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and Republican Nations which govern themselves within their own frontiers, abdicate their natural rights and hand themselves over to the disposal of their governments as regards their exterior affairs. That representative system which operates in the national organism vanishes completely in the sphere of internationality. It has been recently counselled by Mr. de Lavelaye that constitutions should reserve to the Legislative Assemblies the right of declaring war and making peace. In countries so singularly favoured as England, where political opinion, besides being enlightened and well-informed, is so influential, such a prerogative of the Parliament would be of immense importance; but where the legislative assemblies do not possess the independence of the British Parliament, the votings in favour of a declaration of war would afford room for similar intrigues to those now employed by Governments which seek to obtain the approval of their estimates or war budgets. If universal suffrage is at any time justifiable, if a duty of conscience ever imposes it as a duty to listen to the vox populi, it is assuredly when the nation is called upon to declare war; and a yet greater right to pronounce freely their will should be exercised by those countries where the military service is compulsory. For a few men there to declare for war, who, perhaps, share neither in its costs or sufferings, without consulting en plebiscite the adult inhabitants, is equivalent to disposing of the lives of these men without their will, perhaps contrary to it; it is to hold in slavery and prepare for slaughter civilized and independent nations, after the slavery of Africans has been abolished. Nothing more iniquitous can be imagined than to see the instigators of war in the Press, the Tribune, and the Parliament holding themselves aloof from the range of war's missiles, and leaving the unhappy people who yearn for peace. to be the food for cannon; nor yet can anything be conceived more contrary to the representative system than to witness a bellicose minority impose its will upon a pacific majority. With the desire of avoiding the commotions which would arise from the taking of plebiscites-commotions, at the same time, infinitely less than those of the conflicts which they would obviate—it might be made a condition that the plebiscite should only be had recourse to when the Chambers declare war against a minority of a tenth or more of the voters. In such cases,

two months after the promulgation of such a vote the declaration of war should be submitted to a plebiscite to obtain the vote or veto of the people direct from the people. The existence of nations imperiously calls for this reform in constitutional charters, no less than for the establishment of arbitration, in order

that when the latter course of judicial procedure between nations. shall be refused, the national will may be ascertained in the manner most genuine and imposing.

Mr. Nagamasa Hara, a Japanese student, read a paper 'On the State of the Consular Courts in Japan.' He referred to the 4th and 5th Articles of the treaty of England with Japan of 1858, providing that all questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects in the dominions of H.M. the Tycoon of Japan, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of British authorities, and also that British subjects who may commit any crime against any Japanese subject or subjects, or citizens of any other country, shall be tried and punished by the consul or other public functionary authorised thereto, according to the laws of Great Britain. He asked why should any foreigners living in Japan be subject to other laws than Japanese laws? Why should any foreigner committing a crime against a Japanese be tried, not by a Japanese but by a foreign tribunal? He stated that it is impossible for Japan to increase her commerce with England while such courts. continue, Japanese merchants not being willing to deal with foreigners who are not amenable to the laws of the country, and objecting to attend those courts whose language they do not understand, and an appeal from which is to a court in a foreign land (China). Mr. Hara referred to a dispatch of Earl Derby, dated 1867, with regard to the old consular courts in Egypt, which the British Government admitted were forced by circumstances, and which were injurious to British interests, and having shown the changes recently inaugurated in Egypt, Mr. Hara hoped that a similar liberal policy might be extended to Japan.

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Is it desirable that a prorogation of Parliament should affect the position of Bills and other matters in progress, as it now does? By R. S. WRIGHT, Barrister-at-Law.

TH

HIS subject is a narrow one, and all that can be said about it lies within a small compass; but it has an importance in Parliamentary economy which is comparable to the import

1 See Transactions, 1873, p. 158.

ance in mercantile economy of devices for reducing engine space or for diminishing waste of coal.

The number of the things which the House of Commons has to do tends continually to increase. The time which can be given to doing them has tended rather to decrease, with the disuse of autumn sessions and with the growing disinclination of members for late sittings. And similar things take up more time than they used to take up, because a continually increasing number of members wish to take part in debate. Further, the distribution of business is unfavourable to legislation. The work of the House of Commons consists partly of finance, partly of the discussion of grievances, and partly of legislation. The two former almost necessarily have precedence over the last, and as they expand it loses in a perpetually accelerated ratio. One result of all this is the annual phenomenon known as the massacre a phenomenon which tends to reproduce itself because of the accumulation of arrears which it bequeaths to the normal supply of new bills with which a new session will always find itself more than sufficiently occupied. Another effect is, that the success of bills introduced by private members is now practically impossible unless by the active assistance of the Government. In the absence of such assistance any one member can stop the bill. This may or not be an evil as regards the character of the majority of the bills which are so stopped; but it distinctly deserves notice that the House of Commons, as distinguished from the Government, has lost almost completely any power which it once possessed of initiating legislation, and that the Government has gained not only a nearly exclusive initiative, but also a self-acting check on all legislation which the Government does not itself initiate. Other obvious results are haste and consequent imperfection in the bills which pass, and loss of the surge of popular interest which would sometimes for the moment serve to float a bill over the bars of prejudice, interest, and apathy. And, what is not the least of the evils, systematic amendment of the law is not attempted by any Government, because experience has proved that nothing but piecemeal legislation can be got through in any single session.

Two principal suggestions have been made for the better economy of the time of Parliament. Mr. Lowe's experience as a legislator in both worlds entitles his plan to priority of consideration. His view is, that a great part of the legislative work done by Parliament does not need the attention of Parliament at all, but might probably be left to some administrative department, such as the Privy Council. Mr. Lowe instances a

bill to confirm marriages contracted in an imperfectly consecrated chapel, a bill to annex certain reefs to Jamaica, a bill to ratify a lease granted by the Office of Works; and he suggests that Parliament, relieved from these, would have leisure for work which cannot be delegated. I venture, however, to think that, if all bills of this kind were jettisoned, the ship would not be lightened or cleared in any appreciable degree. Probably the whole time taken up by twenty such bills in their passage through both Houses of Parliament does not exceed two hours, and even that time is taken, not from the working hours of the House, but from the preliminary and concluding moments when no other business can be done. The legislative hours of Parliament are usually taken up with bills on subjects of a kind to which no such expedient could be applied-Church Patronage, Merchant Shipping, Regimental Exchanges, Offences against the Person, Savings Banks, and so forth.

The other suggestion is the one for discussion to-day. It is, that a bill which has reached a certain stage in one session should not wholly expire with that session, and have to be gone over again de novo in the next through all the stages of introduction, second reading, motion that the Speaker leave the chair, committee, report, and third reading, with possible debates at every point, but should be allowed to be taken up again after the recess at the stage at which it was left. The possible economy of such a system is obvious; but before discussing its value or the objections which may be brought against it, some consideration is necessary of the precise nature of the proposition. The principal difficulty will be to determine at what particular stage a bill should be held to have. shown sufficient vitality to be entitled to revival. Leave to introduce the bill must, of course, have been obtained in its first session, and first reading is a mere formality. But ought it to suffice that the bill has been read a second time? It must be remembered that many bills are what are called 'play-bills,' intended merely to enable a vote to be taken on a principle, or a grievance or hobby to be aired, but not calculated to bear discussion of their details in committee. And even in the case of bills differently framed, it may be doubted whether there. would often be much economy in continuing bills which have not gone further than second reading. If a bill has not received sufficiently strong and deliberate acceptance to pass second reading in a second session without much debate, its passage through the second session will not be much facilitated by omitting that stage. Practically the choice appears to me to

lie between the stage of having gone through committee and the stage of having completely passed through one House. It would be hardly possible to frame a satisfactory standing order defining any stage of partial progress through committee which should be considered sufficient; and there would be some disadvantage in resuming the committee in another session, some danger that different parts of the bill might be settled on different principles. On the other hand, it may be said that in the cases in which continuation is the most likely to be of practical use, namely, bills for the consolidation and amendment of large branches of the law, committee is precisely the stage which requires continuation. And there may be a difference for this purpose between an ordinary committee of the whole House and a select committee. A select committee is less liable to influence and to change of view. It would certainly be worth while to try how the continuation of a select committee would work in the case of a consolidation or a mainly legal bill. In other cases, it would probably be well in the first place to try the less violent experiment of continuing a bill only when it has completely passed through one House. Even if the change should be carried no further, considerable economy would result, and mere obstructiveness, which is always a serious power in Parliament, would be partially disarmed.

Then what are the objections to continuation, so limited and guarded? Mr. Lowe suggests that when a disagreeable bill is sent up to the Lords late in a session, they may shelve the bill for a year, on the plea that they desire to consider it more fully during the recess, and that little time will be lost if they resume it early in the next session. But this is not in practice the sort of way in which the fate of an important bill is determined; or, if the pretext could be used under the proposed system, it can be used with nearly equal ease under the existing system. Another objection is, that the paper of the House would become crowded with continued bills, and might in time even become occupied for years in advance. But there is no force in this objection so far as Government bills are concerned, for Government will then, as now, arrange its own business in its own time; and there is no force in the objection as regards private members' bills, for not only would priority be balloted for as now, but a continued bill would block the way for a less time than a wholly new bill. And if bills are not continued unless they have completely passed through one House, not only does the objection wholly disappear, but it is obvious that the block in the list of bills will be reduced because the bill will have been removed into the other House. A third objec

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