respect have held the doctrine of legal transfer, or literal substitution, and those on the other who have denied it, as still maintaining the scriptural view of the nature of the atonement; and this on the simple principle that both hold the grand fact itself,viz.that the sufferings and death of Christ make the requisite display of the justice of God, in the pardon of sin. We do not say that to hold this truth without also holding the necessity of the atonement, &c. is enough to constitute orthodoxy on the general subject, but that this is orthodoxy in respect to the nature of the atonement. Such unquestionably has been the estimate of most of the orthodox of the North, and of the South, or the voice of mutual anathema, had long ago told us to the contrary. With these views of the subject, we ask with what propriety Dr. D. can charge us, with omitting the atonement itself, in the summary we gave of the leading and essential points of the general subject? But we are not alone in fault. Dr. M. it seems, "in a sermon professedly written on the nature of the atonement, has not informed us what the atonement is." The term nature is of various import; and that Dr. D. and Dr. M. understand it in different senses, we need not stop to show. We cannot, however, but think, that when Dr. M. speaks of the nature of the atonement as that which makes a display of the justice of God equal to, or greater than, that which would be made by the execution of the penalty on sinners, (we speak not now of what was necessary to making such display,) he with great accuracy delineates that in the suffer ings of Christ, which, so to speak, constitutes their atoning quality, or which constitutes them an atonement. Now if Dr. D. can show that it is not essential to the nature of the atonement, that it should display the justice of God, or that the sufferings of Christ, if they did not make this manifestation, could be an atonement; or if he can show that the sufferings of Christ, making this manifestation, be the mode of the fact what it may, will not constitute an atonement, then he may claim that Dr. M. has given us no information,' as to what the atonement is. True, there may be a mode of displaying the justice of God, which shall be essential to the fact of such display. But then, the mode which is essential to the fact, may not be an essential point of faith, nor can it be supposed to be any part of the faith of the great body of real Christians. Whether then, the mode of the fact be supposed to be by Christ's becoming our sponsor, by a legal transfer of guilt and punishment, or by a literal substitution or not, we shall arraign no man for essential doctrinal default on this point, who admits the fact, that the sufferings and death of Christ so display the justice of God as to become an adequate and the only ground of the remission of sin; at least we shall not do this, until the chapter and verse of the Bible be pointed out, which unfolds the mode of this fact, and exhibits it as the 'essence' of the atonement. But, says Dr. D. "the grand defect of this account is, that he [Dr. M,] represents that as the essence of the atonement which is one of its appendages or results. Because God has set forth Christ as a propitiation, to declare his righteousness, it certainly does not follow, that the propitiation of Christ, and the manifestation of God's righteousness, are synonymous and convertible terms." It is true indeed that these terms in this connexion, are not exactly synonymous; but it is equally true that nothing is more common than to call that which manifests, displays, expresses, &c. a manifestation, display, &c. ;* and *The sufferings of Christ, as we view them, are a direct and unequalled display we cannot but be surprised that Dr. .D. should overlook this obvious fact. Dr. D. admits as unquestioncable, that “the atonement affords an illustrious manifestation of the righteousness of God; but this manifestation is its result, its effect, not its essence." 66 66 The essence of the atonement as we gather it from Dr. D.'s statement consists in "the Saviour's substitution in the place of sinners," the fact that his sufferings were vicarious (in the received sense of of the term,)" and the fact that they constituted a proper satisfaction for sin.""In these, mainly, consists the essence of the atonement"-and the manifestation of God's righteousness is only "its re-sult, its effect, and not its essence." It is not in our power to compare this statement with any thing which Dr. M. has said till we shall have received a definite explanation of two of its particulars :-first, what Dr. D. understands to be the 'received sense' of the term vicarious; and secondly, what we are to understand by "a proper satisfaction for sin," in distinction from "the manifestation of God's righteousness"-keeping in mind that the former is to the latter as a cause to its effect, or as the thing itself to its appendage. Of Dr. M.'s sermon Dr. D. further says that it "omits and apparently rejects the doctrine of the Saviour's substitution in the place of sinners, &c." We would ask if mere omis of the evil of sin, and the abhorrence with which God regards it. They are intended primarily for this very purpose."-Dr. Wood's Reply to Dr. Ware, p. 207. "The object of the death of Christ is then, to declare, or manifest, that God is righteous, and that in the salvation of sinners, he will support the honour of his law and the "interests of virtue."-Letters to Unitarians, p. 102. How much does this proposition differ from the following? "The death of Christ is then, a declaration, or manifestation, of the righteous ness of God," &c. VOL. VI.-No. 12 84 sion of one point of doctrinal theology in a sermon, is doctrinal delinquency, and also if apparently ejecting as distinct from really rejecting that poiut, is a sufficient warrant for virtually charging such delinquency? Because a preacher, in endeavouring to unfold a particular part of a great subject, does not dwell on all its bearings and relations, whether suggested by his text or not, does he therefore deny that the subject has those bearings and relations ? Is it a fact, however, that Dr. M. does omit the doctrine of the Saviour's substitution in place of sinners? The question is not whether he has dwelt on this subject so distinctly and fully as was neces sary to give completeness to his sermon in Dr. D.'s judgment; but has he furnished evidence--even the negative evidence of omission, that he rejects this doctrine? We think we have shown the contrary. It is true that he has not said, totidem verbis, that Christ was a substitute for sinners, but has he not said the thing? For when he says that the sufferings of Christ were a substitute for the execution of the law, for whom would he have us understand that they were thus a substitute? Plainly for sinners:--and what more is asserted when it is said that Christ was a substitute for sinners. Was he a substitute in any other way than by his sufferings, and as these sufferings become the ground of remission to the transgressor? Where then is the vast difference which some imagine between saying that the sufferings of Christ were a substitute for the execution of the law, in the true import of this language, and the proposition that Christ was a substitute for sinners. That there is any difference worthy of notice except that the former phraseology more specifically states what the substitution respects, our theological ken has notyet discovered. On this point we would be learners. The assertion that Dr. M. " de nies Christ's sufferings to be vicarious in the received sense of the term" assumes that the term 'vicarious' has but one received sense, whereas the fact is otherwise. We adverted to the different senses in which the term is applied by different writers to this subject and showed that while Dr. M. denies the sufferings of Christ to be vicarious in one sense, be fully admits them to be so in another sense. The discussion need not be repeated here.* After all then, for we are anxious to settle this point, how does it appear that Dr. M. denies that Christ's sufferings were vicarious ? That Christ suffered, and in our nature, he surely does admit. Unless Christ had thus suffered man must have suffered the penalty of the law :this Dr. M. also admits. Christ's sufferings then are in place of man's suffering in other words Christ suffered in place of the sinner. It is true, the suffering in the one case is not precisely what the suffering would have been in the other case. Nor does Dr. D. contend that it must be. If this does not amount to the doctrine of substitution or vicari ous suffering, what more will Dr. D. add to it, stopping short of a literal and exact substitution. He may if he please go on to describe Christ's sufferings and say that he endured the "torturing pains of divine dereliction" and that "no sorrow was like Magee. "I have used the expression vicarious import rather than vicarious to avoid giving any color to the idle charge made against the doctrine of the atonement of supposing a real substitution in the place of the offender, and a literal translation of his guilt and punishment to the immolated victim. "Dr. Woods." A literal and exact substitution was impossible." Fuller's Dialogue on Substitution. "If no more were meant resumed James than that which he did and suffered is graciously accepted as if it were ours, I freely as I have said before, acquiesce in it, But I do not believe, and I can hardly persuade myself that brother Peter believes the obedience and sufferings of Christ to be so ours, that we can properly be said to have obeyed and suffered." his sorrow"-and Dr. M. will not differ from him here. He may add, if he chooses to express himself so, that Christ by his suffering satisfied the law, and if he means by this that the law was satisfied in regard to the end to be answered by the execution of the law on transgressors, Dr. M. takes this ground with him-it is the very thing he labours to show. But does Dr. D. urge that Dr. M. makes the immediate object of Christ's sufferings to be, not the salvation of sinners, but the manifestation of God's righteousness ? Grant this; but what is the object of this manifestation? Does it terminate in itself? Is it a manifestation for the sake of a manifestation? No, Dr. M. tells us, its object was the salvation of sinners-"it laid a proper foundation for the pardon and salvation of sinful men." Nor has he any where said as Dr. D. more than intimates "that the manifestation of God's righteousness is the sole and exclusive end of Christ's death." Dr. M.'s reasoning then is this :-Christ suffered for sinners-he stepped between them and the law, and saved them from the full weight of its penalty, by so suffering in his own per son as to answer the same end which would have been answered by the execution of the law itself on the transgressors. This was 'satisfying divine justice' in the only supposable way in which it could be satisfied, except by a literal transfer of legal liabilities to Christ or by suffering the law to take its course on sinners. This was saving us from the curse by being made a curse for us, so far as the necessary and we may say admissible import of this language is concerned according to Dr. D.; for even he rejects the notion of a legal transfer. Dr. D. may add, if he prefers a different phraseology, this was "a real endurance of the penalty so far as the nature of the case admitted or required." But while the language is changed, is the thing altered? But let us look again for a mo ment at Dr. D.'s difficulty in regard to Dr. M.'s making the nature of the atonement to consist in the manifestation of God's righteousness, which manifestation Dr. D. tells us is not essential to the nature of the atonement, but is an appendage or result. Yet the atonement, Dr. D. declares, must satisfy the law. "The principles of substitution, of vicarions suffering, and a proper satisfaction to the violated law and justice of God, are all essential to constitute the nature of the atonement." Sermon, p. 15. His Letter says the same,-In these, mainly, consists the essence of the atonement." By "a proper satisfaction to the law"is not meant however a literal endurance of its penalty; for this Dr. D. disclaims. Nor must this language mean that manifestation which is made by means of Christ's sufferings, of the righteousness of God while he pardons sinners; for the atonement it is said, is complete without this manifestation; and the grand defect of Dr. M.'s sermon is, that it makes it otherwise. We are able then to state, though we cannot so well explain,the peculiarity of this view of the atonement. If we are not mistaken it is this: the violated law is satisfied, while it dispenses with the literal execution of its penalty, on the one hand, nor on the other, leans for its support on the righteousness of God as seen in the atonement. It finds its satisfaction in something distinct from this, something on which this manifestation of God's righteousness is itself dependent. We will not say that this view of the atonement subverts the law," but we ask on what does the law rest? We have no disposition to dispute the agreement which Dr. D. claims between himself and Professor Stuart; especially after having laboured to show the same thing ourselves. But as this agreement is in the sense and not in the letter, we hope he will not question Dr. M.'s orthodoxy, if he also shall appear to agree in sentiment with Prof. S. though his phraseology should not be exactly the same. "The doctrine of his (Prof. S.'s) sermon is" says Dr. D. "that Christ suffered as our substitute; or that his sufferings and death were an expiatory offering on account of which our sins are pardoned and we are restored to divine favour." Again we add, Prof. S. says "his (Christ's) sufferings and death were, by divine appointment, accepted instead of the punishment due to us as sinners, and that God in consequence of the offering made by Christ, pardons our offences and restores us to his favour: What says Dr. M.? The atonement, "was a substitute for an execution of law." Again speaking of what Christ did to make atonement, "this appears to be the most efficacious atonement, the best substitute for the execution of the law, which infinite wisdom could devise." p. 30. Again he says "it laid a proper foundation for the pardon and salvation of sinful men.” Now we ask if the things said in these passages cited from the two Professors are not the same things? We do hope the difference if there be any will be pointed out. But says Mr. S. in reference to the position now cited, "this also is JUST WHAT I MEAN, when I say that Christ in his sufferings and death was our substitute. Again Prof. S. says, "He was not an isolated monument of suffering and of God's displeasure against sinners; not merely a sign that sin could be pardoned, by which an abstract testimony could be given, like that which the rainbow gives of God's covenant to drown the earth no more." Does not Prof. M.say as much ?-"But I venture to say this symbol has a natural fitness for its object. Its primary object was not so much to enlighten ings of creatures. the understanding as to impress the feelA mere revelation, written or oral, might have been sufficient if the former of these had been the object. Again the feelings of creatures were to be impressed by an exhibition not of the intellectual conceptions of the divine mind, but of the determinate purposes and the holy feelings of God." And in another place speaking of following quotations. We make Christ's sufferings, he says, "The human mind can conceive of no them not for the purpose of proving any inconsistency in Dr. D. but with the hope of inducing him to exhibition calculated to produce a deep- examine again the real character of er impression." Where is the dissonance then be tween Dr. Murdock and Prof. Stuart. And since Dr. D. also agrees with Prof. S. where is the difference between him and Dr. Murdock? We remember an axiom that if two things be equal to the same thing they are equal to one another. Or, if A. agree with B. and B. agree with C. it follows that A. and C. agree. Therefore the Doctors are agreed. But we promised to notice the complaint of Dr. D. that we bad represented him as proceeding in the latter part of his discourse, on the supposition of a literal execution of the law. We would willingly waive the discussion of this matter lest we should seem either to disprove the correctness of our own position that our authors were agreed, or else find Dr. D. at variance with himself; neither of which we have any wish to do. In the former part of his discourse Dr. D. states his own views of the doctrine in debate; in the latter part be combats what he supposes to be the views of Dr. M. Now admitting that the two gentlemen were agreed in the position that the law was not literally executed on the Saviour, it must be evident that Dr. M. could not be controverted on this point, except on the ground that the law was literally executed. Accordingly the purport of our remark was, that it was not on the ground of quotations containing the direct statement of Dr. D.'s views on the point in question, that we spoke of discord, but rather in view of conclusions near the close of his discourse; "for in this part of it he proceeded on the supposition that the law was literally executed on the Saviour." Perhaps the remark was hasty if so we have no apology but what may be found in the : that discourse to controvert which it was necessary to use the phraseology which he employs. Of Dr. M.'s 'system' Dr. D. says: "It tends apparently, at least, to subvert the law. It declares that "the atonement is something different from the execution of the law, and a substitute for it." -p. 13. Now if the error which is com batted here, does not consist in the denial of a literal execution of the law on Christ, in what does it consist? The man, it should seem, who is wrong in asserting a literal execution of the law, and wrong in asserting something different from it" must find the correct idea somewhere between these positions. We have puzzled ourselves to find this idea, but it is too "shadowy' for our apprehension-it vanishes into "thin air" as often as we try to grasp it. Again : "Surely, then,his atonement was not "a substitute for the execution of the law." On the contrary, his obedience and sufferings were a substantial fulfilment of its precept and its penalty, &c." It might be asked here; If the atonement was not a substitute for the execution of the law, nor yet strictly speaking, the execution itself, what was it?-But to proceed; “His obedience and sufferings were a substantial fulfilment of its precept and its penalty:" that is, his obedience was a substantial fulfilment of the precept of the law, and his sufferings a substantial fulfilment of its penalty. Are we then to understand in this instance as before, the word substantial' as "a qualifying term and opposed to literal?" But this would make Dr. D. say that the obedience of Christ was a substantial, i. e. not a literal fulfilment of the divine precept; whereas the scripture tells us he |