Thus there spreads out to our view again another grand series of laws governing reproductive thought, and so forming an integral portion of critical culture.

Style is a general term for the executive skill shown in the effecting of any purpose, productive elegance and excellence. Style has a mental and a material aspect. Though ideas are capable of reproduction in different styles, some styles are more, some less suitable for giving them effective external existence; and hence, even when only ideal, the style of various forms of executive production may be determined to be more or less fitting. This, however, is greatly influenced by the material in which any idea is to be reproduced, for every material has its own capabilities and its own laws of manipulation. The felicitous correspondence of the ideal form and the material externalization constitutes what is called mastery of style. Style is not the superficial dress of thought; it is the embodiment and symbolization of that to which intellect had given birth. It transforms conceptions into perceptions. To effect this the style must be apt at once to the idea expressed and the matter in which it is sought to express it. Style is the subtle culminative evolution of an idea from its irrepresentable to its representative state. It involves, therefore, the consideration of, first, the fitness of form; and, second, the fitness of the material of reproductive realization. It implies the marriage of thought with some externalizing medium, the bringing of thought by the transforming agency of act into fact. The form, the proportion, the relation of part to part, and the suitableness of each to each as well as to the constitution of the whole,— all belong to those elements of which style supplies the regulating laws, and upon which it gives judgment. Every one knows that there is a certain relation of fitness between a given idea and that of the style in which it is reproduced; e. g., if we saw a coal-scuttle manufactured either of crystal or gold, we should at once affirm that that style of thing would not do. Similarly, to treat of the Trojan war in a sonnet, or to write an epic on an eyebrow, would disconcert our sense of congruity. To imagine that the volition of an ant was the cause of an epidemic would affect us as an inadequate antecedent, and we should object to being exposed to philosophizing in that style. We see, then, that there is a sort of "natural fitness of things," as the phrase is, between specific ideas and special forms of externalizing them-a style which satisfies the behests of reason or opposes its dictates. This, then, shows that there is a logic of congruities to be studied, whose conclusions become imperative over all industrial, artistic, literary, or scientific effort. A knowledge of these laws is indispensable to the critic; for he can only be a correct judge of the tone, the form, the details of style, when he knows the requirements of the human mind regarding the reproducitve externalization of its designs.

Truth is a logical characteristic as well as a moral quality.* There

"Truth is thought, which has assumed its appropriate garments, either of words or actions; while falsehood is thought which, disguised in words or actio ns

is a truth of being as opposed to seeming. When a product has its own nature and properties, and does not put on the appearance for deceptive purposes, of something else, it is true and real. If it has the outward form without the inner substance of that which it seems, and is offered for what it seems, it is false. An Armstrong gun made of Everton toffy, or a bride-cake constructed of glass instead of confections and pastry, however like they might seem, would certainly fail in being regarded as true if tested. A tragedy, again, if veritably performed upon the stage, would be no play; for a play is a simulated reality: but if a dinner-party on assembling at a host's house were to be set to regale themselves with viands of a stage-property description, just indignation might be felt, and perhaps would be expressed, by the guests. The truth of productive effort is the absolute and entire conformity of the thing produced with that which it professes to be. There is no falsehood in imitation unless the imitation be presented as real, and there is no truth in reality if it is presented as an imitation. When the perception agrees with the conception, and reproduces it fully and adequately, we have truth; but when we have a semblance and mere appearance given instead of a reality or an actuality, we have fictions;—-and the fictitious, not the truthful, is before us. A novel may be truthful although unreal, and a history may be false though no single unauthenticated fact may be related in it. A poem may be" of imagination all compact," and yet possess critical truth; and it may be the express reproduction of the mere actualities of life, and yet be aesthetically false. It is with no desire to remove ancient landmarks, or to sophisticate common sense, that we say this. We can estimate the truthfulness of a fiction, and condemn it perchance as untrue to the kind of life it represents, and we can adjudicate upon a history and acknowledge its value as a repository of facts, while we affirm that it supplies or excites a false view of times, persons, characters, sequences, &c. Paradoxical as it may seem, all facts are not true, nor are all truths facts. Criticism discovers the truths in facts, and separates the seeming from the real to give us science; and science provides us with conceptions which are truths, but which are not facts: as examples of the former we may instance the law of gravitation, and of the latter we may indicate the Apollonian parabola.

There is not only truth of being, but truth of ornament. Spurious ornament is untruthful, it excites our sense of the incongruous, and, however ingenious in itself, displeases the mind as misplaced or misapplied. Faithful reproduction in ornamentation,

not its own, comes before the blind old world, as Jacob came before the patriarch Isaac, clothed in the goodly raiment of his brother Esau. And the world, like the patriarch, is often deceived; for though the voice is Jacob's voice, yet the hands are the hands of Esau, and the false takes away the birthright and the blessing from the true. Hence it is that the world so often lifts up its voice and weeps."Longfellow's "Hyperion," book iv., ch. i.

in expression, in tone, and feeling, are all required by a logical criticism which objects to and puts its veto upon floridity, superfluity, bathos, &c.; which permits only the apposite as the genuine.

The canons of truth are irreversible; criticism discovers and arranges them, it does not invent them. It insists on attention to these as preliminary to true reproductive efforts, and in consequence of this insistence it is that criticism demands accuracy of ideation, consistency of influence upon the sentiments, conformity of executive skill to the highest possibilities attainable under the conditions, and with the materials of production; and correctness of conceptive presentation in the perceptive representation, of correspondence between the ideal form and that in which it is realized; hence the intellectual standard of criticism is all-consistent truth.

Every product of human thought and effort possesses worth of some sort or other. It may be that it is a worth of expediency, of economicality, of commercial interchangeability, of artistic attractiveness, of literary merit, of intellective satisfactoriness, of moral tendency, or of religious blessing. Worth varies from the low range of expediency to the lofty height of sacramental grace. The estimate of worth comes, therefore, to be a matter of much interest and importance, and the knowledge of what standard to aim at is not less valuable to the producing agent than is a perception of the demands requisite, to be made, in regard to any given sort of product, indispensable to the critic. The settlement of the kind and amount of worth any skilled effort should possess is one which requires not only rare tact, but rare honesty in the critic.

The logic of value, so far as criticism is concerned, is very different from that which the political economist fixes. It does not discuss supply or demand, but need or merit. Men may have a demand for epic poems, but that will not gift the nations with Homers, Virgils, Dantes, Miltons; it may only produce Southeys, Herauds, Klopstocks, and Viennets. Men may have a supply of philosophic thought, but, cheapen and popularize it as you may, you cannot bring the minds of the masses to accept the expositions of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Kant, Hamilton, J. S. Mill, J. H. Stirling, or Dr. M Cosh. Men need a religion, but just in proportion to their need of it is their heedlessness about it; and a true philosophy merits recognition, though the likelihood of its gaining it is exceedingly doubtful.

The critic should know the real needs of men, and ought to be able to pronounce upon the merits of productions in their relation to these needs. The real worth of a work of mind may be very different from its accidental value in a given age, and the accidental popularity and value of a work may far exceed or fall below its genuine deserts. The true, i.e., the subtle, searching judicial critic is the umpire between the public and the producer, the advocate or denouncer of the latter, and the protector of the former. The determination of a just estimate of worth, intrinsic or accidental, and the power of giving it effect in his adjudication, is not less

requisite in the true critic than it is necessary for the dependent public.

What constitutes real worth? What kind and degree of worth ought each class of product to possess? To what class of society does the special worth of any work commend it? What encouragement should the worth of the work secure for it ?-and what are the duties of society in regard to this product of worth? are some of the questions which criticism should be able to solve. But the decision of any one of these questions involves a process of reasoning, an exertion of logical culture, of specific thought applied to the particular matter in hand, thought governed by definite laws, proceeding from premiss to conclusion in regular sequence. The critic must be cultured. Disciplined mental culture is logic: it may be the logic of facts, of analogies, of symbols, of ethical problems, of inductions, of poetics, of arts, of sciences, of faiths, of probabilities, of historic evidence, of interpretation, of theories, of theologies, &c., but logic it must be; i. e., a scientific culture by which the mind is corrected and improved in its several activities by an acquaintance with and exercises in the methods of reasoning, which conform to or result from the laws of thought. For, however little we may be inclined to believe it, logic has a latent force in all the efforts of mind, and may be traced, if sought after, in every exertion of mental power which has resulted either in the gratification of the present age, or in the improvement of these influences which have outlived the ages of the past.

What, then, in a word, does the highest criticism demand? The greatest possible amount of harmony compatible with the conditions of production between ideation, style, taste, truth, and worth ;-the consistency of all elements involved in the effecting of any result. As the manner of doing this best can only be resolved by logical process, so it should form a distinct culture. It may or may not bear the name of a logic of criticism, but such it would be in effect. We have endeavoured to call attention to its elements, that it may be seen that we do not think that tart, smart, caustic, fluent opinionativeness, however valuable or eloquent, constitutes criticism; and that we may induce others to believe that no criticism is really trustworthy which is not only reasonable, but willing to render a reason. An academy of criticism as a tribunal of judgment might, probably, dogmatize and tyrannize-it would not, in all likelihood, condescend to reason. If we were to insist on all critics giving evidence of reasoned thought, we should not require to care about their anonymity. Hence, as a means of moving out of our present reprehensible uncertainty, we advise the study of the logic of criticism. Such a study would not only increase the trustworthiness of criticism, it would make it a moral agent and a beneficent power-a true leader of the thoughts of men, and an advantageous Dikastery on the merits of all human products, industrial, commercial, artistic, or literary. Reviewing to be critical must become logical. Criticism is applied logic.

Religion.

OUGHT STANDARDS OF FAITH TO BE IRREVISABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE Completion of a volume brings with it the close of the present animated debate on this interesting and important subject, and it becomes the duty of those who led the van on either side of the attack to rally their forces, and to examine how far they have penetrated the fortifications of their opponents, as well as how much their own defences have suffered from assault. It is not less with considerable pleasure than diffidence that I undertake this taskpleasure that the debate has called forth so many able contributors on both sides, and diffidence of my own powers in adequately reply. ing to so many eminent writers. But not to waste time in parley, let us turn to the work in hand.

And first to the article of "G. M. Sutherland." With the writer of this temperate and thoughtful article I in many points agree, and on first perusal thought it really was meant for an affirmative paper, and had been misplaced. Even now I can hardly understand why the writer should be found on the negative side of the question, and I fancy before this he must have changed his opinion. He holds that there was one rule of faith given at the beginning; but then where he and most of my opponents differ from myself is in the continuance or otherwise of this standard of faith. "G. M. Sutherland" and others believe that this faith once delivered to the saints has been lost, and argue accordingly. I, on the other hand, from my own independent examination of the New Testament, of ecclesiastical history, and of the works of the Christian fathers, am persuaded that this faith, once for all delivered, still exists; and that, though mingled in some cases with error, and in others altered in small points of discipline, yet as the church has with its many members but one Head, so there is among its many members the unity arising from their holding one faith." I cannot logically come to any other conclusion, nor see how I can believe myself a true member of the Church Catholic, or call myself a professed member of any of its branches, unless my faith in the truth of its doctrines is firm and steadfast. G. M. S. very truly says that "this faith was to reign supreme and unalterable down the entire steep of time." And neither he nor any of those who have written on the same side have shown any valid reasnos why the standard should be revised. An alteration to suit different stages of the language is not a revision in the proper sense of the term as applied to standards of faith. A revised translation of the Bible was necessary at

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