Catholics than Protestants in the city, the former own 1,108 lots to the latter's 866. The average size of the sites of the Catholic churches is larger than that of the churches of the other denominations. Fifteen lots are occupied by the Catholic Church of the Nativity. St. Columbkill Sister's of Charity have sixty-eight lots; the Jesuit Church of the Holy Family eighty lots. Nearly one-third of all the Catholic land in the city is the property of the Archbishop. Of this much is unimproved ; some of the land is occupied by tenants from whom a revenue is received. A very moderate estimate of the value of all the lots in the city held by religious bodies puts it at $2,094,000, with the statement that it is probably twice that All this property is exempt from taxation under the laws of the State. The value of these lots is increasing rapidly, and the "unearned increment," in a few years, will make the societies that own them enormously wealthy, like the Trinity corporation in New York, for instance, and yet while the people are groaning under the burden of taxation imposed by the city government, these valuable lots, kept sacred to the Lord, enjoy the protection of the law and the advantages of a great city without paying one cent of taxes. In other words, the people generally who own property are taxed to enrich religious societies. This is most unjust and will result in evil.-Religio-Philosophical Journal.

amount.

YALE has recently begun "The Alumni University Fund," open to contributions of any amount and at all times, the receipts to be invested and the income to be available for any need of the University. One of the investments is to be land, especially such as might be useful for additional space for the buildings required by such a great and growing institution. Some of the alumni have been mathematically inclined and announce that if every one of the 7000 living graduates would contribute ten dollars each year, the annual receipts would yield an income sufficient to pay one additional professor each year. The necessity for such a scheme of increasing the income, arises from the payments made by the students being much less than the cost of tuition. Henry W. Farnum, treasurer of Yale University, New Haven, Conn., is the proper person for further information.

NO BACK NUMBERS of the CURRENT COMMENT for 1889. Only a few of 1890. This Magazine is printed from type and the edition is exhausted each month.

THE LAWYERS NEAR THE FIRE.-Mr. Isham related an anecodote connected with the early lawyers of the Maumee Valley.

He stated that one cold night, John C. Spink, Judge Way, the late Chief Justice Waite, and a number of other lawyers of that day, who were attending court at Maumee, were at the hotel kept by Mr. Kingsbury, an uncle of Col. Henry D. Kingsbury, bailiff for the Circuit Court. They were sitting in a circle about a large fireplace, telling yarns and enjoying themselves hugely.

A man rode up the hotel on horseback, dismounted, stripped off his overcoat, leggings, leather overshoes and was escorted before fairly warm, into the dining room for supper.

After eating his supper the stranger, who had the appearance of being a well-to-do farmer, was invited into the sitting room adjoining the bar room where the lawyers were seated about the fire. The man was cold, fairly chilled through from riding, but there was no move on the part of the lawyers to make room for him near the glowing logs in the fire place, but they were otherwise quite cordial in their greeting and evidently thought to have a little sport at the expense of the stranger.

One asked the man where he hailed from, " Chicago," was his reply. Then another inquired as to the condition of the roads there. "They are horrible," he said, and continuing, remarked that "the roads through the swamps between here and Chicago are the worst I ever saw-worse than h-ll."

This last remark struck Judge Way as an opening for the fun to begin, so he turned towards the stranger and said: "My dear sir, you speak like one familiar with h-ll. How are things down there ?" To this the stranger replied: "O, it is there just as it is everywhere else, the lawyers are always nearest the fire."

That circle opened at once and made room for the shivering stranger.-Toledo Commercial.

The American Law Register has been printed from plates since 1861, when the New Series began, and any volume of the New Series, newly printed on fine paper, can be supplied; but no single copies of the monthly numbers prior to 1872 can be supplied. Very few extra numbers of the recent monthly issues are kept in stock. The publishers aim to furnish newly printed bound volumes on fine paper, from sheets expressly printed for binding; they thus furnish a law book as fine in mechanical execution as the contents are superior in a legal view.

REPORT:-The Select Committee on the Election of President, Vice-President, and Representatives in Congress, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 10958) "to amend and supplement the election laws of the United States and to provide for the more efficient enforcement of such laws, and for other purposes," having given the same full consideration, report a substitute therefor back to the House, and recommend its passage.

In connection with this bill, as it seems to your committee, there are two points to be chiefly considered: First, the power of Congress to enact such legislation; and, second, the expediency of doing so.

This necessary power is found in section 4, Article I, of the Constitution of the United States, which is as follows:

The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.

The language employed in this section is so plain that it would seem almost superfluous to enter into argument or discussion as to its meaning. If words mean anything those just quoted mean that the power of Congress over the conduct of elections of members of this body is absolute and complete. The Constitution says that Congress may make all regulations in regard to the election of Representatives, and the power to "make regulations" thus conferred is in terms exclusive and paramount. But out of abundance of caution the framers of the Constitution went further and added to the word "make" the words "to alter; that is, under the Constitution, Congress has power to assume complete control of elections of its members and conduct them at such times and places and through such officers and under such rules as it may see fit. On the other hand, Congress may under this clause leave the entire regulation of the election of Representatives to the States, or it may take a partial control of a part of the necessary procedure and leave what remains to the State, or it may alter and amend the State regulations and supervise and enforce their execution.

On a matter of such importance, however, it will not be amiss to cite a few controlling authorities and to show that the power of Congress in regard to the election of Representatives is not only paramount but that it can be exercised to any degree, from total

control downward, which Congress may deem wise. In the convention of 1787, on the 9th of August, Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge moved to strike out the words which in the draft then before the convention conferred this power upon Congress. The motion was lost, apparently without a division, and, if we may judge from Mr. Madison's notes, had no serious support in the convention. The remarks made, however, in opposition to the motion of Mr. Pinckney show clearly the view taken of this clause by the framers of the Constitution and the paramount character of the power conveyed by it, although in the draft then under consideration the clause was much less sweeping than it afterwards became in the instrument as adopted.

MR. MADISON. The necessity of a general government supposes that the State legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expense of their local conveniences or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people and not to the legislatures of the States supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times, places, and manner of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce; should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place; should all vote for all the Representatives or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district-these and many other points would depend on the legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments.

Whenever the State legislatures had a favorite measure to carry they would take care so to mold their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the representation in the legislatures of particular States would produce a like inequality in their representation in the National Legislature, as it was presumable that the counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a controlling power to the National Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? First, of a Senate to be chosen by the State legislatures. If the latter, therefore, could be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. Secondly, of Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State legislatures. Surely, then, if confidence is due to the latter it must be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State legislatures this great authority over the election of the Representatives of the people in the General Legislature as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their representatives in the State legis lature.

MR. KING. If this power be not given to the National Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Although this scheme of erecting

the General Government on the authority of the State legislatures has been fatal to the Federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen still foster the dangerous idea.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed that the States might make false returns, and then make no provisions for new elections. (The Madison Papers, vol. 3, pp. 1280, 1281.)

The interpretation then given to this clause of the Constitution has never been shaken. Mr. George Ticknor Curtis, in the latest edition of his Constitutional History of the United States, which is, as everybody is aware, a work of very high authority and great research, says in regard to this clause :

This provision originated with the committee of detail; but as it was reported by them, there was no other authority reserved to Congress itself than that of altering the regulations of the States, and this authority extended as well to the place of choosing the Senators as to all the other circumstances of the election. In the convention, however, the authority of Congress was extended beyond the alteration of State regulations, so as to embrace a power to make rules, as well as to alter those made by the States. But the place of choosing the Senators was excepted altogether from this restraining authority and left to the States. Mr. Madison, in his minutes, adds the explanation that the power of Congress to make regulations was supplied, in order to enable them to regulate the elections if the States should fail or refuse to do so. But the text of the Constitution, as finally settled, gives authority to Congress "at any time" to "make or alter such regulations; " and this would seem to confer a power which, when exercised, must be paramount, whether a State regulation exists at the time or not. (Constitutional History of the United States, vol. 1, pp. 479, 480.)

We are not left, however, merely to the views of the convention or of the commentators upon the Constitution to learn the meaning of this clause, conferring the power to regulate elections. Its correct interpretation has been twice given in the fullest manner by the supreme judicial tribunal upon which the Constitution confers the authority to determine finally upon the meaning of its own provisions. In the case of Siebold (ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371), Mr. Justice Bradley delivering the opinion of the Court, Justices Clifford and Field dissenting, the following passages give the views of the Court upon this important power of Congress :

It seems to us that the natural sense of these words is the contrary of that assumed by the counsel of the petitioners.

After first authorizing the States to prescribe the regulations, it is added, the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations. "Make or alter!" What is the plain meaning of these words? If not under the prepossession of some abstract theory of the relations between the State and National Governments, we should not have any difficulty in understanding them. There

is no declaration that the regulations shall be made either wholly by the State