drunkenness, or mania. It very frequently follows masturbation or excessive indulgence in sexual intercourse. It is often simply due to excessive indulgence in life: it is a decay and derangement very often incident to old age. We have already pointed out that this is not simply the ordinary decay of age. There is a clear distinction to be drawn between these two conditions, and it is necessary that this distinction should be borne in mind, because no allegation is more common in courts of law than that all the symptoms mentioned in proof of the existence of dementia are only the indications of that "breaking up" which is due to the ordinary decay of age. To be able to distinguish between these is therefore a matter of much importance. It is of much importance, as we shall hereafter' see, in a medico-legal point of view, for while the law becomes vigilant when it is made cognizant of acts done by very old persons, and inquires diligently to see that the actor had the power and the will to do the deed which is ascribed to him, it does not, by any presumption of incapacity, deprive a person, however extreme his age may be, of the capacity to perform all the acts and enjoy all the privileges of a citizen. That this is a most wise rule cannot be doubted. No one can say at what age a man loses the free and intelligent use of his faculties. In the case of some men, the mind continues active long after the body has fallen into the direst decrepitude. "The effect of age upon the vigor of the mind," says an American Judge, "varies so much according to individual constitution, that it is difficult to form a sound, general conclusion on the mere fact of advanced age. In an intellectual sense, there is nothing in the mind, abstractly speaking, tending to decay: its loss of tone and power is consequent upon the ravages of time and disease upon the body, and especially upon the brain, upon which the mind is dependent for manifestation." But the fact that longevity varies so infinitely in accordance with the conditions and circumstances of men, gives very strong grounds for asserting that old age in itself cannot fairly be. regarded as a legal disability. It appears that in Madden's tables of the ages of the most distinguished modern philoso Post ◊ 292, 208. phers, jurists, artists, and authors, and in Disraeli's notes on the "Progress of Old Age in New Studies," there are the names of very many men of genius whose intellectual powers were unimpaired at the end of a very long career. And the statistics of Franchiné and Hawkins show that the lives of literati are unusually prolonged, or, in other words, that senile decay is abnormally postponed. Dr. Crichton Browne founds an interesting speculation upon these facts, and comes to what we are compelled to think is a correct conclusion, viz., that dementia is a disease which is incident to stupidity, that it follows more closely on the heels of relaxation than upon the tired heels of hard work, and that although mental anxiety, mental grief, or mental shock, may be productive of disease, simple, genuine, honest hard work is productive of conditions of health, of vigor, and of longevity. These circumstances show the importance of coming at correct conclusions as to the real symptoms of the disease which has been designated senile dementia. 288. The Stages of Dementia.--The stages in dementia which Pritchard has indicated crudely by the words forgetfulness, irrationality, incomprehension, and inappetency, are in many cases clearly distinguished from one another, while in some cases they are unrecognizable. (208) It is characterized by all the features which we have described, inactivity, incoherence, stupidity, followed by mere oblivion. It is a loss of friends, of places, of the world: it is a loss of mental life. In dementia, the centripetal force of mind seems to have overcome the centrifugal; in mania, the centrifugal seems to have proved too strong for the centripetal. It is only in the balance of these that mental health consists, as it is on the balance of these that planetary safety depends. Rational life seems to lie between mania and dementia. It is the temperate zone of a sphere of which these are the arctic and the torrid regions. Man lives between these, as he is a "pendulum betwixt a smile and a tear." 289. The Cause Affects the Course of the Disease.As in all other diseases the characteristics of its course and progress have a certain relation to the cause. This is not pe culiar to dementia. It is, however, sometimes well-marked in cases of dementia which arise from mental shock. It is only what one would expect to find. That a cause lives in its effect, as the features of a father live in his children, is the most natural of all things. 290. Novelty and Change Causes of Dementia.— Novelty, which to the young is often one of the conditions of the most perfect health and activity, is often, in those who have grown old, a cause of dementia. The entire change of a man's life, a man's retirement from business which has occupied him for many years, the existence of empty habits, so to speak, the impossibility which exists in old age to reform one's life in conformity with other circumstances, very frequently predispose to this disease. And as rest after habitual labor causes this disease, so some unwonted exertion after long continued rest will not unfrequently have the same effect. This, of course, is more likely to occur where the constitution has become weakened by continued ill health or dissipation. Old age is a weakness, and it is weakness which is a prey to disease. 291. General Remarks.-If all these symptoms are taken into consideration in any case which may raise the question as to the presence of dementia, as to its distinction from imbecility, from mania, or from simple old age, little difficulty can we imagine arise in giving a satisfactory answer. As all thought is by contrast, as when we think of "one" have to think of its "other," as light could not be known without darkness; so we, having still to consider the prominent characteristics of mania, hope that this subject may be made still clearer by the considerations which will naturally arise in the course of that inquiry. CHAPTER XIII. THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF DEMENTIA. ? 292. Questions of Law to be considered in connection with Dementia.-Of course, the degree of mental soundness which is necessary to render a person responsible for crime, capable of marrying or entering into any other contract, and capable of giving evidence as a witness in a court of law, requires to be discussed in connection with the disease, the incidents of which we have considered in the foregoing chapter; but the question which it is most important to answer in this connection is the soundness of mind which in the eye of the law is necessary to entitle an individual to make a valid will. As we have seen, dementia is essentially a disease of old age, and as we know will-making is the function of the citizen which is relegated to his declining years. Old men may marry, and it may be of the utmost importance to discover whether they have sufficient mind to give a rational consent. Of course, old men may be called upon to give testimony in legal proceedings, and it may be necessary to determine whether such are to be believed or not; but the infrequency with which these events occur, while it does not relieve us from the necessity for considering the legal questions in connection with them, deprives them of the importance which attaches to questions of testamentary capacity. Wills are made when men are decrepit and old-often when they are stretched upon beds of suffering or of death. By wills the whole of the property of a country is disposed of at least once in each generation; by wills, men who have no longer the fear of the censure of their fellow-men amongst whom they have to live before their eyes, may do most wilful, cruel, capricious actions, and it is therefore of paramount importance to lay down some rules for the determination of the testamentary capacity of those who dispose of their property by will. We will consider this question in the first instance. 293. Testamentary Capacity.-"Whatever degree of mental soundness," says Sir James Hannen in the recent case of Boughton v. Knight, "is required for any one of these things, responsibility for crime, capacity to marry, capacity to contract, capacity to give evidence as a witness, I tell you, without fear of contradiction, that the highest degree of all, if degrees there be, is required in order to constitute capacity to make a testamentary disposition; because, you will easily see, it involves a larger and wider survey of facts and things than any one of these matters to which I have called your attention." We cannot but think that this is a correct opinion upon the part of this learned Judge. Very young children are able to understand and appreciate the permitted and the forbidden, which are the principles upon which our criminal law is founded and by which responsibility must be gauged. Very weak minds are capable of conserving the impressions of the senses, and of giving a correct and actual account of what they saw and what they heard, and are consequently in a condition to give evidence. Very low forms of mental capacity are capable of withdrawing will from an object in which it has been posited, and of placing it in something else, which act of mind constitutes the essence of consent, which is, as we know, the essence of contract. But no one but a man possessed of active intelligence and memory can thoroughly understand the particulars of the business to be transacted at the making of a will, to perceive their relations to one another, and to form the rational judgment with regard to them, which is the basis of a valid will. "The elements of such a judgment should be the number of those who are proper objects of his bounty, their deserts with reference to conduct, capacity, need, and what he had before done for them, and the amount and condition of his property." While upon these grounds we think that the learned Judge of the Probate Court is correct in his opinion, we 2 1 42 L. J. Pr. 25; 28 L. T. 562. "Per Lord Redesdale, 2 Dow P. C. 283. See 2 P. Wms. 270; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 403 |