particularly those of re-convictions, and also occasions other inconveniences upon which I need not dwell. The following is a list of the principal misdemeanours : Agents or bankers, embezzlement by (punishment not exceeding seven years' penal servitude). Bankruptcy (various offences relating to). Common assault, assault on constables and other officers, assault with intent to commit felony, rape, or an unnatural offence. Attempt to commit a felony at common law, or a misdemeanour. Abusing female children above ten and under twelve. Uttering counterfeit coin knowing the same to be counterfeit (not previously convicted).--Ditto, having other false coin in possession. Having possession of three or more pieces of counterfeit coin with intent to utter (punishment not exceeding three years' penal servitude). Compounding a felony (at common law). Conspiracy (of numerous kinds). Disobedience to Justices' orders, &c. Disorderly house, keeping. False pretences, obtaining money by (punishment not exceeding three years' penal servitude.) &c. Felony, misprision of. Fish, taking or destroying in private water, &c. Game (various offences connected with). Indecency, exposing person, &c., exposing indecent books, Larceny of dogs (second offence, &c.) Libel. Malicious injuries, to mill and fish ponds, turnpike gates, &c., scientific and literary collections, &c. Oaths, unlawful, taking or administering. Post Office (various offences relating to). Receiving stolen goods, where principal guilty of a misdemeanour (e.g. goods obtained by false pretences, &c., punishment not exceeding seven years' penal servitude). Smuggling (various acts relating to). Some of these offences are of course slight, and ought obviously to remain misdemeanour. I would, however, venture to suggest that at least the following crimes ought to be made felonies: Embezzlement by bankers or agents. Obtaining money under false pretences. Perjury. And receiving stolen goods where the principal is guilty of a misdemeanour.1 These offences are not only serious in themselves, but are already punishable with penal servitude; and it would seem reasonable to say that wherever the punishment is penal servitude, the crime should be felony. But, besides these, it appears to me that uttering counterfeit coin, knowing the same to be counterfeit,' and the like, should also be felony; and I am doubtful whether the same rule should not be applied to assaults with attempt to commit certain felonies of a grave description—e.g. rape, and to some other crimes. I do not propose to enter into the question of the adequacy of the punishment assigned in particular cases, whether felony or misdemeanour. Such a question is distinct from, though perhaps allied to, our present inquiry, which I would limit to the necessity of a re-classification of offences. In this case, if it should at any time be thought well to give practical effect to the proposed change, a very brief and simple enactment of the Legislature would suffice. It would be enough to provide that such and such offences (describing them) should henceforward be felonies. The law would of itself do the rest. In conclusion, I can only express my regret that I have not been able to give a more adequate examination of the subject. What I have said can only be regarded as tentative and introductory. It will be for others to decide what further steps (if any) are to be taken in the matter. MISCELLANEOUS. Mrs. WOLSTENHOLME-ELMY read a Paper on the 'Married Women's Property Act, 1870.'2 Mrs. Elmy said that the severe rule of the Common Law takes away all property from the wife upon marriage, and vests it in her husband, to whom also it gives whatever she may earn. The only case, this, in which English law takes away property from one person, without offence proved or imputed, and gives it without consideration to another. The action of the Court of 1 Receiving, &c., where the principal is guilty of felony is already a felony. 2 See Transactions, 1870, pp. 242–549. This Chancery and the custom of marriage settlements had largely modified this severity of the Common Law for all persons rich enough and prudent enough to avail themselves of such protection. Modern civilization, however, consists in the growing perception of the rights of individuals and in the security afforded to these rights by law. A public opinion, therefore, adverse to the extinction of the wife's personality, and of her rights over her own property, had been gradually growing up; and in 1857 the first attempt was made in the British Parliament to alter the old rule of forfeiture of a wife's property. The Married Women's Property Bill of that year went no further than second reading; but some protection for the property of a wife deserted by her husband was made procurable on application to a magistrate. Ten years later, in the autumn of 1867, a memorial, influentially signed, was presented to the Council of the Social Science Association, asking them to take into consideration the injustice of the law as between husband and wife, and to endeavour to procure a legislative remedy. The consequence of the action taken by that Association was the introduction by Mr. Shaw Lefevre, in the session of 1868, of the Married Women's Property Bill, which passed the second reading by the casting vote of the Speaker, and was referred to a Select Committee. Committee took much important evidence and reported generally in favour of the principle of the Bill, but nothing more was done that session. The first clause of the Bill proposed to enact that a married woman shall be capable of holding, acquiring, alienating, devising, and bequeathing real and personal estate, of contracting, and of suing and being sued, as if she were a feme sole.' In the session of 1869 the Bill was introduced by Mr. Russell Gurney, and passing through its several stages in the House of Commons, went up to the House of Lords, too late, however, in the session to be proceeded with. In 1870 Mr. Russell Gurney again successfully conducted the Bill through the House of Commons; but the House of Lords dealt with it in the most trenchant manner, so altering it in fact as practically to substitute for it a new measure, which gave to women not the right to their own property, but a power of securing, by various processes, some degree of protection for that property. But as even the Lords' Bill recognised fully the right of a wife to the absolute ownership of whatever she might earn after her marriage by her own independent industry, and so offered comfort and security to thousands of toiling wives and mothers of families, the friends of the original Bill did not feel at liberty to reject the measure. The Lords' amendments were therefore agreed to by the House of Commons, and the Married Women's Property Act of 1870 became law. A measure, however, resting upon so unjust a principle as that of the maintenance of the rule of confiscation of a wife's property could not fail to be faulty and contradictory in detail, and to work practical injustice. To one special flaw in the Act a partial remedy was applied by an amending Act passed in 1874. The Act of 1870 expressly freed a husband from liability for his wife's debts contracted before marriage, but as the old Common Law rule was left in full force, and the wife's property still became the husband's unless she had invested it in certain ways provided by the Act, and gone through a formal process with regard to each separate portion of it, a real wrong against creditors was thus created, since the husband could take the whole of the wife's property without becoming responsible for one penny of her debts, and a real grievance to unmarried women, especially to those engaged in trade, as they began to find it difficult to obtain credit, the wholesale dealers fearing they might marry, and so extinguish their liabilities. The Act of 1874 imposed upon the husband liability for the wife's debts to the extent of the property acquired by him through the marriage, and made him liable to be sued jointly with the wife in such a case. The original Married Women's Property Bill, on the other hand, had proposed to leave to a wife the absolute ownership of her property, and the sole liability for her debts. This proposal would do justice not only to the creditors of a woman who marries whilst in debt, but to the creditors of a married woman trading separately from her husband. Such creditors have now no remedy at law, for the Act of 1870, though it gave to a wife power to sue for debts due to her in such cases, imposed upon her no corresponding liability to be sued. Earnings made by a wife after her marriage and after the passing of the Act of 1870 are by that Act recognised as her separate property, but earnings made before marriage and all personal property possessed at the time of the marriage will become the husband's, unless the woman has prudently invested them in some one or other of the few investments selected by the Lords for protection, and unless, in anticipation of her marriage, she has further gone through the special processes needed for their protection. Moreover, although the right to her own earnings would seem to imply the prior right to earn them, yet the husband can, in virtue of his 'marital right,' forbid his wife to earn anything, by refusing his consent to any contract of service into which she may enter, whilst the non-liability of a wife to be sued for breach of contract, even in cases in which she has had the full consent of her husband, places married women at a serious disadvantage whether in the labour market. or as 'separate traders.' Personal property, coming to a wife during her marriage, will still, according to the Common Law rule, become the husband's, except when the wife becomes entitled to it as next of kin, or one of the next of kin, to an intestate, or when a bequest does not exceed 2007. In such cases the property will belong to the wife for her separate use. As to real property the old law was left untouched, except again in the case of an inheritance under an intestacy, in which case the heritage becomes the wife's for her separate use. The Act of 1870 is then only a permissive' measure of protection so far as regards the property of married women. Retaining the unjust principle of forfeiture, it seeks to apply partial remedies for consequent injuries. It is frequently urged that as the law imposes upon a husband the liability to maintain his wife, it is but fair that the law should give him her property to enable him to maintain her and their children. But the only legal liability of a husband (however rich he may be) to maintain his wife and children is but a Poor Law liability-i.e., he must not allow them to become chargeable to the parish, though, should he so do, all that the parish can sue him for is the usual pauper pittance. But the Act of 1870 imposed upon a married woman who had separate property of her own the same liability for the maintenance of her children as is by law imposed upon a widow. That is, she is liable to be sued and punished for neglecting to maintain them just as much as her husband is, provided only that this is not construed to free him from any liability. Yet, though equal duties are imposed, equal rights are not given. The custody of the child belongs to the husband, and he alone is recognised by the law as a parent when privilege or prerogative is concerned. But the Act further imposes upon a wife possessed of separate property' (including, of course, earnings) the same liability for the maintenance of her husband which is imposed upon a husband for the maintenance of his wife. But the claim of a wife for maintenance rests upon a very different footing from that of a husband. The money value of the domestic services of a wife whose time is occupied with the care of husband and children, is, in the vast majority of cases, more than equal to the cost of her maintenance, and gives her an absolute claim upon the husband for the means of living. Yet for the classes below the level of marriage settlements, the only ways in which a wife can enforce this claim are through |