choice. In unhealthy or dangerous work children under fifteen will have to obtain the royal permission.

Whereas most European countries have laws regulating the employment of women and children in manufactories and trades, very few have touched upon, and then only lightly, the employment of men. This consists principally of the number of hours that constitute a day's work and Sunday work.

In Austria there is a law governing the maximum working hours for men. By this law a man may not work in manufactories or at trades more than eleven hours daily, not including rests.

Switzerland's work day consists of eleven hours, and on the eve of a holiday and Saturdays only ten hours. Besides this, a working day is to be considered as between six A. M. (in summer five A. M.) and eight P. M. Night work is dependent upon permission. In dangerous work the Bundesrath can still further reduce the hours, and an extension of a working day can also be made by the authorities of the canton. Irregular work, which is done before or after regular hours, provided the same is done by men, is not included in this article. The Swiss laws go further than those of any other land. At the beginning these laws were regarded with great suspicion, yet strictly carried out; and by some dissatisfied persons the misfortune overtaking several industries, notably the silk industry, was attributed to these laws, yet time has proven these laws to be good, as a ten years' test has demonstrated.

In France the law fixes a day's labor at twelve hours. A decree appeared, others soon followed, making exceptions for many different manufactories and allowing laborers in same to work thirteen to fourteen hours daily.

The other European countries have no fixed laboring hours. In Great Britain, where the best laws exist, they are disregarded. While they have fixed the time for women and children at ten hours in manufactories where women and children are necessary besides men, they disregard the latter.

European nations are giving increasing attention to Sunday rest legislation. Judge Gottschalk emphasizes this significant fact.

In Germany Sunday work is not only forbidden, but the manufacturer cannot compel the laborer to work on Sundays or holidays. Therefore, a contract to do Sunday work is void, and a laborer cannot be discharged for refusing to do Sunday work. Those manufactories which must be constantly in operation are excepted. All the various States of Germany adhere to this law.

In Austria all manufactories must close on Sunday, except for

purposes of cleaning. Exceptions, when good reasons are shown, can be made by the Trades Minister and Minister of the Interior. On holidays the assistant laborers must finish the cleaning necessary in time to attend church. The Sabbath rest begins no later than six A. M. Sunday and continues for twenty-four hours.

Similar regulations are in vogue in Hungary. Besides those mentioned, it is stated that in those manufactories where Sunday labor is a necessity it must be so arranged that the laborers have at least one Sunday every month or a half-Sunday every two weeks free.

In Great Britain the keeping of Sunday holy in such a custom as to make it unnecessary to make other laws. For the protected persons-women and children working in the manufactories-they have, besides the Sundays and regular holidays, eight half-holidays per year.

In Switzerland Sunday labor is prohibited, but the Bundesrath makes exceptions for those establishments that must be in operation continuously; but even in these establishments each laborer must have every other Sunday free at least. The laws of the cantons may designate eight days yearly as additional holidays, which have the same effect as a Sunday. The railroad rules compel all railroads to allow at least one holiday in every three weeks to railroad employees.—Alta California.

THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER for May, published by the D. B. Canfield Company, Limited, the Drexel Building, Philadelphia, is occupied almost exclusively by two articles of unusual interest and importance at this time. The first is entitled " Christianity and the Common Law," both as regards England and the United States, by A. H. Wintersteen; the second is "State ex rel. Weiss et al. v. District School Board of Edgerton, S. Ct. Wis.," and is a thorough review from a legal standpoint of a case which is still attracting a great deal of attention in connection with the use of the Bible in public schools. The latter is accompanied with annotations by A. H. Wintersteen. Space forbids anything like a proper analysis of these articles, which need to be studied in their entirety by the reader.- The Christian at Work.

FEAR is nothing else but a betraying of the succours which reason offereth.-Wisd. xvii, 12.

Dissatisfaction with the working of the jury system seems to be increasing. It is no longer looked on with the admiration and respect that made it a most precious right in the eyes of our ancestors. One of their prominent grievances against King George was, as they said in the Declaration of Independence, " depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury." The Constitution guaranteed these benefits in criminal cases, and the amendments proposed at the first sessions of the first Congress secured the same privilege in civil cases. Though the civil provision has been held to apply only to the Federal courts, the right is established in all the State and lower courts, except in cases involving trifling amounts. From that day to this the spread-eagle orators of the country have seldom failed to boast of "trial by jury" while extolling the institutions of liberty.

Nevertheless, the incapacity of ordinary jurymen to deal intelligently with many of the intricate cases developed from the complexity of modern society, has led to a natural substitute for the old system in the shape of referees, auditors, or arbitrators, who, by general education or special training may be presumed to be qualified to unravel the particular case at issue. Judging by the increase in number of references, this method is growing in favor. Certainly it often saves both expense and delay, each of them important considerations in modern litigation. Nevertheless, Judge Dwight Foster, not many years ago, wrote that he was firmly persuaded that the verdicts of juries are, as a rule, more satisfactory to all concerned-parties, counsel, and intelligent observers-than the awards of arbitrators or referees." Thus it will be seen that as to this remedy opinions differ, but at the same time that its partial success, as shown by its spread, proves the need of a remedy of some sort.

Another step in the same direction is the practice in many courts of dispensing with the jury and letting the judge decide questions of fact, provided neither party to the suit calls for a jury. The chief objection made to this is that a judge should invariably be the decider of law and not of fact. Judge Foster said that he had been "less frequently, seriously, and permanently dissatisfied with the verdicts of juries than with the decisions of judges on similar points." Judge Robert C. Pitman has made another point against compelling the court to try questions of fact, in the matter of "the danger of thus impairing the confidence of litigants in its

impartiality," for "all understand that the judge does not make but declares the law, but in deciding facts he must necessarily judge and weigh parties and witnesses." Yet Judge Pitman testifies that in Massachusetts this works satisfactorily.

The simplest and most logical way of increasing the justice of civil decisions, if we grant that justice can have any comparative degree, is possibly not the substitution of something else for the jury, but the removal of the requirement for unanimity of the jury. Very eminent authorities have long disapproved of this requirement in civil cases. Bentham styled it a system of "perjury enforced by torture," a description somewhat hyperbolical, but based on the facts. Hallam called it "that preposterous relic of barbarism." The experts appointed by Parliament in 1830 on the courts of common law, said: "It seems absurd that the rights of a party in question of a doubtful and complicated nature should depend on his being able to satisfy twelve persons that one particular state of facts is the true one." They proposed that after twelve hours, the opinion of nine of the jurors should prevail. Lord Campbell, many years after, introduced a bill to carry such a measure into effect, but it did not pass.

In a recent article in Current Comment, General Thomas Ewing has forcibly presented the arguments against unanimity, which he thinks is unsustained by either reason or experience, though he admits that in criminal cases it is a just and necessary safeguard of liberty. The presumption is that the accused is innocent, and to rebut it the proof of his guilt should exclude all reasonable doubt, not only in the minds of the majority, but of each and every one of the jurors. But, he says, there is no presumption in a civil action that the plaintiff is wrong. Where the verdict cannot, in the nature of the case, be a compromise, as in an action of ejectment or on a promissory note, disagreements of jurors result from the corruption or dullness or prejudice of a small minority. In almost all other cases the verdict is a compromise forced by a small minority and accepted by a large majority as only better than a mis-trial, a compromise founded on no testimony or principle, generally not representing the judgment of any single juryman.

The strongest argument for unanimity is that which insists upon the great value of giving to each juryman a veto power that insures for his opinions a fair consideration in the deliberations of the jury-room. In reply to this it is urged that the same end should be accomplished by providing that only a unanimous verdict would

be received for several hours after the jury had been sent out. As General Ewing recalls, when the present jury system was young, unanimity was obtained by fining the obstinate minority or by punishing the whole jury, as by driving them in open carts from one assize to another. More recently was devised the plan of imprisoning them, often without food or water, until cold, hunger, thirst, or fatigue compelled the weak or ill or mean-spirited to commit moral perjury by assenting to a verdict against their consciences. 'Why a unanimous verdict thus obtained was better than a majority verdict no one has attempted to tell."

The opinion seems to grow that sooner or later we are coming to the majority verdict. Judge George C. Barrett has well pointed out that the demand for such a change will be greater as juries improve and as the difficulty in securing conscientious unanimity increases. It is hard enough already for twelve strong men, in this enlightened age, to agree upon almost any debatable subject. Many argue, therefore, that if three-quarters or two-thirds, or even a bare majority, can come to a decision where a measure of damages is to be fixed that is all that can reasonably be asked.-Bradstreet's.

DRUNKEN JUROR.-The Supreme Court July 5th, last, rendered a decision affirming the judgment denying a new trial in the case of Ipswitch against Fernandez. Ipswitch, who lost his suit in the Superior Court, wanted another trial, on the ground that one of the jurors was drunk during the taking of testimony and when the verdict was rendered, as he had imbibed freely during every recess. The Court held that a drunken juror or two cut no figure in a civil trial, provided nine were sober jurors. According to the record the juror's inebriated condition was apparent to the judge, attorneys, and witnesses during the trial, but the Supreme Court held that Ipswitch should have made his objection then, instead of waiting until the case went against him.-Alta California.

The rule is otherwise in a criminal case: People v. Lee Chuck, 77 Cal. 317; 28 American Law Register 709, with an annotation formulating the rules governing such cases.

THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER. The B. D. Canfield Company, Limited, Drexel Building, Philadelphia. We welcome this publication to our table. It is exceedingly instructive and helpful and will prove of value not only to the professional lawyer but to the layman. The Central Baptist.