flesh and blood. They can go in and out through walls and places which I cannot. I go to the grave; they live here. after, unless, indeed, I've a gift different from my father and mother, that I don't know. After death my spirit will ascend to heaven or remain in purgatory. I can prove purgatory; I am a Roman Catholic; I attend Moorfield's, Chelsea Chapel, and many other chapels round Loudon; I believe purgatory; I was taught that in my childhood and infancy; I know what it is to take an oath; my Catechism taught me from my infancy when it is lawful to swear; it is when God's honour, our own or our neighbour's good require it; when man swears, he does it in justifying his neighbour on a prayer-book or obligation. My ability evades while I am speaking, for the spirit ascends to my head; when I swear I appeal to the Almighty; it is perjury the breaking of a lawful oath, or taking an unlawful one; he that does it will go to hell for eternity." He was then sworn, and gave a perfectly connected and rational account of the transaction which he reported himself to have witnessed. He was not certain as to the day of the week on which the circumstances he spoke of took place, and on cross-examination said, "These creatures insist upon it it was Tuesday night, and I think it was Monday." Whereupon he was asked, "Is what you have told us what the spirits told you, or what you recollect without the spirits?" And he said, "No, the spirits assist me in speaking of the date. I thought it was Monday, and they told me it was Christmas-eve-Tuesday; but I was an eyewitness, an ocular witness, to the fall to the ground." The question for the Court of Criminal Appeal was-Richard Donelly's competency as a witness. The accused having been convicted, the case was argued before Lord Campbell, C. J. Coleridge, and Talfourd, J. J., and Alderson and Platt, B. B. The conviction was upheld. Lord Campbell, in delivering his judgment, said: "The question is important, and has not yet been solemnly decided after argument; but I have no doubt that the rule was properly laid down by Parke, B., in the case which was tried before him, and that it is for the Judge to say whether the insane person has the sense of religion in his mind, and whether he understands the nature and sanction of an oath, and then the jury are to decide on

the credibility and weight of his evidence. * * A man may, in one sense, be non compos, and yet be aware of the (314) nature and sanction of an oath. In the particular case before the Court, I think the Judge was right in admitting the witness: I should have certainly done so myself. * * * It has been argued that any particular delusion, commonly called monomania, makes a man inadmissible. This would be extremely inconvenient in many cases in the proof either of guilt or innocence: it might also cause serious difficulties in the management of lunatic asylums. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Judge must in all cases determine the competency, and the jury the credibility. Before he is sworn, the insane person may be cross-examined, and witnesses called to prove circumstances which might show him to be inadmissible; but in the absence of such proof, he is prima facie admissible, and the jury must attach what weight they think fit to his testimony." Talfourd, J., said: "It would be very disastrous if mere delusions were held to exclude a witness. Some of the greatest and wisest of mankind have had particular delusions."

2459. As to Cause of Error in all Testimony.—In almost every respect, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal is satisfactory. One thing can, it seems to us, be learned from the evidence given by Donelly, and that is, the tendency which many monomaniacs have of parading their delusions. The real feelings of an orator are only known to those who have spoken to an audience. There is something added to the thought by the presence of many of one's fellows, and the level prose rises into eloquence. Lunatics very often seem to partake of this feeling of the orator; and when they are relating their delusions, they are not unfrequently carried beyond the actual depth of their own morbid impressions, and the real delusion is eked out by ordinary voluntary imagination. This is a cause of error even in the

Sce Waring v. Waring, 6 Moore's P. C. C, p. 311. In this connection, the following cases may be consulted: Reg. v. Eriswell, 3 T. R. 720-1; Currie v. Child, 3 Campb. 283. See also Chapman v. Graves, 2 Campb. 333 n.; Adams v. Kerr. 1 Bos. & P. 360; Cuncliffe v. Sefton, 2 East, 183; and Bernet v. Taylor, 9 Ves. 381; Rex v. Morley, quoted in Reg. v. Hill.

evidence of the best witnesses; but it complicates the question considerably when it is found in connection with real mental aberration. It is another proof that the evidence of a monomaniac may often be received even when the disease is manifested by the most extravagant delusions.

460. The Value of the Testimony of Melancholics.— The principles already enunciated, and the rules laid down with regard to partial mania in relation to testimony, are really applicable to the evidence which may be given by persons laboring under melancholia. It is true there are clear distinctions to be drawn between these two diseases, but these distinctions are not of such a nature as to introduce new rules with reference to the reception of evidence. The melancholic will in many cases make a competent witness. The mind is sluggish, much of its power is in abeyance, but still it is a mind, although a mind under the blanket of the dark; and although most of the mental processes are performed at snail's-pace, they can be performed. In relation to this disease, which in higher stages of civilization often takes the form of religious fear and doubt, there is not unfrequently a state of hyperæsthesia-morbid consciousnesswhich, although at first sight it might seem to be a qualification for truthful testimony, is really calculated to injure the person's capacity as a witness. What one requires in a witness is robust, practical truthfulness. The squeamish doubts of the casuist, or the morbid conscientiousness of a melancholic, are both inimical to real and useful truth-speaking in a court of law

2461. Deposition of Insane Person may be Read.-It may be well to note in this place that if a sane person has given a deposition and subsequently goes insane, upon proof of his insanity, his disposition will be admissible in evidence at common law, in like manner as if he were dead; and it is said that the same rule prevails although the insanity be only of a temporary character. So it may be well to remember

Proctor v. Lainson, 7 Car. & P. 631, per Ld. Abinger.

* Reg. v. Eriswell, 3 T. R. 720, 721, per Ashurst, J., and Lord Kenyon. See Taylor on Evidence, 5th ed., p. 463.

that the insanity of a subscribing witness lets in the proof of his signature.'

462. As to Affidavit of Lunatic. The jurat of an affidavit sworn by a person suffering from monomania, and confined in a lunatic asylum, should state the fact that it was sworn in an asylum, otherwise it is irregular and will be taken off the file.2

463. Effect of Inquisition of Lunacy on Evidence.An inquisition of lunacy found against a person is prima facie evidence of his incompetency as a witness, and unless it be overcome by evidence of his sanity, he should not be permitted to testify, even as against one not a party to the proceedings in lunacy."

2464. Habeas Corpus to bring up a Lunatic.-A habeas corpus has been awarded to bring up the body of a person confined as a lunatic, for the purpose of giving evidence in a cause, but it was only granted on an affidavit which stated that he was not dangerous, and was in a fit state of mind to be examined. That this is the practice shows how important it is that medical men and others should understand the rules and principles applicable to the question of the admissibility of the evidence of the insane.

1 Currie v. Child, 3 Camp. 283, per Ld. Ellenborough; Bernett v. Taylor, 9 Ves. 381, per Buller, J.

4

Spittle v. Walton, 40 L. J., Ch. 368. See also Re Christie, 5 Paige, 242.

Hoyt v. Adee, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 173.

Fennell v. Tait, 1 C. Man. & R. 534.

CHAPTER XXIV.

ON THE EXAMINATION OF PERSONS SUPPOSED TO BE OF UNSOUND

MIND.

2 465. The Difficulty of Diagnosis.-[320] There is scarcely any subject in connection with the medical jurisprudence of insanity which it is so important that medical men should rightly understand as diagnosis. It is by no means. easy to discover when a person is insane. The difficulty is sometimes quite as great in establishing the fact of sanity. Of course the determination of these questions necessitates a thorough knowledge of insanity as distinguished from sanity. But in many cases all a physician's wisdom will not serve to assist him to a satisfactory diagnosis unless he has a considerable amount of that peculiar cleverness in the minutiae of human intercourse which has been called tact. We cannot give rules for the exercise of this ability. All that we can do, in this place, is to suggest a few rules which may guide the questions of the practitioner who is asked to see an individual with a view to signing a certificate, or who has to examine an alleged lunatic with a view to ascertaining the fact of his sanity or insanity, whether it be with regard to civil or criminal proceedings. When we have done this, much will remain to the individual genius of each member of the medical profession who may be brought, for any of the above-mentioned purposes, in contact with persons of unsound mind. It is impossible to state rules for the manners of the examiner, and yet any one who has been associated with the insane must be aware how important demeanor is in all cases.

2466. The Method of Examination.-Medical men may be called upon to examine persons who are supposed to be