from embodying its pacific and fraternal sentiments in declarations tending to promote national stability and guaranty just international relations among the nations of the continent: Be it therefore

Resolved, That it earnestly recommends to the Governments therein represented the adoption of the following declarations:

First. That the principle of conquest shall not, during the continuance of the Treaty of Arbitration, be recognized as admissible under American public law.

Second. That all cessions of territory made during the continuance of the Treaty of Arbitration shall be void, if made under threats of war or the presence of an armed force.

Third. Any nation from which such cessions shall be exacted may demand that the validity of the cessions so made shall be submitted to arbitration.

Fourth. Any renunciation of the right to arbitration made under the conditions named in the second section shall be null and void.

DISORDERLINESS is the beginning of perdition.-3 Clem. Hom. 59.

THE COPYRIGHT is the great conscientious touchstone of English journals, and, as usual, the Lady's Pictorial, of London, waxes indignant over an American newspaper reprinting a story from its columns, yet on the same page prints an editorial paragraph stolen verbatim from the Philadelphia Press without credit.

THE DUDLEY CASE.

I have concluded to lay before the public a statement of facts, with letters and correspondence, which will demonstrate that the warfare made upon me as United States district judge, for the year and a half past, has been causeless and unjust. Always without reason and excuse, it was begun and has been waged upon a single pretext-an alleged intentional inconsistency between two grand jury charges concerning the crime of counseling or advising bribery at the election of a Congressman. The second of the charges referred to was given on the 15th of January, 1889, and on the next day was raised the outcry against me, which has not been allowed to cease-in this city by the Sentinel, and in Washington city by ex-Senator McDonald. Not having and not waiting for accurate or trustworthy knowledge of either charge, the Senator consented to an "interview" on the subject with a reporter of the Louisville Courier-Journal, in which, according to his own version of it, he said of the second charge "that it seemed to him to be a complete departure from the former charge, and that it would bear the criticism of being intended to shield Dudley from indictment, and, at all events, would have that effect." As reported, he was made to say: "This bears evidence of a prearranged plan between Dudley's influential friends and the presiding judge, and was concocted and so decreed for the express purpose of relieving Dudley from probable prosecution in the future."

This, it will be observed, contains the substance of all that has been said against me since, whether it be found in newspapers or speeches, or in the first resolution of the platform which was adopted by the convention held in this city on the 28th ult. Taken up as a keynote, the interview was widely republished and commented upon, and for several weeks met no public disavowal. The result of the first publication of it was a correspondence between the Senator and myself, commencing with my letter of January 18th, 1889, and ending, on the Senator's part (though not on mine), with his letter of February 16th, 1889, published in the Sentinel of the 19th of that month, in which he did in part disclaim the interview, and, among other things, said:

"My personal relations with Judge Woods, and my faith in his integrity would not permit me to believe, much less to express such a belief, as that he had corruptly given the charge. I desire, therefore, in the most unqualified manner, to disclaim any intent or purpose to reflect upon the character of Judge Woods."

But for the context this was comprehensive and explicit enough. Whether, however, he dealt in scrupulous fairness with me, and with the question of law between us, let the correspondence determine. It will all go to the public with this letter, and, if on my part there was some display of warmth, it will not, I think, be thought, under the circumstances, to have been unbecoming. It is fair to say that Mr. McDonald has disclaimed responsibility for the assault upon me in the platform of his party.

But now to the exact question between my accusers and me. The pronunciamento of the 28th ult. fails to disclose the precise ground and nature of the sweeping denunciation contained in it. That there may be no mistake or quibbling about it I will restate the accusation as it was originally made and has been persistently reiterated. Stated succinctly and as plainly as I can do it, the charge is that in respect to the blocks-of-five letter I gave to the federal grand jury inconsistent instructions, and that the second, reversing the first, was given for the purpose of shielding Dudley from indictment. In other words, there are here two propositions important to be considered: (1) That the two instructions were inconsistent; and (2) that the change of ruling was intended to shield Dudley from indictment.

What are the facts? Dates are important. The grand jury was impaneled and first instructed November 14th, 1888. The second, or supplemental instruction, was given two months and a day later -on January 15th, 1889. The first instruction, so far as important here, was that under Section 5511 of the United States Revised Statutes-one who "aids, counsels, procures, or advises" another "to commit, or to attempt to commit any offense" named in the section (including the bribing of a voter) is punishable. The essence of the second instruction is contained in a single sentence of it, namely: "But in any case, besides the mere fact of the advice or counsel, it must be shown that the crime contemplated was commited or an attempt made to commit it." On this point there is in the first charge no explicit statement. It was purposely left out; and nothing more explicit upon the point ever would have been said to the grand jury but for the request it made for further instruction, which, of course, I could not refuse to answer. How the request originated I am not informed. It came to me as late as seven o'clock P. M., of December 24th, after I had gone home, supposing that the grand jury had already adjourned until January 14th, as it had been theretofore