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be known to us without the power of perceiving relations. -Again, we see a fellow-being; and as we make him the subject of our thoughts, we at first think of him only as a man. But then he may, at the same time, be a father, a brother, a son, a citizen, a legislator; these terms express ideas of relation.

129. Of the use of correlative terms.

Correlative terms are such terms as are used to express corresponding ideas of relation. They suggest the relations with great readiness, and, by means of them, the mind can be more steadily, and longer, and with less pain, fixed upon the ideas of which they are expressive. The words father and son, legislator and constituent, brother and sister, husband and wife, and others of this class, as soon as they are named, at once carry our thoughts beyond the persons who are the subjects of these relations to the relations themselves. Wherever, therefore, there are correlative terms, the relations may be expected to be clear to the mind.

§ 130. Of relations of identity and diversity.

The number of relations is very great; so much so, that it is found difficult to reduce them to classes; and probably no classification of them which has been hitherto proposed, exhausts them in their full extent. The most of those which it will be necessary to notice may be brought into the seven classes of relations of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY, of DEGREE, of PROPORTION, of PLACE, of TIME, of POSSESSION, and of CAUSE and Effect.

The first class of ideas of relation which we shall proceed to consider, are those of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY.— Such is the nature of our minds, that no two objects can be placed before us essentially unlike, without our having a perception of this difference. When, on the other hand, there is an actual sameness in the objects contemplated by us, the mind perceives or is sensible of their identity It is not meant by this that we are never liable to mistake; that the mind never confounds what is different, nor separates what is the same; our object here is merely to state the general fact.

Two pieces of paper, for instance, are placed before us, the one white and the other red; and we at once perceive, without the delay of resorting to other objects and bringing them into comparison, that the colours are not the same. We immediately and necessarily perceive a difference between a square and a circle, between a triangle and a parallelogram, between the river and the rude cliff that overhangs it, the flower and the turf from which it springs, the house and the neighbouring hill, the horse and his rider.

Whatever may be the appearance of this elementary perception at first sight, it is undoubtedly one of great practical importance. It has its place in all forms of reasoning, as the train of argument proceeds from step to step; and in Demonstrative reasoning in particular, it is evident, that without it we should be unable to combine together the plainest propositions.

131. (II.) Relations of degree, and names expressive of them. Another class of those intellectual perceptions which are to be ascribed to the Judgment, or what we term more explicitly the power of RELATIVE SUGGESTION, may properly enough be named perceptions of relations of Degree. Such perceptions of relation are found to exist in respect to all such objects as are capable of being considered as composed of parts, and as susceptible, in some respects, of different degrees.—We look, for instance, at two men; they are both tall; but we at once perceive and assert that one is taller than the other. We taste two apples; they are both sweet; but we say that one is sweeter than another. That is to say, we discover, in addition to the mere perception of the man and the apple, a relation, a difference in the objects in certain respects.

There are terms in all languages employed in the expression of such relations. In English a reference to the particular relation is often combined in the same term which expresses the quality. All the words of the comparative and superlative degrees, formed by merely altering the termination of the positive, are of this description, as whiter, sweeter, wiser, larger, smaller, nobler, kinder, truest, falsest, holiest, and a multitude of others. In oth

er cases, (and probably the greater number,) the epithet expressive of the quality is combined with the adverbs more and most, less and least. But certainly we should not use such terms if we were not possessed of the power of relative suggestion. We should ever be unable to say of one apple that it is sweeter than another, or of one man that he is taller than another, without considering them in certain definite respects, and without perceiving certain relations. So that, if we had no knowledge of any other than relations of Degree, we should abundantly see the importance of the mental susceptibility under review, considered as a source of words and of grammatical forms in language.

§ 132. (III.) Of relations of proportion.

Among other relations which are discovered to us by the power of judgment or relative suggestion, are those of PROPORTION; a class of relations which are peculiar in this, that they are felt only on the presence of three or more objects of thought. They are discoverable particularly in the comparison of numbers, as no one proceeds far in numerical combinations without a knowledge of them. On examining the numbers two, three, four, twenty, twenty-seven, thirty-two, nine, five, eight, and sixteen, we feel certain relations existing among them; they assume a new aspect, a new power in the mental view. We perceive (and we can assert, in reference to that perception) that three is to nine as nine to twenty-seven; that two is to eight as eight to thirty-two; that four is to five as sixteen to twenty, &c.

And when we have once felt or perceived such relation actually existing between any one number and others, we ever afterward regard it as a property inseparable from that number, although the property had remained unknown to us until we had compared it with others. We attach to numbers, under such circumstances, a new attribute, a new power, the same as we do, under similar circumstances, to all the other subjects of our knowledge. There are many properties, for instance, of external bodies, which were not known to us at first, but, as soon as they are discovered, they are, of course, embraced in the

general notion which we form of such bodies, and are considered as making a part of it. And pursuing the same course in respect to numbers, if, on comparing them with each other, we perceive certain relations never discovered before, the circumstance of their sustaining those relations ever afterward enters into our conception of them.

◊ 133. (IV.) Of relations of place or position.

Other feelings or perceptions of relation arise when we contemplate the place or position of objects. Our minds are so constituted, that such perceptions are the necessary results of our contemplations of the outward objects by which we are surrounded. Perhaps we are asked, What we mean by position or place? Without professing to give a confident answer, since it is undoubtedly difficult, by any mere form of words, fully to explain it, we have good grounds for saying that we cannot conceive of any body as having place, without comparing it with some other bodies. If, therefore, having two bodies fixed, or which maintain the same relative position, we can compare a third body with them, the third body can then be said to have place or position.

This may be illustrated by the chessmen placed on the chessboard. We say the men are in the same place, although the board may have been removed from one room to another. We use this language, because we consider the men only in relation to each other and the parts of the board, and not in relation to the room or parts of the room. Again, a portrait is suspended in the cabin of a ship; the captain points to it, and says to a bystander, that it has been precisely in the same place this seven years. Whereas, in point of fact, it has passed from Europe to Africa, from Africa to America, and perhaps round the whole world. Still the speaker uttered no falsehood, because he spoke of the portrait, (and was so understood to speak of it,) in relation to the ship, and particularly the cabin; and not in relation to the parts of the world which the ship had visited.-Such instances show that place is relative.

Hence we may clearly have an idea of the place or poN

sition of all the different parts of the universe, considered separately, because they may be compared with other parts; although we are unable to form any idea of the place or position of the universe considered as a whole, because we have then no other body with which we can compare it. If it were possible for us to know all worlds and things at once, to comprehend the universe with a glance, we could not assert, with all our knowledge of it, that it is here, or there, or yonder, or tell where it would be.

But if place express a relative notion, then it follows that all words which involve or imply the place or position of an object are of a similar character. Such are the words high and low, superior and inferior, (when used in respect to the position of objects,) near and distant, above and beneath, further, nearer, hither, yonder, here, there, where, beyond, within, around, without, and the like.

134. (V.) Of relations of time.

Another source of relative perceptions or judgments is TIME. Time holds nearly the same relation to duration as position does to space. The position or place of objects is but space marked out and limited; time, in like manner, is duration set off into distinct periods; and as our notions of the place of bodies are relative, so also are our conceptions of events considered as happening in time. It is true, that the notions of duration and space are in themselves original and absolute; they are made known to us by Original rather than by Relative Suggestion; but when they are in any way limited, and events are thereby contemplated in reference to them under the new forms of place and time, certain new conceptions arise which are relative.

All time is contemplated under the aspect of past, present, or future. We are able, chiefly in consequence of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, to form a distinct notion of portions of time, a day, a month, a year, &c. ; we can contemplate events, not only as existing at present, but as future or past. But always when we think or speak of events in time, (in other words, when we speak

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