legislatures or wholly by Congress. If Congress does not interfere, of course they may be made wholly by the State; but if it chooses to interfere, there is nothing in the words to prevent its doing so, either wholly or partially. On the contrary, their necessary implication is that it may do either. It may either make the regulations or it may alter them. If it only alters, leaving, as manifest convenience requires, the general organization of the polls to the State, there results a necessary co-operation of the two governments in regulating the subject. But no repugnance in the system of regulations can arise thence, for the power of Congress over the subject is paramount. It may be exercised as and when Congress sees fit to exercise it. When exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them. This is implied in the power to "make or alter." (Pp. 383, 384.)

So in the case of laws for regulating the elections of Representatives to Congress. The State may make regulations on the subject; Congress may make regulations on the same subject, or may alter or add to those already made. The paramount character of those made by Congress has the effect to supersede those made by the State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no farther. There is no such conflict between them as to prevent their forming a harmonious system perfectly capable of being administered and carried out as such. (Page 386.)

The objection that the laws and regulations, the violation of which is made punishable by the acts of Congress, are State laws and have not been adopted by Congress is no sufficient answer to the power of Congress to impose punishment. It is true that Congress has not deemed it necessary to interfere with the duties of the ordinary officers of election, but has been content to leave them as prescribed by State laws. It has only created additional sanctions for their performance, and provided means of supervision in order more effectually to secure such performThe imposition of punishment implies a prohibition of the act punished. The State laws which Congress sees no occasion to alter, but which it allows to stand, are in effect adopted by Congress. It simply demands their fulfillment. Content to leave the laws as they are, it is not content with the means provided for their enforcement. It provides additional means for that purpose, and we think it is entirely within its constitutional power to do so. It is simply the exercise of the power to make additional regulation. (Pages 388, 389.)

ance.

On the contrary, as already said, we think it clear that the clause of the Constitution relating to the regulation of such elections contemplates such co-operation whenever Congress deems it expedient to interfere merely to alter or add to existing regulations of the State. If the two governments had an entire equality of jurisdiction there might be an intrinsic difficulty in such co-operation. Then the adoption by the State government of a system of regulations might exclude the action of Congress. By first taking jurisdiction of the subject the State would acquire exclusive jurisdiction in virtue of a well-known principle applicable to courts having co-ordinate jurisdiction over the same matter. But no such equality exists in the present case. The power of Congress, as we have seen, is paramount, and may be exercised at any time and to any extent

which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no farther, the regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.

The Supreme Court also discussed this clause of the Constitution still more fully in ex parte Yarborough (110 U. S. 651), when Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court and no dissent was noted:

That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest consideration.

If this Government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the General Government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption.

If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption. (Pages 657, 658.)

Will it be denied that it is in the power of that body to provide laws for the proper conduct of those elections? To provide, if necessary, the officers who shall conduct them and make return of the result? And, especially, to provide in an election held under its own authority for security of life and limb to the voter while in the exercise of this function. Can it be doubted that Congress can by law protect the act of voting, the place where it is done, and the man who votes from personal violence or intimidation and the election itself from corruption and fraud?

If this be so, and it is not doubted, are such powers annulled because an election for State officers is held at the same time and place? Is it any less important that the election of members of Congress should be the free choice of all the electors because State officers are to be elected at the same time? Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371.

These questions answer themselves; and it is only because the Congress of the United States, through long habit and long years of forbearance, has, in deference and respect to the States, refrained from the exercise of these powers that they are now doubted.

But when, in the pursuance of a new demand for action, that body, as it did in the cases just enumerated, finds it necessary to make additional laws for the free, the pure, and the safe exercise of this right of voting they stand upon the same ground and are to be upheld for the same reasons. (Pages 661, 662.)

If this were conceded, the importance to the General Government of having the actual election-the voting for those members-free from force and fraud, is not diminished by the circumstance that the qualification of the voter is determined by the law of the State where he votes. It equally aflects the Government; it is as

indispensable to the proper discharge of the great function of legislating for that Government that those who are to control this legislation shall not owe their election to bribery or violence, whether the class of persons who shall vote is determined by the law of the State or by the law of the United States, or by their united result. (Page 663.)

If the Government of the United States has within its constitutional domain no authority to provide against these evils, if the very sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage without legal restraint, then, indeed, is the country in danger, and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it are at the mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute force, on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the other. (Page 667.)

The court in ex parte Siebold also ruled very plainly in regard to the power of Congress under this clause of the Constitution to treat State officers conducting elections as officers of the United States:

It is objected that Congress has no power to enforce State laws or to punish State officers, and especially has no power to punish them for violating the laws of their own State. As a general proposition this is undoubtedly true, but when in the performance of their functions State officers are called to fulfill duties which they owe to the United States, as well as to the State, has the former no means of compelling such fulfillment ?

In view of the fact that Congress has plenary and paramount jurisdiction over the whole subject, it seems almost absurd to say that an officer who receives or has custody of the ballots given for a Representative owes no duty to the National Government which Congress can enforce, or that an officer who stuffs the ballotbox can not be made amenable to the United States. If Congress has not, prior to the passage of the present laws, imposed any penalties to prevent and punish frauds and violations of duty committed by officers of election it has been because the exigency has not been deemned sufficient to require it, and not because Congress has not the requisite power. (Pages 387, 388.)

They also decided that it conferred upon Congress the power to appoint officers of its own to act as police at the polls, where a member of Congress is being chosen, for the preservation of order and for the protection of the electors in their right to freely and peaceably cast their ballots.

The counsel for the petitioners concede that Congress may, if it sees fit, assume the entire control and regulation of the election of Representatives. This would necessarily involve the appointment of the places for holding the polls, the times for voting, and the officers for holding the election; it would require the regula tion of the duties to be performed, the custody of the ballots, the mode of ascertaining the result, and every other matter relating to the subject. Is it possible that Congress could not, in that case, provide for keeping the peace at such elections, and for arresting and punishing those guilty of breaking it? If it could not, its power would be but a shadow and a name. But if Congress can do this, where is the difference in principle in its making provision for securing the preservation

of the peace, so as to give to every citizen his free right to vote without molestation or injury, when it assumes only to supervise the regulation made by the State, and not to supersede them entirely? In our judgment there is no difference; and if the power exists in the one case it exists in the other. (Ex parte Siebold, page 396.)

In view of the language of the Constitution, of its intention as explained by its framers, and of the full and elaborate decisions of the Supreme Court on every point which could be involved therein, there can be no need for your committee to offer further argument as to the constitutional powers of Congress to pass such a bill as that which they report herewith. This bill is only a partial exercise of the plenary power of Congress in regard to the election of Representatives. It provides merely that the United States shall watch over every stage of an election which concerns the choice of a member of this body, shall give to all those proceedings the utmost publicity, which in this country is the surest safeguard of the rights. of the people, and shall by a single act of control, if necessary, prevent the false certification of a member by any State officer or officers who may be ready to violate the laws.

On the second point involved-the expediency and need of such a measure as this- your committee do not feel that it is necessary to enter into a detailed argument in this report.

They conceive that the fact that in many districts of the country elections are tainted and their results perverted by fraud, violence, or corruption, is too well known to require in a report an elaboration of the evidence. They believe it to be also well known that whether fraud, violence, and corruption exist to the degree which is generally supposed or not there can be no doubt that such is the popular belief, and that popular confidence, which is the only guarantee of the peaceful acceptance of the verdict of the ballot-box, has been seriously impaired in regard to Constitutional elections in many districts in the United States. The evidence on these points which has accumulated during many years can be more fitly examined in debate than in a report, if the House desires to enter upon its discussion. Your committee deem it sufficient to say here that they believe that fraud, violence, and corruption exist to such a degree, and popular confidence has been so largely shaken in regard to elections in many Congressional districts that they have as little doubt of the expediency of such a measure as this which they propose as they have of the full and absolute power of Congress to enact legislation of this kind whenever circumstances seem as they do now imperatively to demand it.

Hon. George M. SABIN, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada died May 13th, about 7 o'clock, at the Palace Hotel, after an illness of about two weeks. While Judge Sabin was accredited to the District of Nevada, he had been holding Court in this city for some time, to aid Judge Sawyer and Judge Hoffman, owing to the crowded condition of the calendars of the Federal Courts here. Though he had been ill for some time with rheumatic gout and stomach trouble, it was not supposed that his illness would terminate fatally, and the interviews had with the attending physicians daily were encouraging up to within the past two or three days. When the climax came he passed away quietly as though he was dropping asleep.

Judge Sabin was born in Ohio and was descended from French stock, the earlier members of the family having settled in Massachusetts. His father removed in 1820 to Ohio, which was then the frontier of Western civilization, where the subject of this obituary was born. After receiving a common-school education, Judge Sabin entered the Western Reserve College at Hudson, Ohio, now Adelbert College of Cleveland, whence he graduated with honors. He afterwards moved to Madison, Wis., where he studied law and was duly admitted to the Bar in 1858. When the war broke out he enlisted as a private in a Wisconsin regiment and served for ninety days. When this time expired he re-enlisted and served until the end of the war, rising through the various grades until he reached the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He also served for some time as Assistant Adjutant-General of the army, and after the Vicksburg campaign he was Judge Advocate. He was at Shiloh and Corinth and at the siege of Vicksburg and participated in other important engagements under General Grant and other commanders.

At the close of the war he remained at Vicksburg and edited a paper for some time. This failed, however, and he went into machinery, patenting a locomotive, but when his works had been constructed and were ready for business a fire broke out and swept them away. He then concluded to come West and arrived in Austin, Nev., in 1868. From there he soon went to Treasure Hill and was a miner. During the White Pine excitement he obtained a place in the Mining Recorder's office, where he remained throughout the White Pine excitement. In 1871 he went to Pioche, in Lincoln county, where he was a short time Deputy Clerk in the District Court.

In April, 1872, he entered into a partnership with W. W. Bishop, now of this city, and they engaged in the practice of law in Pioche