a possessor of it who possesses it in his own name from whatever cause, and not in the name of another person because he has the thing or possesses it, so that he may restore it or name the person who has control over it, as if any one claims from another a certain thing, some estate or land, and contends that he has the right over it, and therefore is the owner, and he sues for that thing, and not its price, nor its value, nor an equivalent of the same kind, and so it is a corporeal immovable thing, which is claimed for whatever cause from some one, who is not bound by any personal right.

We have discussed above if the thing be immovable which is claimed, now when the thing claimed is movable, as a lion, an ox, or an ass, a robe, or anything else which consists in weight or in measure. It appears on first glance that the action or plea ought to be for the thing, as well as against the person, on the ground that a certain thing is claimed, and that the holder of it is bound to restore the thing claimed, but in truth [the action] will be against the person only, because he from whom the thing is claimed is not bound precisely to restore the thing itself, but disjunctively either the thing itself or its price, and upon paying the price he is released, whether the thing itself appears or not. And therefore if anybody claims a movable, from whatever cause. it may have been carried off or lent, he ought in his action to define the price, and so to state his action: I, so and so, sue that so and so restore to me such a thing of such a price; or, I complain that so and so unjustly detains from me or has robbed me of such a thing of such a price, otherwise the claim for a movable will not avail if the price of it be not stated. The same thing will happen if movable things are claimed which consist in weight, or number, or measure, like bullion or money or barley, or things which consist of liquid, as wine or oil, in which case, if things of such sort are claimed, it will be sufficient if the defendant restores so much as is of the same weight or number or kind or measure, and hence, because he is not compelled to restore pre

cisely the thing itself which is claimed, there will be an action against the person, since the defendant may be released by payment of an equivalent.

WILLIAMS, REAL PROP. (17th ed.), 23. The terms real and personal were first applied to actions; and were afterward extended to things and property with the meanings which they had acquired in connection with actions. Actions in English law were classified as being either real, personal, or mixed. The term real action is simply a translation of the expression actio realis used by early writers on English law as equivalent to the term actio in rem, which Bracton borrowed from Roman law. Real actions in English law were those in which a man sought to be restored to the enjoyment of some free tenement of which he had been unjustly deprived. The mark of a real action was that therein the required restitution might be enforced. by the strong hand of the law dealing directly with the very thing claimed; in other words, process of execution might issue against the thing demanded (in rem). The successful litigant in a real action could have the King's writ commanding the sheriff to put him in possession of the identical holding in respect of which the action had been brought. Personal actions were brought to enforce an obligation imposed on a man personally to make satisfaction for a breach of contract or a wrong; in other words, they were brought to obtain pecuniary compensation for a violation of right— what the English law calls damages. Mixed actions were those in which a claim for damages was made along with a claim for the specific recovery of some tenement. Now it was established in Bracton's time that specific restitution could only be obtained in actions for the recovery of immovable things, or tenements. In actions for the recovery of. movable things, the defendant might always absolve himself by payment of their value in money, if the things themselves were not forthcoming. Actions for the recovery of movable things were accordingly numbered among per

sonal actions; for damages only could be recovered with any certainty therein. Real actions then being for the specific recovery of lands or tenements, and personal actions for the recovery of damages, actions were said to be or to sound in the realty or in the personalty, according as the relief afforded therein were the specific recovery of some thing by process of execution issuing against the very thing demanded, or the recovery of damages against the person of a wrongdoer. The word realty was also used to denote things recoverable in the realty, or specifically; that is, lands and tenements. Such things were also called things real. Things recoverable in the personalty, or by action and process against the person who wrongfully withheld them, as movable goods, debts, damages, and the like, were termed things personal.

CHAPTER II.

CHATTELS REAL.

BRACTON, 27. If, moreover, a gift be made for a term of years, though of exceeding length-longer than the life of man-nevertheless this will not give the donee a freehold, since a term of years is fixed and ascertained, and the limit of life is uncertain, and because, although nothing is more certain than death, nothing is more uncertain than the time of death.

ID., 220. I must now speak of the case of a person being ejected from the use and occupation of any tenement which he holds for a term of years before the expiration of his term. For in one and the same tenement one man may have a freehold and another use and occupation. The usual remedy open to such lessees, when they are ejected before the expiration of their term, is by action of covenant. But inasmuch as this action was not available, except as between lessor and lessee, and third persons could not be bound by the covenant, and even as between lessor and lessee it was an insufficient and inconvenient mode of determining the matter, by the advice of the Curia Regis a remedy was provided which the farmer could avail himself of as against any person whatsoever who should turn him out of possession. This was by means of the following writ: "The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command A. that he duly and without delay do restore to B. so much land with the appurtenances in such a township, from which the said A., who demised the land to B. (has wrongfully ejected him, etc.)." Or thus: “If A. gives proper security, summon B. to show cause why he ejects and keeps ejected A. from so much land with the appurtenances which C.

demised to A. for a term which is not yet passed, and within the said term the said C. sold the land to B., by reason of which sale the said B. afterward ejected A. from the said land, as he saith, etc." And if such a writ is available against a stranger on account of a sale to him, much more is it available against the lord himself who demised' to, and without reason ejected, the lessee, than against a stranger who had some sort of excuse, if at the time of the sale made to him his vendor ejected the farmer, or if on any other ground any one other than the original lessor has ejected the lessee. In that case the writ speaks of "the land which C. of N demised for a term which has not yet expired, within which term the aforesaid A. or C. wrongfully ejected B. from the said land, as he alleges, etc."

DIGBY, HIST. REAL PROP., Ch. III., § 17. Terms of Years. -The characteristic of this class of interests in land is that the estate is sure to come to an end on the lapse of some specified time, however remote that time may be. The passage is very remarkable, as noting the precise point at which terms1 of years came to be recognized as estates in land. Before the change here mentioned the termor or lessee had no interest which the law would protect against third persons, nor indeed against the lessor, unless the interest in the lands rested on a conventio, or covenant by deed. It had been the practice from very early times to grant leases by deed, and in such a case, if the lessor wrongfully ejected the lessee, the lessee had his remedy by action on the covenant (per breve de conventione), as in the case of any other covenant under seal. The new writ which was introduced, as stated in this passage, afforded the lessee a remedy against his lord, whether the lease was by deed or not; and also gave him a right to protection against ejectment by a third person, and probably an additional remedy, by en

'It should be observed that by the word "term" is meant not only the period during which the interest lasts, but the interest or estate itself.