with slow steps, making sure that his pupils comprehend, as far as it is desirable that they should do so, every successive lesson; and as their faculties expand, the teacher takes care that the subject-matters of instruction are enlarged accordingly.

Before a child can think, he must be supplied with the first elements of thought; the names and properties of external objects constitute these first elements. Objects are distinguished from one another by their properties, and a knowledge of these properties can only be acquired by sensation and perception; in fact, the child must see these properties before he can have any idea or conception of the objects to which they belong. One body is round or square, black or white, hard or soft, transparent or opaque, solid or fluid, &c., according to the impression which the body itself produces upon the senses of the child; hence it follows, that the educator should convey a knowledge of the properties of objects, and the names by which they are called, in connection with the actual perception of the objects themselves. The name of a thing, or the name given to the properties of a thing, should never be given apart from the perception of the thing itself. After the thing is withdrawn, the name of it, as well as the conception of it, remains fixed in the mind; the vividness and truthfulness of the conception formed of a thing being always in proportion to the intensity of the interest which the thing itself excited in the mind. Thus words are always associated with ideas. A child's mental existence almost entirely depends on the exercise of the faculty of conception.

At this early stage of development, the proper intellectual aliment is a knowledge of facts,-these facts become the first subjects of reflection, and thus prepare the way for a higher development. As the first step in philosophy is to make a collection of facts, so the first stages of instruction should be the communication of a knowledge of facts, without any attempts to convey a knowledge of causes, for this should belong to a higher and subsequent period of instruction. Nothing can be more out of place,

or more absurd, than the attempts of authors, as well as of teachers, to explain the causes of familiar phenomena to very young children; or to bring down to the level of their capacity subjects which presuppose the intelligence of riper years. Such instructors fill the head of the pupil with learned words and phrases, which convey no positive idea to him; torture his memory and understanding with a catalogue of frightful names; and render the work of education a painful infliction in the place of a delightful duty.

A knowledge of the properties of external objects should be taught by comparison and contrast, and things that are unknown by those that are known. Thus, for instance, in explaining the property of transparency, we should show that glass is transparent,—that there are other bodies which are also transparent,-that there are some bodies which are only half-transparent or semitransparent, and that there is a great number of bodies which are opaque. Here the property is made a subject of comparison and contrast. Again, the picture of a tiger, aided by the resemblance which he has to a cat, will enable us to convey a sufficiently correct conception of this gigantic specimen of the feline race: thus we should say to the child;— A tiger is a great wild savage cat, which can tear an ox in pieces with its large claws and teeth with as much ease as our house cat can tear a little mouse. In this way we should convey a knowledge of the unknown thing, by means of the qualities of a thing that is known. Commencing with what the child knows, we conduct him by easy gradations to a knowledge of what he does not know. In like manner, the conception which the child forms of his earthly father enables him to form an idea of his heavenly Father: thus he readily understands what is meant by the language- “Our Father, which art in heaven."

Pictorial representations aid us in giving vivacity and vigour to the faculty of conception.

We should lead the child to draw simple inferences from the properties of the objects presented to his senses.

Glass scratches copper, glass is harder than copper. Iron sinks in water,-iron is heavier than water; wood floats on water,-wood is lighter than water: and so on.

The great end to be attained by object lessons is to familiarise the young mind with the meaning of scientific terms and facts, so as to facilitate the systematic study of science at a later period. Water flows from one vessel to another, water is called a fluid. Lead is a solid, but the heat of the fire causes it to melt, — lead is fusible. Water boils in the kettle; the heat makes the water boil; the steam that you see coming out of the mouth of the kettle is water in the form of vapour,-what you see going on is called vaporisation. A little water is spread over a plate; the water gradually disappears; -what you see going on is called evaporation: and so on. These lessons should, of course, always be methodical and suited to the ages and capabilities of the children. Some of the most important properties and definitions of numbers and geometrical figures may be readily taught by means of tangible objects.

Object lessons to be instructive and interesting should always contain something fresh and sparkling. Unfortunately teachers are too much in the habit of reiterating again and again the same sort of lessons containing similar enumerations of properties, &c. Such teachers seem to have no idea that progress should characterise all our instruction. In our object lessons we should always leave something for the conceptive faculty to work out; by this means we give an intellectuality and ideality to our lessons: graphic pictures and striking contrasts or analogies interest the feelings, and thereby give depth and vigour to the conceptions; things that are visible are associated with things that are invisible; objects that are near with those that are distant; events that are present with those that are past; and the present and the past taken together constitute the clue by which we penetrate the mazes of the future.

A child must take many things as facts of observation which he may have afterwards to establish by a process of abstract reasoning, or by a process of induction; and

it necessarily follows that many of our first lessons, in certain departments of knowledge, must be imperfect; we must often rest satisfied with giving tangible demonstrations when logical processes would fail to be understood; and where demonstrations cannot be given, illustrations must supply their place; we must teach particular forms of propositions when the general form lies beyond the intellectual grasp of the child; and many truths, plain and almost tangible in themselves, will be accepted as axioms or as facts, which would not be classed under that category by the learned logician. Simple expositions of familiar and important truths not only exercise and develop the mind, but they are the most efficient means of imparting real positive knowledge.

VII. The reasoning and higher faculties should be】 cultivated on an enlarged basis of instruction.

The subject matters of instruction should be commensurate with the expansive nature of the faculties. Our rich stores of scientific and useful knowledge furnish us with the means of giving a superior kind of culture to the reasoning powers. The present basis of school instruction is not broad enough to afford scope for the full development of the reflective faculties. In addition to the subjects of language and mathematics, some of the most useful and interesting branches of physical science should be more thoroughly and systematically taught in our upper schools, not only as a means of intellectual culture, but also on account of their immediate bearing on the business of life.

Whilst a sufficiently large basis of instruction gives breadth and expansiveness to the reflective powers, a narrow basis tends to give them a set or leaning, which stands in the way of their future development. Now we maintain that these faculties are cultivated only imperfectly by means of classics and mathematics, — they do not properly exercise all the reflective faculties ; they are too limited in range and too abstract and

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scholastic in form; they do not sufficiently bear upon the great purposes of life, or prepare the boy for fulfilling the duties of the man. As all kinds of philosophical apparatus can now be purchased at a comparatively cheap price, it is to be hoped that teachers will suit their instruction to the advanced state of our science and civilisation, and that they will no longer restrict their subjects of instruction to that narrow range of knowledge which characterised an age that is past.

VIII. Instruction should proceed from the simple to the complex.

Although this principle of education is generally known and acknowledged, yet comparatively few teachers understand it rightly, or practise it completely. It is by no means uncommon to find teachers practising a dogmatic and technical system of instruction, while at the same time they believe that they are teaching from the simple to the complex: our dogmatic modes of instruction are simple enough as regards the work of the master, whilst they are anything but simple when considered in relation to the mental efforts required of the pupil. As this species of self-delusion is so fatal in its consequences, it is important that we should exactly understand what is meant by teaching from the simple to the complex. We teach from the simple to the complex when we explain the various particular forms of a general or abstract principle before we attempt to explain the general principle itself: or when we explain the simpler elements or parts of a subject before we attempt to teach the subject as a whole. In order to keep within the sphere of the child's capabilities, we must advance by slow and sure gradations from the things that are known to the things that are unknown. What the child does know should form a stepping-stone to what he does not know. In short we should teach a subject, little by little, now a little and then a little,