And we may not only say, in general terms, that the action of the sensibilities implies the antecedent action of the intellect, but may even assert more specifically, (making allowance for those constitutional differences which pervade every part of the mental structure,) that the activity of the sensibilities will be nearly in proportion to that of the intellect. In other words, on all subjects which are calculated to excite any interest at all, those who have the broadest and most satisfactory views will be likely to feel more intensely than others; the sensibilities expanding and exerting themselves in conformity with the expanded and energetic action of the perceptive and cognitive powers.

◊ 242. Division of the sensibilities into natural or pathematic, and moral

As we pass onward from the percipient and cognitive nature to the distinct and more remote region of the emotions and passions, it seems proper, before we enter more minutely into the various inquiries which may be expected to present themselves, to consider whether the department of the Sensibilities itself is not susceptible of being resolved into some subordinate yet important divisions. In accordance with this suggestion, our first remark is, that the Sensibilities, when subjected to a careful examination, will clearly be found to separate themselves into the great divisions of the Natural or Pathematic, and the Moral. These leading departments will be found to run, if we may be allowed the expression, in two separate channels, which, although they are, for the most part, parallel with each other, are, nevertheless, essentially and sufficiently distinct; each being characterized by its own attributes and by its appropriate results. Our examination of the Sensibilities will accordingly proceed upon the basis of this division.

In reference to the use of the term Pathematic, as applicable to the states of mind embraced in one of these great divisions, it is proper to observe, that it appears to have been formed from its Greek original, and first used by Sir James Mackintosh. He repeatedly speaks of that part of our nature which includes the emotions and passions, as unnamed; and, in the progress of his discussions,

appears at times to be embarrassed for the want of suitable English words to express it. Under these circumstances he proposes the term in question, which, in its etymological import, is applicable to any state of mind which involves emotion, desire, or passion.

§ 243. The moral and natural sensibilities have different objects. The Natural and Moral Sensibilities appear to take, fundamentally, different views of the objects in respect to which they are called into exercise. The one considers objects chiefly as they have a relation to ourselves; the other, as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks what is GOOD; the other, what is RIGHT.

Obliterate from man's constitution his Conscience, (what may be called, if we may be allowed the expression, the moralities of his nature,) and you at once strike from the mind one half of its motives to action; for, in respect to everything which is considered by us desirable to be done, the question always recurs, is it right to be done? At one time, on the supposition of an entire erasure of the moral sensibilities, all his movements are dictated by the suggestions and cravings of the appetites. At other times, he covets knowledge, or seeks society, or indulges in the refinements of the arts; but it will be found in these instances, as well as when he is under the influence of the appetites, that pleasure is still his object, and that he is disappointed in not securing it. And even in his higher moods of action, when raised, in some degree, above the influence of the subordinate propensities, his movements will always be based on calculations of interest; and although the various suggestions which influence his conduct may have an extensive range, they will never fail to revolve within the limits of a circle, the centre of which is HIMSELF. It is his moral nature, and that alone, which places him beyond the limits of this circle, and enables him, on suitable occasions, to act with exclusive reference to God, his fellow-men, and the universe.

◊ 244. The moral sensibilities higher in rank than the natural. And such being the objects of these two great departments of our nature, it is not surprising that they do not hold the same place in our estimation. There is obviviously a sort of graduation in the feelings of regard and honour which we attach to different parts of the mind. We at once, as it were instinctively, regard some as higher than others. We may not be able always to tell why it is so; but such is the fact. We never hesitate, for instance, to assign a lower place to the instincts than to the appetites; and, on the other hand, we always allot to the appetites, in the graduation of our regard, a place below that of the affections. And, entirely in accordance with this general fact, we find it to be the case, that the moral sensibilities excite within us higher sentiments of regard; in other words, hold, in our estimation of them, a higher rank than the appetites, propensities, and passions, which constitute the leading divisions of our pathematic nature.

The moral sensibility appears to occupy, in respect to the other great division of our sensitive nature, the position of a consultative and judicial power; it not only stands above it, and over it, in our estimation, but actually is so, viz., in the exercise of a higher authority; it keenly scrutinizes the motives of action; it compares emotion with emotion, desire with desire; it sits a sort of arbitress, holding the scales of justice, and dispensing such decisions as are requisite for the due regulation of the empire of the passions.

◊ 245. The moral sensibilities wanting in brutes.

It will, perhaps, throw additional light upon the distinction which we assert to exist in the Sensibilities, if we call to recollection here that the natural or pathematic sensibilities exist in brute animals essentially the same as in man. Brute animals are susceptible of various emotions. They have their instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections, the same as human beings have, and, perhaps, even in a higher degree. They rush with eagerness in the pursuit of whatever is calculated to gratify their appetites, and are deeply interested in everything that is addressed to the natural affections. They are pleased

and displeased; they have their prepossessions and aversions; they love and hate with as much vehemence, at least, as commonly characterizes human passion.

But if we look for the other and more elevated portion of the sensibilities, viz., the Moral Sensibilities, it is not there. And here, we apprehend, is the great ground of distinction between men and the brutes. The latter, as well as human beings, appear to understand what is good, considered as addressed simply to the natural affections; but man has the higher knowledge of moral as well as of natural good. The brute, as well as man, knows what is desirable, considered in the light of the natural appetites and passions; but man enjoys the infinitely higher prerogative of knowing what is worthy of pursuit, considered in the light of moral and conscientious perceptions.

246. Classification of the natural sensibilities.

Beginning, in the examination of the interesting subject before us, with the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, we shall find this portion of our sensitive nature resolving itself into the subordinate divisions of the Emotions and Desires. These two classes of mental states follow each other in the order in which they have been named; the Emotions first, which are exceedingly numerous and various; and then the Desires, embracing, under the latter term, the Appetites, Propensities, and Affections. This is not only the order in succession or time, but it is also the order in nature.

In other words, and stated more particularly, such is the constitution of the human mind, that, when we pass from the region of the Intellect to that of the Sensibilities, we first find ourselves (and there is no other possible position which, in the first instance, we can occupy) in the domain of the EMOTIONS. We are at first pleased or displeased, or have some other emotion in view of the thing, whatever it is, which has come under the cognizance of the intellect. And emotions, in the ordinary process of mental action, are followed by Desires. As we cannot be pleased or displeased without some antecedent perception or knowledge of the thing which we are pleased or displeased with, so we cannot desire to possess or avoid Ꮓ

anything, without having laid the foundation of such desire in the existence of some antecedent emotion. And this is not only the matter of fact which, as the mind is actually constituted, is presented to our notice, but we cannot well conceive how it could be otherwise. To desire a thing which utterly fails to excite within us the least emotion of pleasure, seems to be a sort of solecism or absurdity in nature; in other words, it seems to be impossible, from the nature of things, under any conceivable circumstances. At any rate, it is not possible, as the mind is actually constituted, whatever might have been the fact if the mind had been constituted differently.

247. Classification of the moral sensibilities.

If we look at the conscientious or Moral sensibilities, we find that they divide themselves in a manner entirely analogous to the division which is found to exist in the Natural. The first class of mental states which presents itself to our notice under this general head, is that of moral Emotions; corresponding in the place which they occupy in relation to the Intellect, as well as in some other respects, to the natural emotions. The moral emotions are followed by another class of moral feelings, which may be designated as Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation; which hold the same relation to the moral emotions which the Desires do to the natural emotions. If we had not moral emotions, (that is to say, feelings of moral approval and disapproval,) it would not be possible for us to feel under moral obligation in any case whatever; the latter state of the mind being obviously dependent on the former.-It will be noticed, that in this place we scarcely do more than simply state the fact of this subordinate classification, without entering into minute explanations. The precise relation which the two departments of our moral nature sustain to each other will be more fully stated and clearly understood, when, in their proper place, they come particularly under examination.