taries, which also tell us that "the law only requires that the claimant be next of the whole blood to the person last in possession," we conclude that the son being the person last seised, he shall be the root or stock from which such inheritance must be derived.

"Thirdly, if we are to trace from the father, it will introduce universal confusion; it will confound the distinction made by Sir Edward Coke, "that the father hath two bloods in him, by which means the father's mother, though of the female line to him, is of the male line to the son." For, if we are to trace from the father, his mother must be of the female line to the son; and, what is still more injurious, in such case the whole maternal line will be totally excluded, for there is no privity of blood between the father and the line of the mother.

"Thus have we endeavoured to prove, that no such point has been nor can be established. We now contend, that the case to which it is applied, the resolution in Clere and Brook, is indirectly stated. It was there settled, that the heir of Dorothy Young, the paternal grandmother of the person last seised, should succeed in preference to Edward Clere his mother's brother; that is, N° 11 shall succeed to John Stiles the son. Whereas we are told in the Commentaries, who might or should have succeeded to Geoffrey Stiles the father. That No 10 should have inherited to Geoffrey Stiles the father before N° 11. This may be true, if John Stiles the son had never been seised; but, the contrary being the case, there was no question who should have inherited the father. The matter settled was, that N° 11 should inherit the son. This indirect stating of the case leads us to the reason why the point above mentioned was attempted

to be established. It was introduced with a view to discard the son; and that the father should become the propositus or root, to whom N° 10 is exactly in the same relation as N° 11 is to the son. Now, can there be a more presumptive proof how far the judgement is here sacrificed, than the forced construction put upon different texts in order to establish a point for the purpose of getting rid of the son? For, when once that is effected, when once we trace from the father, No 10 will certainly inherit. But, as the fact is otherwise, as the son is the person last seised, shall not No 11 confessedly succeed?

"The negative application of the rule is this: Because the issue of Luke and Frances Kempe, or N° 11, should not have inherited to the father, therefore they shall not inherit to the son. Now it is certain, that not one person of those represented in the table of descents, from N° 14 to N° 20 inclusive, shall ever inherit the father; but who will be found to contend, that therefore not one of them shall inherit the son?

"However, by virtue of this liberal rule, John Stiles is utterly excluded, as though he had never existed; notwithstanding we are told by the author himself that John Stiles held the land as a feud of indefinite antiquity. Let us then for a moment admit of the delusion, and refer ourselves to Geoffrey Stiles the father. Now, if the heirs of Christian Smith shall inherit John Stiles, as by the table they do, by parity of reason, must not the heir of Ann Godfrey succeed to Geoffrey Stiles? To hesitate were useless; their respective relation is the same; if the heirs of the great-grandmother shall succeed in one instance, they shall in another, or there is no virtue in consistency. Nevertheless, having once secured Geoffrey Stiles as

the propositus, the system of the table of descents is deserted; and appeal is made to the resolution in Clere and Brook: so that, when Justice Manwoode argues rightly from the son, the doctrine is reprehensible; whereas no scruple is made, in tracing from the father, to admit the same arguments.

"To pursue the proposed plan of defence, we should continue to examine whether such inference follows, as is suggested from the stating of the case resolved. But we are prevented by the express prohibition of our author: who, perhaps not thinking he should ever adopt a contrary opinion, hath in effect told the student, that if any case be put except as from John Stiles, he should not admit it. 2Comm. 240. The words are," The student should bear in mind that, during this whole process, John Stiles is supposed to have been last actually seised of the estate; for, if ever it comes to vest in any other person as heir to John Stiles, a new order of succession must be observed upon the death of such heir; since he, by his own seisin, now becomes an ancestor or stipes, and must be put in the place of John Stiles."

"Had we previously attended to this admonition, we should have found that our arguments against the appointment of George Stiles the father, as the stipes, were needless; for in such case a new order of succession must be observed, and the student is forewarned accordingly. Can we therefore, with any propriety, pursue our inquiries respecting the inference, when we are forbidden to admit the proposition?

"Upon the whole, we presume to have shown, that of the foregoing reasons, the first, second, and third, are merely speculative; the fourth is drawn from an inapplicable medium, and a charge which is contra

dicted by the express words of Plowden; the fifth depends upon a distorted authority, and violent assumption; the sixth on a misquotation; that the seventh involves a contradiction between the table and the text; and of the eighth it will not be deemed intemperate to say, that it collects a point of doctrine from authorities by which that doctrine is opposed, which point is applied to a case we are directed not to allow, and from which an inference is drawn, though we are enjoined not to admit of the premises."*

* A case exactly in point, arose on the Midland Circuit in 1805, and was intended to have been argued in Westminster Hall, but was compromised. Several eminent counsel were however consulted, among whom was the late Mr. Serjeant Williams; and they were all of opinion that Sir W. Blackstone's doctrine was wrong.

Remainders, &c. descend

to the Heirs of the Per

son in whom they first vested.

SECTION 1.

HE rules laid down in the preceding chapter

TH

respecting the descent of estates in possession, do not apply to the descent of estates in remainder and reversion, expectant on an estate of freehold. Because where there is a preceding estate of freehold, the actual seisin is in the possessor of that estate, not in the person entitled to the estate in remainder or reversion.

2. It follows from this principle, that where a person entitled to an estate in remainder or reversion, expectant on a freehold estate, dies during the continuance of the particular estate, the remainder or reversion does not descend to his heir; because he never had a seisin to render him the stock or root of an inheritance: but it will descend to the person who is heir to the first purchaser of such remainder or reversion, at the time when it comes into possession.