THE NY 7752 If there is one accomplishment of as acknowledged importance and power as any other, that accomplishment is good Oratory; and with regret, but equal truth, we may assert, to the manifest discredit of a large number of our Colleges and Universities, that if there is one department which is not sufficiently noticed or filled by competent instructors, that forsaken department is the study of Oratory. This remarkable deficiency is felt by every student, but in explanation is attributed to a variety of causes. The ordinary College exercises, and the facilities which the Literary Societies afford, are certainly of great value, but they are not adequate to make the complete orator-the "omni laude cumulatus orator." Having in mind the number of those who are good natural orators, College faculties seem to go on the assumption that if it is foreordained that a man shall be an orator, he will become one by the means afforded, whatever those means be; and if there are no means, the man must contain within himself the power of making himself an orator, without any external aid. This seems to be their position; and while it is sufficiently clear to us (though it may not be to all) that whatever is foreordained has its means foreordained, it is also a fact that if the means are increased the fruit must increase. The principal cause of the scarcity of instructors in the branches pertaining to this art is therefore to be found, I imagine, in the unimportant light in which it is held by our College Boards. They are waiting to have these Professorships established by the munificent generosity of some noble man who feels an interest in, and sees the importance of, this study. Very willingly, indeed, do Colleges accept endowed Professorships of this branch, but with equal unwillingness do they establish these important offices of their own accord. It is, of course, to be expected that Colleges instead of being blind to its vast importance, should at once see the necessity of this branch of education; and in theory this is doubtless the case, but practically, the need is first noticed and felt by generous private individuals, who immediately see that a sufficient endowment is provided. But Colleges do manifest injustice to their students, and are highly censurable when they see these deficiencies in their courses of study, and do not at once remedy them. Waiting for endowment is perhaps a pleasant occupation, and receiving the endowment is, doubtless, still pleasanter; but when it is at the expense of a large body of students it is by no means commendable. NAT. THORLE. STRUNG PEARLS. (Translated from the German of Frederick Rückert.) BY PROF. THOMAS C. PORTER. 1. O look whene'er the world would lead thy sense astray, 2. In Heaven the sun and moon in friendship turn aside, Lord, teach me toward my child to represent thy care. 5. From God there is no flight, only to him; for love, 6. Know'st thou the place, where slave and master are unknown ? Where each the other serves, impelled by love alone. 7. Just as thou would'st receive, in self same measure give; 8. Love's sacrifice disarms the heart of all its pride; THE WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE. BY PROF. BLOOMBERG. It is an error to consider the war between France and Germany as a dynastic quarrel, Bonaparte versus Hohenzollern. Were it so, the war would have been prevented by the withdrawal of Leopold from his candidature; or the war would stop now by the fall of Napoleon. This war was the cherished wish of the French Army-the desire of the French nation—the hope of French Statesmen. Never was Napoleon more popular than when he fulfilled the national will and wish for war with Germany. Says a French Publicist- "La nomination du Prince de Hohenzollern est l'occasion la meilleure qui se soit encore presentee pour la France de prendre sa revanche de Sadowa, et de marcher droit au Rhin pour retablir l'equilibre rompu entre la France et l'Allemagne." This is the real cause of the war. France feels that by the consolidation of Germany virtually achieved at Sadowa, her political supremacy has passed into the hands of Germany, by whose political impotency, caused by the intrigues of France, the latter ruled supremely on the continent of Europe. For Germany and France, after the extinction of the house of Charlemagne, had the same impotent constitution—an elective King presiding over a large number of powerful feudatories, among which the territory was divided. A wise internal policy enabled the French kings to unite these different fiefs in the course of five centuries with the crown, so that about 1500, France was a consolidated nation. In Germany, on the contrary, the policy of the kings was a senseless foreign one. They received the shadowy crown of the Roman Empire, wasted their strength in foreign wars, while their feudatories became sovereign princes, acknowledging as their Suzerain a phantom, which the world honored by the title Emperor. Richelieu, the great minister and master of Louis XIII., accomplished the power of France, within, by crushing the last efforts of the nobility and of the protestants for independence; without, by his foreign policy which rested on the principle, divide et impera, especially to weaken Germany by internal dissensions. To borrow the language of a Statesman of the last century: "La France doit entre tenir des ministres dans les cours electorales, a la diete de l'empire et meme chez les plus puissants princes de l'Allemagne, afin qu'elle puisse tonjours s'ingerer dans leurs affaires, et se faire des amis en leur rendant de petits services; car il est de la derniere importance pour la France, que le corps Germanique ne soit jamais uni, et qu'elle y ait constamment gros parti." And in another place: "La France devait avoir pour but de sontenir toujours une autre grande maison en Allemagne, qui put contre-balancer celle de l'empereur." By this insidious policy, France was, until 1866, the centre and head of the political system of Europe. France alone was powerful enough to carry on wars without allies-all other powers, even Russia and England, were depending on alliances. Thus, even coalitions like the one which dictated to her the peace of Utrecht, 1714, and the one which dictated the peace of Paris, 1814 and 1815, did not destroy her supremacy. For the shortsightedness of Europe, instead of strengthening the political power of Germany, left her more impotent than ever—a more easy prey to the attacks of France. Let us see what France stole from Germany during these centuries of French intrigue and German discord. 1552-Henry II., who murdered the Calvinists in France, supported the Lutheran party in Germany. Result to France— the cession of three bishoprics with the important fortresses, Metz, Toul, Verdun, which at present resist so well the German arms; to Germany-a French party. 1618 to 1648-Thirty years' war between Catholic and Protestants, kindled partly and prolonged by France. Result to France-cession of the province of Alsace; to Germany-virtual sovereignty of the feudatories. 1648 to 1714-Wars of Louis XIV. Result to France-cession of Strasbourg, the bulwark of Germany, and several principalities; to Germany-open confederacy of German princes with the foreign conquerer. 1733-Louis XV. takes Lorraine. 1740 to 1748-France caused the war for the Austrian succession. 1756 to 63-France succors. Austria against the only truly German power-Prussia. 1792 to 1815-Wars of the French republic and the first empire, result in the breakdown of the German empire, which in 1815 was transformed into a hideous confederacy of states, consisting of a half-Slavonic empire, Austria, of five kingdoms, the largest among which was Prussia, some twenty-seven grand dukes, dukes and princes, and four republics. This confederacy was so divided in its interests, that in great political questions in Europe, Germany had no voice, for Austria and Prussia had diverging interests. Of the two, however, Prussia alone pursued German interests and prepared German unity by her custom house union, by her national education, by her army. In 1866 she made successful war on Austria and her confederates, dissolved the German Confederacy, annexed several territories, cast Austria out of Germany and formed a new confederacy comprising all Germany as far as the Mein with a population of thirty millions, in which Prussia presides without a rival. The eight million Germans south of the Mein are nominally independent, but are bound by the Zollverein and the treaties of 1866, according to which, in times of war threatening the North German Confederacy, these South Germans are bound to assist their German brethren of the North, under the supreme command of the King of Prussia. Thus we find Germany virtually united, and France, since that time, actually diminished in political influence. She saw herself checked in every effort she made to extend her power. Her claims on Luxemburg were successfully resisted; her desire to unite Belgium and Holland into a custom house league frustrated; her veto on the St. Gotthard railroad |