Literary Notes.

66

The Logic of Criticism.

READERS of all classes have been struck with the singular diversity of opinions often pronounced upon authors and their works. In the various periodicals of the day the most opposite verdicts are expressed, not only regarding the manner but the matter of books. One is not unfrequently informed, in a review of a new work, that it is full of originality, interest, and ability; while in another the same production is spoken of as destitute of any claim either to excellence of style, soundness of reasoning, or superiority of treatment. 'The glorious uncertainty" of criticism has become almost as renowned as that of the law; and men have begun to believe that king David's dissuasive exhortation "Put not your trust in princes"-should be extended also to critics. The different organs of opinion seem to employ canons of judgment at utter variance with each other; but, worse than all, in the same serial it is not unusual to find one composition reviewed by a critic holding one sort of opinions on such books, while another work of the same kind is adjudicated upon by an advocate of opinions of a completely dissimilar description. Politics, religion, party, sects, local influence, personal feeling, and many other agencies by which the judgment is warped, are named among the reasons for this state of affairs; so that though the cause of it may admit of dispute, we presume the fact will not be denied; it has, indeed, become the scandal of literature.

The reality of the fact is so patent, that several methods have been suggested for the extirpation or the mitigation of the evil. It is held by some that the anonymity of criticism, by releasing the reviewer from a sense of personal responsibility, encourages him to take up that view of any particular work which promises to admit of the most striking treatment and the production of the most telling kind of paper; that such a method of reviewing does not bind the critic to the constant maintenance of the same form or spirit of judgment, or necessitate the testing of the canons employed, previously to their application in any individual case. It is not uncommon for writers who take this line of argument to stigmatise anonymous as unprincipled criticism, so that the word unprincipled passes (shall we say by a fallacia accidentis ?) from bearing the signification of unscientific to suggesting that of dishonest. Certainly the objections taken to anonymous reviewers may be held to prove that, in the opinion of the remonstrants, such criticism as they produce is in some sense untrustworthy, and that it would, in all probability, be rendered less so by the introduction of the fashion of signing all such articles with the name of the writer.

Another scheme suggested for the improvement, in this respect, of current criticism, is the establishment of a school of critics, who should become legislators on taste and dictators in letters. This cure for the Philistinism of the periodical press depends for the cogency of the argument in favour of its adoption, on the admission of the desperateness of the evil sought to be remedied by such a severe scheme as the inauguration of the reign of tyranny in the republic of letters. We do not think that, even although we had got the length of Ishmaelism in literature, such a method of reducing the discordance among critics would readily gain favour; and, indeed, we find one of the best of the Free Lances of literature -G. H. Lewes-protesting against the idea of the institution of a school of criticism within the territories of human thought. No effective confession of literary faith-still less any all-subduing code of literary practice is possible, in his opinion, among the writers of books. Even inventors in art and discoverers in science would despise “the traditions of the elders;" and wherefore should "the serene creators of immortal things"-poets, novelists, historians, philosophers, &c.-submit to the decisions of a Sanhedrim of Critics, or any Council of Ten who might seek to lord it over the heritage of the human race-thought, inquiry, and truth?

A recent case of recalcitrant defiance to critical imperiousness has "fluttered the Volscians," and brought the aim and purport of true criticism as a matter of high import before the minds of all who are interested in the progress, the purity, and the propagation of thought in literature. It is not the province of the writer, in this department of this serial, to deal with subjects of a debatable nature in a dogmatic manner, or to attempt to decide upon any matter of controversy as such. He arrogates no such prerogative, and claims no such right. Nor does he wish to prejudge any question which may arise for discussion. Of the opinions expressed here the writer accepts the entire responsibility, and for them he only requests a reasonable consideration. He presents them subject to criticism, nay, brings them for criticism, not for acquiescence. The belief that he writes for thoughtful readers stimulates his own thoughts, and makes him anxious to excite in others that personal activity of mind which accepts no dogmatic teaching without searching examination and thorough testing. He will not, therefore, venture to controvert the propriety of anonymous reviewing, or discuss the advisability of establishing a school of criticism; but he may, with the permission of the reader, state some of the principles of thought which should govern all critical thought, and be potent in all adjudicatory literature.

A school of criticism without principles would be nugatory; sig. natured contributions, unless they secured correct thought, would be vain; but if we could procure any approximation to a trustworthy Logic of Criticism, it would make little difference whether the signature of the thinker were attached to his production or not, and with or without a school it could scarcely fail to be advantageous.

I am not aware that any attempt of such a sort has heretofore been made. I know, of course, that many poems in ancient and in modern times have given didactic precepts on matters connected with criticism, and that many prose works have been composed for the purpose of explaining and enforcing the principles which regulate the production of literary effect, or the rules which govern the activities of thought; that, in fact, criticism in theory and in practice has been the topic of much admirable and erudite investigation and exposition. But I am not acquainted with any work which shows that its author has sought down to the very fundamental powers and dispositions of mind on which criticism depends; and, looking at their mere mode of operation, has attempted to express in the briefest form, and in logical sequence, the laws of their dependent and interdependent connections, the method and process of the mind in judging of whatever is submitted to it-whether it is up to or under the mark which it is desirable or requisite that it should have attained. And yet some such plan of bringing consciously before the mind of the critic, and those who trust to his decisions, the material acts and operations of the reasoning and emotive faculties involved in just reviewing seems to be specially requisite to secure consistent, correct, and progressive criticism.

Never in any age, perhaps, has criticism been more indispensable than in this. The desire for engaging in the production of literature is exceedingly wide-spread, the delight taken in efforts which can attain a visible embodiment in type is intense; and though the power of execution has not been generally cultured with the sedulous attention it requires, a certain amount of imitative dexterity is common. Hence the writing of books has vastly increased, and the amount of composition offered to periodicals is all but incalculable. Much of this latter matter is, of course, greatly below the ordinary literary standard, and is rejected; a good deal of it requires touching up and management; and some reaches the dignity of padding, while, in exceptional cases, a few rise into notice. As a general rule, however, amateur work betrays itself by its neglect of some of the rules of effective authorship; and hence proves that a course of training in the laws of letters is, if not absolutely requisite, at least highly valuable in enabling one to attain a place among those who picture out their thoughts in words. Not among amateurs alone, however, is this want of knowledge of the conditions of effectiveness, and a deficiency of skill in the arts of securing it, discernible. In many of the works of our men of genius signs of inadequate attention to the lessons to be learned from the best models, or from those who have deduced their precepts from the study of them, are clearly observable and sometimes very remarkable. So that in author-craft, as well as in critic-craft, there seems to be a want of fixed first principles, of settled canons, obedience to which is obligatory, and a knowledge of and skill in which are consequently essentially pre-requisites to success.

It is certain that there must be some best way of producing

literary work, and equally indisputable that an acquaintance with the laws and a mastery of the details of that matchless method would contribute to excellence of production. No less efficacious in the perfectioning of criticism would such a knowledge be; for whoso knew the highest and purest decisions of experience and theoretic insight could best judge of the nearness of any book's approach to those standards. If a science of criticism were possible, therefore, it would be advantageous, if used as other sciences are, for the improvement of the arts which depend on them. That criticism may be subjected to a systematic study can scarcely be doubted; and if the truths in which the study results are properly arranged and set in sequence, a science of criticism would not fail to result.

Had we such a science of criticism-of reasoned-out principles of discernment and adjudication, anonymous writing would almost be preferable to acknowledged authorship; for then we should scan the principles thoroughly, instead of trusting to the name and in the fame of the critic. Nor should we require, were such the case, a school of critics. We could readily enough permit individuality of criticism were it customary to lay down and adhere to fixed canons of judgment, and to reason from these or according to these in all cases. As it is now, Professor Arnold's accusation is too truly tenable-"Our organs of criticism are organs of men and parties having practical ends to serve, and with them these practical ends are the first thing, and the play of the mind the second; so much play of mind as is compatible with the prosecution of these practical ends is all that is wanted."* Were a logic of criticism always adhered to, and definite principles of judgment followed, this would be altogether removed from the category of complaints, for we should then have educated minds, possessed of definite principles of judgment and fixed standards of comparison, insisting upon clearness, correctness and propriety of thought and reproduction, condemning those who despised these matters, and rebuking those who neglected them. Opinion would be controlled by reasonable thought, and criticism would exercise its due influence on all the outgrowths of the human intellect.

The function of criticism we hold to be twofold (1) predeterminative, in the mind of the thoughtful producer; (2) determinative, in the thoughtful tester and attester; the witness to others of the place the product holds in regard to (a) the highest possible reach of attainment in that species of effort, (b) the best existing examples thereof, and (c) the requirements of the age in regard to such products.

Criticism is the application of trained and skilled judgment to the consideration of any given product, for the purpose of deciding on its fitness or unfitness for the effecting of its proposed end or aim, or the degree of nearness it has attained to the perfection of its kind or nature, due consideration being given to all circum* Matthew Arnold's "Essays in Criticism," p. 19.