An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: Being an Argument in Favour of the Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind. To which are Added, Some Remarks on the Systems of Hartley and Helvetius |
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Page 24
... sion impelling me to the pursuit of any object is by the supposition incompatible with any such interest as belongs to the ac- tual enjoyment of any good , or to the idea of possession . The real object of any par- ticular volition is ...
... sion impelling me to the pursuit of any object is by the supposition incompatible with any such interest as belongs to the ac- tual enjoyment of any good , or to the idea of possession . The real object of any par- ticular volition is ...
Page 53
... sion of pain he connects the idea ( though not a very distinct one ) of himself as about to feel it . Let us consider in what way the intervention of this idea can be sup- posed to cause or increase his dread of the pain itself . In the ...
... sion of pain he connects the idea ( though not a very distinct one ) of himself as about to feel it . Let us consider in what way the intervention of this idea can be sup- posed to cause or increase his dread of the pain itself . In the ...
Page 54
... sion , and not from his referring it histori- cally to his own past existence . In like manner I conceive that this idea of pain when combined by the imagination with other circumstances and transferred to the child's future being will ...
... sion , and not from his referring it histori- cally to his own past existence . In like manner I conceive that this idea of pain when combined by the imagination with other circumstances and transferred to the child's future being will ...
Page 55
... sion of any particular pain to be inflicted on himself causes in the mind ? There are two ways in which this may at first sight appear to be satisfactorily made out . The at the end of this essay . In the mean time I wish the reader to ...
... sion of any particular pain to be inflicted on himself causes in the mind ? There are two ways in which this may at first sight appear to be satisfactorily made out . The at the end of this essay . In the mean time I wish the reader to ...
Page 62
... sion of the same pain to be inflicted on another whom he must believe to be en- dued with the same feelings , and with whose feelings he must be capable of sym- pathizing in the same manner as with his own imaginary feelings , should ...
... sion of the same pain to be inflicted on another whom he must believe to be en- dued with the same feelings , and with whose feelings he must be capable of sym- pathizing in the same manner as with his own imaginary feelings , should ...
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An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: Being an Argument in Favour of ... William Hazlitt No preview available - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
absolute abstract absurd actual affected asso associated ideas association of ideas attachment benevolence brain cause child circumstances communication conceive connection consciousness consequence continued deep foundation desire direct disinterested disposition distinct duce equally evil excite exist faculty fect force foundation future feelings future interest future sensations ginal give gratification habit Hartley Helvetius human mind hypothesis idea of pain iden identity imaginary imagination immediate impelled implies impres impression indifferent individual ject kind manner means mecha ment metaphysical motive to action nature necessary nerally never notion object original ourselves particular past pathy perceived person personal identity pleasures and pains posed present pression previ principle produce pursuit rational reason recollection relation respect self-interest self-love selfish sense sensible shew shewn similar sion sophism sort suppo suppose supposition sympathy tain tendency terest thought tion true turally ture tween uneasiness vidual volition voluntary action welfare whole
Popular passages
Page 73 - That which is now a horse, even with a thought The rack dislimns, and makes it indistinct, As water is in water. EROS. It does, my lord. ANT. My good knave Eros, now thy captain is Even such a body.
Page 72 - Sometime, we see a cloud that's dragonish, A vapour, sometime, like a bear, or lion, A tower'd citadel, a pendant rock, A forked mountain, or blue promontory With trees upon 't, that nod unto the world, And mock our eyes with air : thou hast seen these signs ; They are black vesper's pageants.
Page 124 - The first foundation of friendship is not the power of conferring benefits, but the equality with which they are received, and may be returned.
Page 133 - There are moments in the life of a solitary thinker which are to him what the evening of some great victory is to the conqueror and hero — milder triumphs long remembered with truer and deeper delight. And though the shouts of multitudes do not hail his success, though gay trophies, though the sounds of music, the glittering of armour, and the neighing of steeds do not mingle with his joy, yet shall he not want monuments...
Page 224 - ... emanative sphere of our thoughts and feelings ; in other words, of our life. It is different in different persons, and in the same person at different times, as it is always in correspondence with our inward states. In all depressing mental conditions, as, for instance, in melancholy, this nimbus or sombre exhalation is to be removed by dispersive passes, which is one of the most effectual ways of changing the morbid mental condition of a patient, and of...
Page 205 - Quand les deux sensations à comparer sont aperçues, leur impression est faite, chaque objet est senti, les deux sont sentis, mais leur rapport n'est pas senti pour cela.
Page 6 - They are, as it were, most closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together. And the prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of language and want of reflection.
Page 135 - ... shall bitterly regret my own folly and insensibility, I ought, as a rational agent, to be determined now by what I shall then wish I had done, when I shall feel the consequences of my actions most deeply and sensibly. It is this continued consciousness of my own feelings which gives me an immediate interest in whatever ,' relates to my future welfare, and makes me at all times accountable to myself for my own conduct. As, therefore, this consciousness will be renewed in me after death, if I exist...
Page 3 - The imagination, by means of which alone I can anticipate future objects, or be interested in them, must carry me out of myself into the feelings of others by one and the same process by which I am thrown forward as it were into my future being, and interested in it.
Page 204 - Apercevoir, c'est sentir; comparer, c'est juger; juger et sentir ne sont pas la même chose. Par la sensation, les objets s'offrent à moi séparés, isolés, tels qu'ils sont dans la nature; par la comparaison, je les remue, je les transporte pour ainsi dire, je les pose l'un sur l'autre pour prononcer sur leur différence ou sur leur similitude , et généralement sur tous leurs rapports. Selon moi la faculté distinctive de l'être actif ou intelligent est de pouvoir donner un sens à ce mot est.