Page images
PDF
EPUB

higher than and above the blinder instinct of an animal life; but to say hereupon that man was made so perfect as to want no guidance but his own, is a step at once to an height of wisdom which may be many ranks above us in the intellectual worldm. That there are prodigious differences between the abilities of even different men, is most apparent: and it is most evidently reasonable that there should be so; that, in the progressive order of each rank of being above that which is beneath it, some should descend almost to the species of those next below them, as others may, on the other hand, be raised to a near approach unto the orb above them. There may be, there ought to be, there are some men, such as that it were to be wished they never would act without an admonisher at their elbow: but, on the contrary, to say of the most intelligent of men, of those who have the most exalted human understanding, that they have a self-sufficiency of wisdom above all want of superior direction, this is

[blocks in formation]

It is to think ourselves to have powers which are over the line which is our boundary: our nature does not reach to this height.

Our reason raise o'er instinct as you can,
In this 'tis God directs, in that but man.

See Pope.

In our degree, we have real perfections both of body and mind. The body has its eye, the mind its understanding; both of excellent use and direction: but to say of either, that they are so perfect as not in any point to want aid or assistance, is to opine beyond our tether. The eye of the body is able in many cases intuitively

[blocks in formation]

to distinguish a straight line from a crooked. But shall we

m Quartus autem gradus, et altissimus est, eorum qui natura boni sapientesque gignuntur; quibus a principio innascitur ratio recta constans

que, quæ supra hominem putanda est, Deoque tribuenda. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. 13.

say of any man that he has an edge of sight so unerring, (however some may excel others in this particular,) as to be able, without line, rule, or measure, by his eye alone, to raise a various fabric, just, straight, upright, and regular, in all true dimensions? It is the same with the understanding, the eye of the mind. We may be able by our reason to deduce and judge aright of many moral duties; but if we would say of the best human reason, that it ever did, without any rule but its own direction, raise the true fabric of all moral virtue", we must produce something to warrant such assertion, beyond what either the ancient inquirers or our modern reasoners have been able to evince. The wisest masters

of the Greek learning could not fix the criterion by which they might know what was only human sentiment, and what more surely was real truth. The Roman philosophy was as indeterminate: the quid est virtus, the very exemplar honesti, was what they were not able indisputably to ascertainP: they wanted some test, whereby they might settle how to distinguish, in the several duties of life, wherein reason and right reason might happen to differ from one another9. And it is as remarkable of all our modern moralists, that, however they shew a great want of precision, of determinate and indisputable direction each in one another's rule or standard, they are every one at last exactly as deficient in their owns.

The word of God is truth. This was to have been the

n Ut sine ullo errore dijudicare possimus, siquando cum illo, quod honestum intelligimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile, formula quædam constituenda est: quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus. Cic. de Offic. lib. iii. c. 4.

ο Εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθὴς ἔστον δύο γένη. Plato in Timæo. Φῶμεν ἀν θρώπους δοξάζειν ἤ ποτε μὲν ἀληθῆ, πότε dè kal yevdî. Plat. in Theætet.

p Sentit domus uniuscujusque, sentit forum, sentit curia, campi, socii, provinciæ, ut quemadmodum ratione recte fiat, sic ratione peccetur. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. iii. c. 27. The author of the book of Wisdom suggests the difference. We may reason, but not

aright. Wisd. ii. 1.

q The test wanted is, By what shall we know when we reason aright, and when not? A Deo, says the disputant in Tully, rationem habemus, bonam aut non bonam a nobis. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. iii. We want a standard, whereby to judge when we make our reason the one, and when the other.

r Mr. Brown, in his very excellent Essay on the Motives to Virtue, rightly observes, that our modern moralists have said little more than what might be transcribed from the old Greek philosophers, and from Tully after him.

p. 122.

s See Mr. Brown's Essay.

t See Psalm cxix. 142. John xvii. 17.

rule of truth in all moral and religious duty to our first parents and their descendants; and a good understanding would have prevailed amongst them, if they would carefully have done thereafter": through the precepts of God, as they more and more improved in knowledge, they would have seen the error of every false way, and in time have been able to delineate the true religion of our nature according to it. But although God gave them his instructions, we are not to represent that he was minutely at their elbow, to leave them in nothing to themselves, in reason to consider things: Moses in nowise writes of them in this manner. God gave our first parents one command, to be a rule to them, how they were to walk humbly with him: he gave them one more, to be the foundation of their relative duty to one anothery: he afterwards gave like precepts in other particulars. If now they would have made these their faith, to receive and believe them, and to square their lives according to them, herein they would have had an abundant direction, and would not have erred, if they would not vary and decline from it. To have added knowledge to their faith, as the incidents arose, which might afford them knowledge, would have been their reasonable duty, as it is ours. And a great field for them herein to exercise themselves must have opened daily unto them: for we cannot opine them to have been so insensible, as to think nothing to be their duty, but barely to observe literally the points commanded them, and no more: they were to see, and would see every thing to be wrong, which would make their lives run counter to the intention of what was directed. The being forbidden to eat of one particular tree, enjoined our first parents not only to abstain from the fruit of a treea, but in every thing, whenever

[blocks in formation]

and whereinsoever God commanded, they were to obey his voice indeed: as the being obliged never to separate from one another, must shew it to be their duty to consider, and be rationally such in their conduct, as to live suitably to this indissoluble tie; that what God had made the indispensable condition, they should for themselves make the real happiness of their lives. And thus revelation can in nowise be said to have superseded reason, but from the beginning to have been no more than the necessary aid, without which human nature could not be made perfect. It was given to be a lamp to our feet, and a light to our paths; to give us what in Tully's language we might say are the formulæ, to mark to us the points, which, if we had been made creatures of an higher intellect, we might have intuitively seen for ourselves, in looking into the natures of things; but which, if they had not been given such creatures as we are, if we had had nothing to give us judgment but the fruits of the tree of our own knowledge of good and evil, we should, not only from the now bias of our appetites, but from (what man was subject to from the beginning) mistakes of understanding, not have found or pursued, so as to be such as we ought in this world, or be able justly to satisfy ourselves how we might be meet for a better.

b Gen. ii. 24.

c Jura, formulæ de omnibus rebus constitutæ, nequis aut in genere inju

riæ, aut in ratione actionis errare possit. Cic. Orat. pro Q. Roscio Comado.

INDE X.

AARON with Hur holds up
Moses's hands, whilst the Israel-
ites were in battle with the Ama-
lekites ii. 40. with Moses, Na-
dab and Abihu sees the God of
Israel ii. 48. required to make
the Israelites an idol ii. 97. his
excuse for suffering the people
to go into idolatry ii. 98. he and
his sons consecrated to the
priest's office ii. 129. with Mi-
riam opposes Moses ii. 138. his
behaviour upon the death of his
two sons ii. 130. dies on mount
Hor ü. 194.

Abel killed i. 2. why his sacrifice

was accepted beyond Cain's i. 52.
Abihu, son of Aaron, his offence
and death ii. 130. reason for the
vengeance inflicted on him ii.
132.

Abilities of understanding ought to
be different in different men, why

ii. 529.
Abiram, with Korah and Dathan,

his rebellion ii. 142. the grounds
of it ib. the miracles that re-
duced it ib.

Abraham, where his ancestors lived
i. 97. when he was born i. 165.
left Ur of the Chaldees i. 162.
lived at Haran i. 163. went into
Canaan ib. removed into Egypt,
i. 164. his religion, what i. 170.
famous in Persia i. 184. goes to
Egypt i. 259. separates from Lot
i. 260. rescues Lot from capti-
vity i. 263. received the promise
of a son ib. went to Philistia
i. 267. tempted to offer Isaac i.
271. married Keturah i. 278.
the accounts which the profane
writers give of him i. 278, 280.

his cotemporaries in the heathen
nations i. 281. he and his de-
scendants worshipped two dis-
tinct divine persons i. 513. be-
fore his time, no appearances of
God or angels i. 525. he knew
the Lord by his name Jehovah i.
526.

Achan, his transgression and death
ii. 272.

Actæus, king of Attica i. 432.
Adam, whereof made ii. 376. where

placed ib. what immediate com-
mand he received from God ib.
called to name the creatures ib.
how he instantly understood the
meaning of God's voice ii. 378.
did not name the creatures all at
one time ii. 391. when first taught
to use sounds of his own for the
names of things ii. 392. learned
the use of words by being called
to name the creatures ib. not
directed what particular names
to give the creatures ii. 393.
named the woman ii. 398. did
not make the reflection, that the
man and his wife were insepar-
ably to live together ib. when
he first began to think, did not
abound instantly with a variety
of conceptions ii. 399. did not at
first make long soliloquies ii. 382.
placed at first in the midst of
plain and few objects ii. 399.
heard at first from God nothing
but what was most obvious and
intelligible ib. his first day, not
a day of hurry and confusion ii.
398-404. the state of his origi-
nal knowledge ii. 404. how he
began to make words ii. 400. not
endowed with a sudden appre-

« PreviousContinue »