himself, but in millions of subordinate instruments, that were more or less remotely dependent upon him. Certain it is, if he had not put forth his volition, the subordinate instrumentalities, however numerous and powerful in themselves, would never have united in and secured the result in question.

§ 457. Volitions involve a prospective element.

Another mark or characteristic of volitions, by which they are distinguished from some, though not from all states of the mind, is, that they have exclusive relation to the future, to something which is to be done.-A volition is "futuritive" in its very nature; it involves in itself, and as a part of its own essentiality, a prospective element; it has no capacity of turning its eye backward, but always looks for ward.

An intellective or perceptive act rests in itself. As soon as it assumes the form of a cognition or knowledge, it accomplishes, so far as its own nature is concerned, the mission for which it was sent. It takes its position, and there it stands; furnishing an occasion, it is true, for other feelings to exist and to operate, but in itself remaining not only complete, but satisfied and quiescent.

But it is not so with a volition, which, from its very nature, cannot rest satisfied with the mere fact of its own existence. If we may be allowed the expressions, it continually reaches forth its hand to grasp objects which have not as yet a being. In other words, it always has in view something which is to take place hereafter; something which is to be done, the completion of which is, therefore, necessarily fu ture. This trait is an element of its nature, or, rather, is naturally and necessarily involved in its nature, and may be regarded as one of the characteristics which help to distinguish it from the perceptive and emotive states of the mind at least, if not from others.

§ 458. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength. There is one additional characteristic of volitions

worthy of some notice, viz., that the volition does not always exist with the same degree of force. Undoubtedly every one must have been conscious, that the exercise of the voluntary power is more prompt and energetic at some times than others. We are aware that it is liable to be objected to this statement, that if we will to do a thing, there can be nothing less than the volition; and that it is necessarily the same under all circumstances. And it is undoubtedly true, that we never will to do an act with anything less than a volition; and that, if there be any act of the will at all, it is one truly and fully so. That is to say, the act is in all cases the same, as far as its intrinsic nature is concerned. And yet we may confidently urge, there is no inconsistency in saying that it may exist with different degrees of force.

The existence of a mental state, which is always the same in its nature, in different degrees, is not peculiar to volition. The same trait is characteristic of the mental act in all cases where we yield our assent or belief. The state of mind which we denominate BELIEF is undoubtedly always the same in its nature, but admitting of various degrees. We determine these differences of strength in the feeling by means of that same internal consciousness which assures us of the existence of the mere feeling itself. In other words, we are conscious of, or feel our belief to be sometimes weaker and at other times stronger, which we express by various terms, such as presumption, probability, high probability, and certainty. And by appealing in the same way to our consciousness of what takes place within, we shall probably come to the conclusion that we put forth the act of volition with much greater strength at some times than others; that at some times it is so feeble as hardly to be distinguished from a mere desire or wish, and is scarcely recognised as a volition, while at other times it is exceed. ingly marked and energetic.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE LAWS OF THE WILL.

§ 459. On the universality of law.

THE will is free; but it is also true, that it acts in connection with law. In entering specifically upon the question, whether the will is susceptible of determi nate principles or laws of action, we may reason in support of that view, in the first place, from the general likeness or analogy of nature. If the universe is everywhere legibly inscribed and written over with the great truth, that all things are subject to law, are we not furnished with a strong presumption that we shall not discover an exception in any part of man's mental nature? As to the alleged fact on which we base this presumption, there can be no doubt of it.Let us look, in the first place, at material things. The parts of the earth are kept in their relative position by the operation of some fixed law; the various immense bodies, composing the system to which the earth belongs, are made to revolve in obedience to some unalterable principle; there is not even a plant, or a stone, or a falling leaf, or a grain of sand, which can claim an exemption from regulation and control. And what is true in these few instances, is true in all. No certain and undoubted exception can be found.

And this great truth holds good also of things which have life and intelligence, Objects of a spiritual or mental nature (if not in precisely the same sense in which the assertion is applicable to matter, yet in some true and important meaning of the expressions) have their appropriate and determinate principles of being and action. There may, indeed, be some things which are as yet unexplainable by man; there may be some objects of knowledge, to the full understanding of whose nature limited human reason cannot as yet reach; but still the vast majority of objects, coming within the ordinary range of our inspection, ob

viously tend to found and to foster the general conviction, that there are laws wherever there are exist ences, whatever the kind or nature of the existence.— There is, therefore, undoubted truth in the remark of Montesquieu, with which he introduces his great work on the Spirit of Laws, where he says, after some suggestions on the meaning of the term, "all beings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws."

§ 460. Remarks of Hooker on the universality of law.

"Of law," says the learned Hooker in a passage often quoted, "no less can be said than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different spheres and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."*

It is a sublime truth, that law, the great bond of the universe, finds its origin and support in the bosom of the Deity, and is, in its basis or elements, co-substantial with his nature; and going forth from that primitive and prolific centre in every possible direction, like rays from the sun, embraces, harmonizes, and controls every form and modification of being, whether intelligent or unintelligent. And how full of grandeur and of consolation is the thought! If we could suppose that even a single unintelligent atom had broken loose from the countless extensions and applications of the great Principle of Unity, which is only another name for that law which binds one existence to another, and both to a third, and all to the great central and superintendent Power, it would not fail to fill us with misgivings and anguish. The doctrine of the universality of law, which is the same as the universality of power under the guidance of fixed *Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, book i

principles, recommends itself to the heart as well as the understanding, and dispenses happiness while it controls conviction. Is any one prepared to say that he is not rendered happy in the recollection that God is around us and in us? Is it not a source of consolation, that his paternal eye rests for ever upon our path; that he knoweth our lying down and rising up, our going out and coming in? And that, while he superintends the minutest actions and events pertain ing to ourselves, He extends abroad, amid the numberless varieties of existence, the watchfulness of his pervading control,

"And fills, and bounds, connects and equals all?"

461. A presumption thus furnished in favor of the subjection of the will to law.

It is not necessary to pursue this subject, when contemplated under this general form, at much length. What has been said will answer our present purpose. If the doctrine of the universality of law be tenable, what shall we say of the Will? Does not the posi tion, that the Will is not subject to laws, imply an anomaly in the universe? Whatever is not under some sort of control, but is entirely irregular, contingent, and exempt from all conditions, is necessarily irresponsible to the supervision of any thing, even God himself. We have, then, an exceedingly strong presumption, when we look at the subject in the most general light, in favour of the proposition that the Will has its laws.