Jemmott v. Cowley, 1 Lev. 170. T. Raym. 135. 158. Gilb. 73. satisfaction of the rent, is not admitted in equity. For the Court of Chancery will always make the lessor account to the lessee for the profits of the estate, during the time of his being in possession : and will compel him, after he has satisfied the rent in arrear, and the costs attending his entry, and detention of the lands, to give up the possession to the lessee, and to pay him the surplus profits of the estate. 73. In grants of rent charges, a clause of entry on the lands out of which the rent charge is granted, is usually inserted; in consequence of which an interest vests in the grantee, whenever the rent charge is in arrear; which he may reduce into possession by an ejectment. But the possession thus acquired is only till the grantee of the rent charge is satisfied his arrears, out of the rents and profits of the land. 74. In case of a distress, no demand of the rent is necessary; but where the remedy for the recovery of rent is by way of entry, there must be an actual demand made, previous to the entry, otherwise it is tortious; because a condition or power of entry is in derogation of the grant, and the estate at law being once defeated, it is not to be restored by any subsequent payment. It is therefore presumed that the tenant is residing on the premises, in order to pay the rent, for the preservation of the estate, unless the contrary appears, by the feoffor's being there to demand it. So that unless there be a demand made, and the tenant thereby, contrary to the presumption, appears not to be on the land, ready to pay the rent; the law will not give the lessor the benefit of re-entry, to defeat the tenant's estate, without a wilful default in him; which cannot appear, unless a demand is actually made on the land. of Use. Havergill v. Hare, 75. In the creation of rent charges, a right of Right of entry is now usually given by the operation of the Entry by way statute of uses. As if lands are conveyed to A., to Gilb. 137. the use, intent, and purpose that B. may receive out of the lands so conveyed a certain annual sum or yearly rent charge; and to this further use, intent, and purpose, that if such rent charge be in arrear for a certain time, it shall be lawful for B. and his assigns to enter upon and hold the land, and receive the profits thereof, till the arrears of the rent charge are satisfied. Here, as soon as the rent is in arrear, a use, derived out of the seisin of the trustee or releasee to uses springs up, and vests in the person to whom Tit. 11. c. 3. the power of entry is given, which is immediately transferred into possession, by the operation of the statute 27 Hen. VIII.: he has consequently a right to take and keep that possession, till the purpose for which it is executed is satisfied; when the use determines. By virtue of this estate he may make a lease for years to try his title in ejectment, either to obtain possession of the lands, if it be with-held from him, or to restore it, if it be disturbed or devested; and if he assigns over the rent charge, this right of entry and perception of the rents and profits of the lands, charged with the payment of it, will pass to the assignee. § 40. 1 Saund. R. 287. n. 76. By the statute 4 Geo. II. c. 28. § 2. it is Ejectment. enacted, that every landlord, who by his lease has a right of re-entry in case of nonpayment, when half a year's rent is due, and no sufficient distress is to be found, may serve a declaration in ejectment on his tenant, and affix the same on some notorious part of the premises; which shall be valid without any formal re-entry, or previous demand of rent: and that a recovery in such ejectment shall be final and conclusive, 1 Burr. 620. e 7 Term R. 117. 1 Inst. 202 a. n. 3. Actions of Courts of B. 1. c. 3. § 3. both in law and equity; unless the rent and all costs be paid within six calendar months after. 77. By the fourth section of this statute it is provided, that if the tenant, at any time before the trial in ejectment, pays or tenders to the lessor or landlord the whole rent in arrear, with the costs; or pays such arrears and costs into Court, the proceedings in ejectment shall cease and be discontinued. 78. In most cases, an action of debt may now be brought for rent. And in all modern leases, wherein rent is reserved, a covenant is inserted, on the part of the lessee, to pay the rent; on which an action of covenant may be brought. 79. As it is a maxim of equity that a right shall Equity. Treat. of Eq. not be without a remedy, the Court of Chancery will, in some cases, give its assistance to persons entitled to rent but equity will not afford a remedy for rent, when there is one at law; nor change the nature of the rent, so as to make the person liable, unless there is fraud in preventing a distress. Bridges v. Ca. 368. 80. Where by great length of time it is become Bro. Parl. impossible to know out of what particular lands ancient quit rents are issuable, the Court of Chancery has exercised a jurisdiction; and has constantly, on proof of payment within a reasonable time, decreed a satisfaction for all arrears of such rents; and payment thereof for the future. TITLE XXVIII. RENTS. CHAP. II. Of the Estate which may be had in a Rent, and its WITH respect to the estate which may be had An Estate in a rent, a person may be tenant in fee simple of a rent service created before the statute of quia emptores. And a rent charge may now be limited to a person in fee simple. in Fee. Tail. 2. A rent charge being an incorporeal heredita- An Estate ment, issuing out of lands, is comprehended within the statute de donis conditionalibus, and may therefore Tit. 2. c. 1. be entailed. There is, however, a very material distinction between a rent limited to a person and the heirs of his body, and an estate in land limited in the same manner; of which an account will be given in Tit. 36. c.7. a subsequent title. 3. A rent charge may be limited to a person for An Estate for his own life, or for that of any other, or for any Life or Years. Occupancy of a Rent. Salter v. Boteler, Vaugh. 199. 1 Salk. 189. 1 Inst. 388 a. Vaugh. 201. Bowles v. Buller v. 2 Roll. Ab. number of lives: in which case the grantee will be tenant for life, or pour auter vie, of such rent. A rent charge may also be limited to a person for any number of years. 4. By the common law there could be no general occupant of a rent: thus where a rent was granted to A. during the life of B., and A. died, living B., the rent determined. For the grant being originally made to A. only; when he died, no one could claim it as occupant, because there could be no entry upon it: nor could any one claim it under the deed, because no one was party to it, but the grantee. It followed therefore, that as no one could take it under the grant, it ceased and determined. 5. There might however be a special occupant of a rent; as if a rent was granted to A. and his heirs, during the life of B., and A. died, living B., the heir of A. would be special occupant of the rent. 6. A person granted a rent charge to W. R. to him and his heirs, during his life, and the lives of M. his wife, and D. and M. his daughters. It was com tended that this rent, being granted to one and his heirs, during his life and that of three other persons, was not descendible to the heir, nor should the heir. be occupant thereof. But all the Court held these mitations to be good enough; and that the heir should have this rent, as a party specially nominated, and as heir by descent; though it was not properly an estate descendible. 7. It is said to have been formerly held, that if a man granted a rent to A., his executors, administrators, and assigns, during the life of B., the executor of the grantee should not be a special occupant, because it was a freehold, which could not descend to an executor. |