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in the cases I have detailed, is not that likely to be usually followed, and that it contains within it the germs of disturbance of existing peaceful relations. Some other mode must, therefore, be sought if the necessity for the occasional modification of Municipal Law to bring it into harmony with International Law be admitted.

And whether this mode be the signification through the ordinary channels of diplomatic intercourse of the consensus of nations on any given point, or the decision of such point by an International Tribunal, if constituted, the necessity for studying the question will be equally apparent, and no less will it be apparent if both these modes should be rejected, and another substituted. I merely throw out suggestions, without pretending to do more than ask your attention to a question of the day, worthy of serious consideration.

Similarly with regard to the problem, what, if any, are the modifications required in the existing Law of Nations. It will be obvious, I hope, that my only desire was to point out that such a question is before us, and that if we do not give it our serious consideration now, we may one day find that the consensus of nations has decided points in which we were vitally interested, while we stood aloof till it was too late to make our influence felt. Let us rather set to work upon all the points, whether in Municipal or International Law, that seem to require modification, and by labouring at this work in union with the other countries which have taken it up, show forth in practice the truth of the Aristotelian doctrine that Good is the universal object of pursuit.'

Mr. A. P. SPRAGUE, of Troy, New York, also read a paper on the question. Mr. Sprague said that regarding law simply as a rule of action among individuals, communities, and nations, we shall find no difficulty in admitting that there is such a thing as international law, a statement which some are disposed to doubt or deny. But it depends very much in what sense the term 'Law' is used, whether the rules of international intercourse may be denominated international laws or not. Strictly speaking there is no international law except in so far as it has been expressly recognised and declared by the nations themselves. It is desirable to make the conditions of international law correspond as far as possible with those of municipal law. The legislative condition may be had by con

* This Paper is printed at length in the Law Magazine of November, 1875.

vening an international assembly to frame an extended treaty embodying rules of international intercourse. The adjudica tive condition may be supplied by establishing an international tribunal to interpret and apply the provisions of an extended treaty or code. But, from the nature of international relations, the executive condition cannot be supplied, there being no power superior to the nations to enforce their public law. International law is essentially self-administrative. Until we have an international code and an international tribunal established by the nations themselves, private and unofficial effort in the direction of reform and codification must be exercised. It is true that the works of elementary writers, the theories and opinions of publicists, the propositions and resolutions of unofficial associations do not constitute the law of nations. But unofficial bodies like this Association, and the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, the Institute of International Law, the various Peace Societies of Europe and America can develop international sentiment, evoke the international conscience, investigate and discuss questions of international intercourse, collect opinions and data preparatory to the official action of nations. Without attempting at present to suggest any modifications in those rules of international law which may be said to be settled, it may be desirable to discuss a very few of those numerous questions which are in an unsettled state, and upon which the light of reason may be thrown with the greatest effect. The question of the abandonment of territory is suggested by the recent decision of Marshal MacMahon, President of France, concerning the title to territory on the Delagoa Bay which was in controversy between Great Britain and Portugal. This question is one of great importance to nations like Great Britain, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, having possessions separated from the home territory by great distances. While the principle is generally conceded that, on the abandonment of territory not contiguous to that of the home government, such territory becomes the property of the first subsequent occupier, the difficult question as to what constitutes an abandonment of the territory remains in a state of obscurity and contention. The arbitrator in the case of the Delagoa Bay does not refer to any general principle of international law. From the statement of the case, as it appears in the award, it is quite evident that the decision was based upon the sufficiency of a pre-existing title, and of a purely technical and nominal continuance of occupancy. But the correctness of this view may be doubted. Occupancy should not entitle a nation to

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non-contiguous territory unless the occupancy is both continuous and effective. The question in the Delagoa Bay case should have been considered as depending upon whether Portugal had in fact abandoned the territory in dispute when Great Britain took possession, by not keeping up a reasonably effective occupancy. In the present condition of the world's commerce, and with the present methods of colonisation, a nation should be deemed to have abandoned a distant and noncontiguous territory when it shall have ceased. to maintain anything more than a nominal and technical control over it. By such a rule nations which have the willingness and the ability to colonise or develop distant territories, to introduce into them civilisation in place of barbarism, and to make them contribute to the riches of the world, will not be deterred by other nations having neither the ability nor the willingness to do likewise, and maintaining only a nominal and entirely inefficient occupancy of unsettled regions of vast extent and great but undeveloped natural resources. Another unsettled point in international law is with reference to the punishment of persons which have been surrendered under treaties of extradition. is contended by some that a person so surrendered may be prosecuted for any offence, whether or not it is included in the demand or the treaty of extradition; and that even peculiar, local, and political offences are thus punishable. But this would effectually destroy, in many cases, the protection which nations throw around fugitives charged with infractions of peculiar or political laws in other nations. The principle ought to be uniformly followed that a fugitive from justice when surrendered should not be prosecuted on any charge not included in the demand, or at least for any offence not included in the treaty of extradition, leaving the offender free to leave the country on his acquittal or punishment in respect to the offence or offences for which extradition is procured or procurable. The next point in international law which I shall notice is suggested by the despatch of the German Minister to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 3, 1875. The rule laid down by the German Minister is that a State ought not to permit its subjects to disturb the internal peace of another State, and is bound to take care by its laws that it is in a position to fulfil this international obligation. This doctrine, as Lord Derby said in the House of Lords, canrot be admitted in its broad form. But the acceptance of the rule in some form and in some sense is quite inevitable. Nations are beginning to understand that they have a delicate system of obligations with reference to each other. But the only

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duties which are recognised in the present state of international relations are in themselves of a negative character, the fundamental principle being that no nation ought to do anything to the detriment of another. But in the performance of this negative duty something positive is found to be demanded. Conformity of municipal law to international obligation is required to some extent. We have two simultaneously existing conditions, national independence and international dependence. How to reconcile these is the perplexing problem. But wherever there is an international obligation there is a corresponding obligation, national or international, direct or indirect, proximate or remote, absolute or limited, to conform municipal laws to the international obligations. There are degrees of duty to conform municipal law to international obligations, or, to state it differently, there are degrees of responsibility for the omission to conform municipal law to international obligations. If a nation's officials, through defective laws or discipline or judgment, commit a wrong, an insult, or injury upon another nation, the liability is absolute. But where the Government itself is not directly concerned a different rule of liability attaches. Thus a nation is bound to use reasonable diligence to prevent, by its internal arrangements, breaches of neutrality on the part of its citizens, and in consequence of the use of its ports and facilities by a belligerent. Where the results of the operation of the municipal laws of one nation as manifested among the people of another are of a remote or indefinite character, there is no international obligation to prevent these results, and no duty to modify or abrogate the offensive laws. Mental, moral, or spiritual influences which may flow from the words or deeds of the citizens of one nation are not the subject of international obligation, although the indirect effects may be the physical disturbance and detriment of another nation. The instruments which are to play the great part in settling these and other questions, are the Codification of International Law and the establishment of an international tribunal. The initial code which we hope to frame in the present century shall be enlarged and completed by other minds in other centuries. The formation of such a code is both desirable and inevitable.

DISCUSSION.

Mr. S. S. DICKINSON (Stroud) said the first branch of the question was too large to be dealt with in a ten minutes'speech. As regarded the second part, How may Municipal Law be brought into harmony with Interna

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tional Obligations? he wished to direct attention in the public interest to the point which he considered lay at the basis of municipal and international law, namely, the duty of the subject of one State whenever he committed any act involving the interests of another State. It appeared to him that the committal of any act which injured another State, rendered that subject, who was the offender, responsible to the tribunal of his own country. A great portion of British law was lex non scripta. In the early days of our legislation the law was said to be made by individuals, and international law also was said to be made by individuals, because early writers on international law had laid down the principles, subsequently adopted by the nations, as found in the present code. The fundamental principle, with reference to the conduct of a subject, was this: 'If you, by your act, involve your country in responsibility towards another State, you are responsible to your own country by the act so done. Therefore, he apprehended, an indictment ought to lie against any such person. The case of the Alabama offered an illustration. That case raised two distinct tions, namely, one regarding the conduct of individuals, and the other as affecting the nation itself. If it were true and he thought that, by the decision of the arbitrators, it must be accepted as true-that the acts of those who fitted out the Alabama were of a character involving our nation in responsibility to America, then he maintained that the persons who performed those acts ought to be held responsible to the tribunals of this, their own, country. In the present day, when everything was done by legislative, and not by individual, authority, our municipal law ought to be laid down on such principles as would show what were the duties of individuals towards foreign nations. Independently of that, there should be laid down this fundamental principle: that, irrespective of any distinct municipal law on the question, a subject shall not do any act towards another country involving his own country in responsibility towards the other. If, therefore, the conduct of individuals in this country be such towards another nation as to make the former responsible to the latter, that would be held to be an illegal act, and punishable as such by the tribunals of this country. Of course the question of the Alabama was a complicated one, because, as he considered, the executive of this country made itself an accessory after the fact; for he had always been of opinion that, after the vessel got away and her character became well known, our executive ought at once to have recognised her real character (her former one having been fraudulently obtained), and ought not to have made itself an accessory after the fact. As a nation, in the foremost ranks, we were in a position to decide such a question as the extradition of criminals, without waiting for the assent of other nations. These international discussions, he believed, were a mistake. We had far better lay down a general principle by which all our tribunals should be guided in all cases; and then we ought to say to other nations, 'Here is our law, apply yours in your own way; and we ask you to deal to us the same sort of justice as we deal to you.' For his part he saw no reason why we should harbour a criminal, because another nation did not enter into a treaty of extradition with us. In regard to the codifi

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