the field, and the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, dwelling in them as a part of their nature, and blessing while they control and guide them. CHAPTER III. APPETITES. 316. Of the general nature and characteristics of the appetites. UNDER the general head of Desires, the subject of apPETITES seems next to propose itself for consideration. But as it is one of limited extent, and of subordinate importance in a metaphysical point of view, only a few remarks will be necessary. The arrangement, which brings the subject forward for discussion under the head of Desires, will recommend itself on a very little attention. The prominent appetites are those of HUNGER and THIRST; but the appetite of hunger is nothing more than the desire for food; the appetite for thirst is a desire for drink. Nevertheless, they appear to be sufficiently distinguished from the other desires. They are not like the instincts, always gratified in a certain fixed and particular manner; nor are they like them in being wholly independent of the reasoning power. On the contrary, they may be restrained and regulated in some degree; and when it is otherwise, their demands may be quieted in various ways. But without dwelling upon such considerations, the statement has been made with much appearance of reason, that they are characterized by these three things.(1.) They take their rise from the body, and are common to men with the brutes.-(2.) They are not constant in their operation, but occasional.-(3.) They are accompanied with an uneasy sensation. It may be remarked here, that the feeling of uneasiness now referred to appears always to precede the desire or appetite, and to be essential to it. 317. The appetites necessary to our preservation, and not originally of a selfish character. Although our appetites do not present much of inter est, considered as parts of our mental economy, they have their important uses, in connexion with the laws and requirements of our physical nature.-"The appetites of hunger and thirst," says Stewart, "were intended for the preservation of the individual; and without them reason would have been insufficient for this important purpose. Suppose, for example, that the appetite of hunger had been no part of our constitution, reason and experience might have satisfied us of the necessity of food to our preservation; but how should we have been able, without an implanted principle, to ascertain, according to the varying state of our animal economy, the proper seasons for eating, or the quantity of food that is salutary to the body? The lower animals not only receive this information from nature, but are, moreover, directed by instinct to the particular sort of food that it is proper for them to use in health and in sickness. The senses of taste and smell, in the savage state of our species, are subservient, at least in some degree, to the same purpose. Our appetites can with no propriety be called selfish, for they are directed to their respective objects as ultimate ends, and they must all have operated, in the first instance, prior to any experience of the pleasure arising from their gratification. After this experience, indeed, the desire of enjoyment will naturally come to be combined with the appetite; and it may sometimes lead us to stimulate or provoke the appetite with a view to the pleasure which is to result from indulging it. Imagination, too, and the association of ideas, together with the social affections, and sometimes the moral faculty, lend their aid, and all conspire together in forming a complex passion, in which the animal appetite is only one ingredient. In proportion as this passion is gratified, its influence over the conduct becomes the more irresistible, (for all the active determinations of our nature are strengthened by habit,) till at last we struggle in vain against its tyranny. A man so enslaved by his animal appetites exhibits humanity in one of its most miserable and contemptible forms." $318. Of the prevalence and origin of appetites for intoxicating drugs. There are not only natural appetites, but artificial or * Stewart's Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, bk i., ch. i * CALIFORNIA acquired ones. It is no uncommon thing to find persons who have formed an appetite for ardent spirits, for tobacco, for opium, and intoxicating drugs of various kinds. It is a matter of common remark, that the appetite for inebriating liquors, in particular, is very prevalent, especially among Savage tribes.-And it may be proper briefly to explain the origin of such appetites. Such drugs and liquors as have been referred to have the power of stimulating the nervous system, and by means of this excitement they cause a degree of pleasure. This pleasurable excitement is soon followed by a corresponding degree of languor and depression, to obtain relief from which resort is again had to the intoxicating draught or drug. This results not only in a restoration, but an exhilaration of spirits; which is again followed by depression and distress. And thus resort is had, time after time, to the strong drink, the tobacco, the opium, or whatever it is which intoxicates, until an appetite is formed so strong as to subdue, lead captive, and brutalize the subject of it. So that the only way to avoid the forming of such a habit, after the first erroneous step has been taken, is quietly to endure the subsequent unhappiness attendant on the pleasurable excitement of intoxication, till the system has time to recover itself, and to throw off its wretchedness by its own efforts. 319. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the appetites. In accordance with the remarks in the last section in the chapter on the Nature of desires, we may add here the general statement, that the operation of all the Appetites, of whatever kind, is twofold, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. So far as they are directed to their objects as ultimate ends, without taking into consideration anything else, their operation is obviously analogous to that of the pure instincts. But after the first instance of their gratification, they may be instigated to subsequent action, not so much by a view of the ultimate object as of the pleasure accessory to its acquisition. And thus it sometimes happens, that their action, in view of the enjoyment before them, is turbulent and violent. Nevertheless, we may avail ourselves of the aid of other principles of the mind to subject them to a degree of restraint, to regulate, and, may And here is the basis of the morality of the appetites So far as they are susceptible of a merely instinctive action, they cannot be said to possess any moral character, either good or bad. They are greatly useful in their place; but, in a moral point of view, are to be regarded simply as innocent. It is only so far as they are voluntary, so far as they can be reached and controlled by the will, that they can, by any possibility, be morally good or evil, virtuous or vicious. So that virtue and vice, considered in relation to the appetites, is located, not in the appetites themselves in their intrinsic nature, but in their exercises; and in those exercises only which are subor. dinate to the influence of the will. CHAPTER IV. PROPENSITIES. X § 320. General remarks on the nature of the propensities. As we advance further in the examination of this por tion of the natural or pathematic sensibilities, we meet with certain forms of Desire which are different from any we have hitherto attended to, and which accordingly require a distinct consideration. There is certainly no danger of their being confounded with the Instincts, inasmuch as they do not exhibit that fixedness and inflexibleness of action which is usually characteristic of those states of mind. They differ from the Appetites also, first, because they are much less dependent for their existence and exercise upon the condition of the body; and, secondly, because in that comparative estimation which is naturally attached to the different active principles of our nature, they confessedly hold a higher rank. At the same time they evidently, in the graduation of our regard, fall below the Affections, besides being distinguished from them in some other respects. Hence we may, with entire propriety, not only assign them a separate and distinct position, but shall find a convenience in designating them by a distinctive name.-Among the Propensities (for this is the name which we propose to attach to them) may be mentioned the principle of self preservation, or the desire of continued existence; curiosity, or the desire of knowledge; sociality, or the desire of society; self-love, or the desire of happiness; the desire of esteem, the propensity to imitate, and some others. Although we have briefly indicated some of the circumstances which separate the Propensities from the other leading principles coming under this general head, it will be noticed that we have not attempted to give a statement of what they are in themselves. It is true, they are all based upon desire, and they all have some object. But whatever is intrinsic or specifically characteristic in their nature will be best learned from the considerations that will necessarily arise, as they pass successively under review. 321. Principle of self-preservation, or the desire of continued existence. The first of those original desires which we shall proceed to notice may be denominated the principle of SELFPRESERVATION, or the desire of a continuance of existence. -The proof of the existence of such a desire is not only abundant in what we see around us, but is so intimate also to our own consciousness, that it can hardly be necessary to enter into details. "All that a man hath will he give for his life," was a sort of moral axiom in the earliest antiquity; and it stands as little in need of the verification of proof now as it did then. It is true that the principle may, in its practical operation, be overcome by the ascendant influence of other principles, by the mere desire of esteem, by the love of country, or by the sentiments of duty; but, although annulled in its results, it can hardly be said to be extinct in its nature. still lingers, unextinguished and unextinguishable, in the foundations and depths of the mind. Even in cases of suicide, the desire of the extinction of life which is sup. FF It |