On looking at the subject in these points of view, we cannot come to the conclusion to rank feelings of obligation with moral emotions, or with any other emotions, but are induced to assign them a distinct place. But it is not surprising, on the whole, that moral emotions are often confounded with them, when we consider the invariable connexion between the two just spoken of, and when also we consider the imperfection of language, which not unfrequently applies the same terms to both classes of mental states.

409. Feelings of obligation differ from desires.

For the reasons which have now been stated, feelings of obligation are not classed with Emotions. We are next asked, perhaps, why they are not classed under the general head of Desires. And, in answering this question, we say in the FIRST place, that consciousness clearly points out a difference. It is believed that few matters come within the reach and cognizance of consciousness which can be more readily decided upon than the difference between our desires and our feelings of obligation. We admit that, in the particular of their fixedness or permanency, and also of their relation to the future, the latter closely approach to the characteristics of the former; and yet a little internal examination will detect a distinction between them which is marked and lasting.

(2.) We may not only consult our own consciousness in this matter, but may derive information from a notice of the outward conduct of men. In speaking of men's conduct, we not unfrequently make a distinction; and we attribute it sometimes to the mere influence of their desires or wishes, and at other times to the predominance of a sense of duty, which is only another name for a sentiment or impulse within, which is morally obligatory. But there would evidently be no propriety in this distinction, if desire and feelings of duty were the same thing; and it would certainly be premature and unjust to charge men with universally making such a distinction when there are no grounds for it.

410. Further considerations on this subject.

If there is not a fixed, permanent, and radical distinc

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tion between desires and feelings of obligation, then there is an utter failure of any basis of morality, either in fact or in theory. It will readily be conceded that morality implies a will, a power of choice and determination. But the mere moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval, do not of themselves reach the Will. They operate on the Will through the feelings of obligation; that is to say, they are always succeeded by the latter feelings before men are led to action. All other emotions operate through the Desires. So that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of mental states, viz., Desires and Feelings of obligation. But brute animals, as a general statement, have all the desires that men have; we mean all those modifications of feeling which have been classed under that general head, viz., instincts, appetites, propensities, the various forms of affection, as resentment, love, the parental affection, &c. But still, being evidently destitute of all feelings of obligation, we never speak or think of them as possessing a moral character. We never applaud them for doing their duty, nor punish them for neglecting its performance. Our treatment of them proceeds on altogether different principles. And it would be the same with men if they were wholly destitute of feelings of moral obligation, and had no motives of action but the various forms of desire. They could never, in that case, be considered morally accountable. They would be without reward when they went right, and without rebuke when they went wrong.

CHAPTER IV.

UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

417. Of uniformity in the decisions of the moral nature and the principle on which it is regulated.

THE two classes of feelings which have been considered, viz., moral emotions, by means of which we approve and disapprove of actions, and the subsequent feelings of

moral obligation, embrace all the states of mind which are properly and strictly included under the head of the Moral Sensibilities; although there are a number of collateral or incidental inquiries, some of which are worthy of notice. One of the most interesting of these inquiries relates to the Uniformity of moral decisions.-In entering upon the subject of the Uniformity of the decisions of our Moral Nature, we remark, in the first place, that there are two kinds of uniformity, viz., uniformity in fact or principle, and uniformity in manifestation or appearance. Uniformity in principle, which is the most important view of the subject, necessarily implies a rule or law, by means of which the uniformity, which is alleged to exist, may be measured and known. And the rule or law upon which the uniformity of the moral nature is unquestionably based, is, that its decisions (excepting those extremely perverted acts which may justly be supposed to imply a state of moral alienation or insanity, and which do not properly come into consideration here) will in all cases conform to the facts perceived; in other words, will conform to the facts and their relations, as they exist in the view of the intellect.

Estimated by this law, we can hardly entertain a doubt that the decisions of conscience may justly be regarded as being, at the bottom, uniform throughout the world. It is not true, as some seem to suppose, that nature has established one code of morals for civilized and another for Savage nations; one law of rectitude on the banks of the Thames, and another on the banks of the Ganges; but in all parts of the world, in every nation and in every clime, on the borders of every river and on the declivities of every mountain, she utters the same voice, announces the same distinctions, and proclaims the unchangeableness of her requisitions.

412. The nature of conscience, considered as a uniform principle of action, requires that it should vary in its decisions with circumstances.

It is well known, that one of the greatest and the only formidable objection which has been brought against the doctrine of a connatural Moral Sensibility or Conscience, is a want of uniformity in its decisions; in other words,

that it approves at one time and in one place what it condemns at another time and place. The remarks which have been made enable us to meet this objection fairly and satisfactorily. We admit that there is a want of that kind of uniformity which, by way of distinction, we have denominated uniformity in manifestation or appearance; but it is not true (with the exception of those extreme perversions which come under the denomination of moral insanity or alienation) that there is a want of uniformity in fact or principle. It is the latter kind of uniformity only which we are desirous to witness as an attribute of the conscience. A uniformity of decision, based upon any other view, would be disastrous to its own authority. In meeting the objection, therefore, which has been referred to, all we have to do is to show that the moral sense or conscience conforms to its own law; in other words, is uniform in its action, relatively to the facts that are placed before it.

And our first remark here is, that the nature of conscience itself involves, that it must vary in its decisions in accordance with a variation or change of circumstances. And the important law of its own uniformity not only permits this, but requires it. As its uniformity exists in relation to the facts perceived, and involves the uniformity or sameness of those facts, it follows that a change in the facts and their relations will be attended by a change in the moral cognizance. The decisions of conscience, therefore, although erected upon a basis of uniformity, and although, in fact, uniform in reference to the principle which has been laid down, are nevertheless in their manifestations sometimes exceedingly diverse; like the multiplied forms of the kaleidoscope, which, although they always exist in accordance with fixed optical principles, are susceptible of almost every possible variety. -Going on the supposition, therefore, that the general uniformity of the decisions of conscience is understood and acknowledged, we proceed now to give some account of its variations. And, in doing this, shall endeavour to show that they all take place in entire consistency with the permanent principles of its own nature; in other words, that the uniformity is real, and that the deviations are merely apparent

413. Diversities in moral decisions dependent on differences in the amount of knowledge.

Diversities in the decisions of conscience will depend, in the first place, on differences in the amount of knowledge, whether such differences in knowledge be owing to differences of intellective power or to any other cause In other words, the conscience may be led astray, so far as to decide otherwise than it would under other circumstances, either by a want of facts, or by a false perception and estimate of facts. This simple statement, if properly applied, can hardly fail to explain numerous mistaken moral judgments, which have been adduced in opposition to the doctrine of a conscience.

We may illustrate this view of the subject by a case of this kind. Two men are required to give an opinion on some question which involves moral duty. The question we will suppose to be, whether it would be right, in a supposed case, to attempt a revolution in the civil government. Of these two individuals one will pronounce it to be right, the other will pronounce it to be wrong. It is admitted that we have here a manifested or apparent deviation in the moral action. At the same time, it is unquestionably the fact, that it is not owing to a difference of structure in their moral nature, but rather to a difference in their perceptive and comparing powers.

The one who pronounces the attempt to be right, in consequence of his greater reach of thought, is able to foresee, after the first convulsive struggles, the subsidence of the angry passions into a state of permanent quiet, and the reorganization of the convulsed frame of society into greater strength and beauty. With these views he thinks it right to attempt to introduce a change into the government of the country. The other, whose intellectual vision is more limited, unable to extend the perceptive eye into the future, sees only the evils of the present moment; the discord and clamour, the breaking up of old habits and associations, the agony, and the blood. With these views he thinks it would be wrong to attempt the change in question. The moral nature, in each instance, pronounces according to the light which is placed before it; and in each case does what it would naturally be expected to do