6 Bro. Parl. Ca. 633. lessor of the plaintiff, which came into possession in 1712, when his title and right of entry accrued. The lease was one of his muniments; a mere weapon in his hands: and it would be going a great way to say that such a form should take from an adverse possession the benefit of the statute. But the Court was clear, that at the trial a surrender of such a lease might and ought to be presumed, to let in the statute of limitations. The special verdict not having found such surrender, the Court could not come at the justice of the case in that shape. It was unnecessary to go into that point, or the former: and it would be very improper unnecessarily to do it. If the Dacres had no estate by virtue of the demise in 1712, then the ejectment was not brought within 20 years after the lessor's title accrued; and no facts were found to excuse him within any of the exceptions. Therefore the Court was unanimously of opinion, that there should be judgement for the defendants. A writ of error was brought in the House of Lords, and the Judges being ordered to attend, the following question was proposed to them :-"Whether sufficient appeared by the special verdict in this case, to prevent the lessor of the plaintiff, by force of the statute of limitations of the 21st of King James the First, from recovering in the ejectment?" Whereupon the Lord Chief Justice Willes, having conferred with the rest of the Judges, delivered their unanimous answer, -"That sufficient did appear by the special verdict in this cause to prevent the lessor of the plaintiff, by force of the statute of limitations of the 21 Ja. I., from recovering in the ejectment." Whereupon the judgement of the Court of King's Bench was affirmed. accrues, a new Entry is 35. Where a person acquires a second right, he is Where a Second Right allowed a new period of twenty years to pursue his remedy; though he has neglected the first. It being a maxim of law, Quando dua jura in una persona concurrunt, æquum est ac si essent in diversis. given. 36. A tenant in tail of lands held in ancient Hunt v. Bourne, demesne, conveyed them by fine, in the court of 1 Saik. 339. ancient demesne, to three persons for their lives; he 2 Salk. 421, afterwards levied another fine of the reversion, in the same court, to the use of himself and his heirs. It was determined, that the first fine created a discontinuance of the estate, and took away the entry of the issue in tail, during the lives of the three persons to whom the first fine was levied; but that the second fine did not make any discontinuance: therefore, although the issue in tail had neglected to bring his formedon within twenty years after the death of his ancestor, when his right first accrued, yet when the last life dropped, the discontinuance was determined, and the heir acquired a new right of entry; for the pursuit of which he was allowed by the statute 21 Jac. I. a new period of twenty years: for when a person has a right, and several remedies, the discharge of one is not the discharge of the other; and the word right in the statute means a right of entry. Upon a writ of error in the House of Lords, it was contended for the plaintiff, 1°. That the fine did not create a discontinuance, the consequence of which was, that the right of entry of the issue in tail commenced immediately on the death of the tenant in tail, which happened in 1663, above twenty years before the issue entered: therefore his entry was barred by the statute of limitations. 2.Th at the discontinuance, if any, did not determine with the estate for three lives, but still continued 4 Bro. Parl. Vide Tit. 35. Ca. 66. to bar the entry of the issue in tail, by the common law; because a fee passed by the first fine to the cognizee, therefore the discontinuance was of the whole fee: but if the first fine alone did not work a discontinuance in fee, yet the second fine and warranty did, in order that the warranty might be preserved. 3. That the entry was barred by the statute of limitations, which enacted, that no person should enter into lands but within twenty years after his right or title should first descend or accrue. In this case the first right or title that descended was a right of action, viz. to a formedon, which accrued to the issue immediately on the death of the tenant in tail, which happened above thirty-five years before; and the issue having neglected for above twenty years to sue for the estate, was thereby barred, not only of his action, but of his entry also; for otherwise, a man might enter into lands, when he had no way by law to recover them, having lost that remedy by his own default; which would be absurd and inconvenient, with respect to purchasers, and the disturbance of long possessors. On the other side it was contended, that the only question in the case was, whether the lessor of the plaintiff might lawfully enter, after the determination of the estate for three lives, granted by the first fine; for it was not pretended that a fine, levied in a court of ancient demesne, would bar an estate tail. That the first fine made a discontinuance of the estate, and took away the entry of the tenant in tail, during the lives of the lessees only; but that the grant of the reversion by the second fine, did not make a discontinuance in fee; consequently, when the last life dropped, in 1693, the discontinuance was determined, and the right of entry revived; therefore the issue in tail might lawfully enter, and was not barred by the statute of limitations, his right not accruing till 1693. The judgement was affirmed. 37. It is said by Lord Hardwicke, that a remainder- 1 Vesey, 278. man expectant on an estate for life or years, to whom a right to enter, or bring an ejectment, is given by the forfeiture of the tenant for life or years, is not bound to do so: therefore if he comes within his Vide Tit. 35. c. 11. time, after the remainder attached, it will be good; nor can the statute of limitations be insisted on against him, for not coming within twenty years after his title first accrued by the forfeiture. The Entry must be on the Land. 38. With respect to the entry which is required to preserve a right of possession, it has been resolved, that in proving an entry or claim, it is necessary to produce evidence of its having been made upon the Ford v. Grey, land claimed; unless there be a special reason to the contrary; and also that it was not a casual entry, but made animo clamandi. 6 Mod. 44. 39. If a person is prevented by force or violence Lit. § 419. from entering on lands, he must then make his claim 1 Inst. 253 b. as near the land as he can; which in that case will be as effectual as if he had made an actual entry. 516. 40. If a person, having a right of entry into a free- 1 Lill. Ab. hold estate, enters upon part of it, such entry will be adjudged good for all possessed by one tenant; but where there are several tenants, there must be entries on each of them: a special entry into a house, with which lands are occupied, claiming the whole, is however a good entry as to the lands. 41. On a special verdict, the single question was, whether the entry of cestui que trust would be sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations of 21 Ja. I. It was neld clearly by the whole Court, that such entry was Kk S Greev. Rolle, 1 Ld. Raym. 716. And followed by an Action. Savings in the Stat. 21 Jac. Doe v. Jones, Doev.Jesson, 4 Taunt. 826. sufficient to avoid the statute; and that they would not hear any argument on the point. 42. By the stat. 4 Ann. c. 16. § 16. it is enacted, that no claim or entry to be made of or upon any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be sufficient within the statute of limitations, unless upon such entry or claim an action shall be commenced within one year after the making of such entry or claim, and be prosecuted with effect. 43. By the stat. 21 Ja. I. c. 16. § 2. it is provided, that if any person or persons that shall be entitled to such writ or writs, or that shall have such right or title of entry, shall be, at the time of the said right or title first descended, accrued, come, or fallen, within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond the seas, that then such person and persons, and his and their heir and heirs, shall or may, notwithstanding the said twenty years be expired, bring his action or make his entry, as he might have done before this act; so as such person and persons, or his or their heir or heirs, shall, within ten years next after his and their full age, discoverture, coming of sound mind, enlargement out of prison, or coming into this realm, or death, take benefit of and sue forth the same, and at no time after the said ten years. 44. Upon the construction of this clause, it has been held that the disabilities here mentioned must exist at the time when the right first accrues; for if the time once begins to run, no subsequent disability will avail. 45. In a modern case, where the ancestor died seised, leaving a son and a daughter infants, and on the death of the ancestor, a stranger entered; the |