one of evidence. It has been similarly stated by a writer on the Criminal Law of Scotland,' where the plea of impulse has been admitted, that although it is most difficult to prove, it is an effectual exculpation if proved. But the want of comprehension upon this point of moral insanity both in this and the sister country is very curious-not that injustice has been done, for we cannot find, on an examination of the cases, that any evil has resulted from the confusion which has existed, but that there have been utterances from the Bench which seem, at first sight, to be at variance with ordinary experience and medical and psychological knowledge. These discrepancies can, it seems to us, be explained away, but it is better when the necessity for such explanation does not arise. In one case, we find a distinguished Scotch Judge saying: "The law does not countenance for a moment the notion of moral insanity; that is to say, what is called irresistible impulse, by which a man is driven into crime, while it is not proved that his reason is destroyed. That perversion of the moral feeling is not insanity, nor is its existence sufficient to make out such a plea." And he added: "The panel must be shown to be unable, by the visitation of God, to do what his duty requires-to struggle and overcome his passions, which every man possessed of reason may." Here, then, we find the denial of impulse as a ground for exculpation. We find a tacit admission of the doctrine that if a man is by disease deprived of the power of struggling and overcoming his passions, he is to be excused. Now, that is the effect of what we call moral insanity: in relation to some particular passion or propensity, the individual has lost the power of control, and if that fact is proved, then for all crimes committed in relation to that passion or propensity, he is to be regarded as irresponsible, and that upon the very principles which were enunciated by the Judge from whom we have quoted in the same charge. In another case, we find the Lord Justice Clerk remarking: "The gambler who destroys himself because ruin is staring him in the face is a

Macdonald's Criminal Law of Scotland, p. 15.

Hume, 41, 4 C, and case of Coalston there; Anne Sparrow (Glasgow) 21st Sept. 1829, Bell's notes, 6.

Smith & Campbell Case, 2 Irvine, 1.

responsible agent, and violates the laws of God. It is not insanity that is the cause of his crime: it is the distempered and disordered workings of a depraved nature within him. You must not consider that insanity is proved by the wicked or the irrational or the irreligious character of the act done: that is not the true view of human nature-it is not the view our religion gives us of it. There are many cases arising from moral depravity and moral wickedness which pass in ordinary language of life as acts of insanity, which are nevertheless acts of a mind rebelling against the decrees of God, impatient of the condition in which the individual is placed, and desirous rather of rushing into the presence of God than of submitting to his decrees. The question for your consideration is whether the party had any notion that the act was one of which the law would take cognizance, for that is the only test which a jury is at liberty to take." And with every word of what is above quoted we can cordially agree. The cases which have been decided in England are equally decisive as to moral insanity, or irresistible impulse. In one it was decided that the circumstance of a person having acted under an irresistible impulse to the commission of homicide is no defence if, at the time he committed the act, he knew he was doing what was wrong;2 and this knowledge must be understood to include the power of will to enable him to refrain from doing it. In another case, a similar rule was laid down in the following words: "A mere uncontrollable impulse of the mind coëxisting with the full possession of the reasoning powers will not warrant an acquittal on the ground of insanity, the question for the jury being whether the prisoner, at the time he committed the act, knew the character and nature of the act, and that it was a wrongful one. But where a person is in a state of mind in which he is liable to fits of madness, it is for the jury to consider whether the act was done during such a fit, though there is nothing before or after the act to indicate it, and though there is some evidence of design and malice. This decision would allow of an acquit

'Yates' Case, Arkley's Rep. 338, at 311.

Reg. v. Haynes, 1 Foster & F. 660.

3

Reg. v. Barton, 3 Cox C. C. 275; and see Reg. v. Richards, 1 Foster & F. 87. + Reg. v. Richards, 1 Foster & F. 87.

tal on the ground of irresistible impulse, if adequate proof were forthcoming. There is moral turpitude, and that ought to be punished. It is by means of punishment that the moral turpitude of the many has become the morality of the majority; but there is also, it seems to us, a moral obliquity which is due to disease, and it is only by the recognition of both of these that we can really arrive at the truth of this matter, or really do practical justice.

2257. Some Recent Cases.-One or two recent cases may be alluded to in this connection. In Reg. v. Townley,' which was tried before Martin, B., in 1866, the defence of insanity was set up. It was proved that the prisoner had stated to several persons that he did not think he had committed any crime, that the girl to whom he was engaged was his property, and that upon it appearing that she meant to throw him over for another, he had a right to kill her. It does not appear whether this was an insane belief or not. Many persons have mistaken notions as to their rights. A man who has been insulted may think he has a right to the life of the person who has trodden upon his intellectual corns, and therefore challenges him. But such a mistake is not a delusion. "If," said the learned Judge who tried the case, "his (the prisoner's) real motive was that he conceived himself to have been ill used, and either from jealousy of the man who was preferred to him, or from a desire of revenge upon him, committed the act, that would be murder. These were the very passions which the law required men to control; and if the deed was done under the influence of these passions, there was no doubt that it was murder." The jury found the prisoner guilty. He was sentenced to penal servitude for life, and sometime after his trial, he committed suicide by throwing himself over a balustrade. We cannot think with those who asserted his insanity that the mode of his death adds much to the strength of the presumption of his moral insanity, and we cannot think with those who maintain that the Judge's charge was inaccurate or unfair. Every word quoted is correct, but although agreeing as we do with the

13 Foster & F. 839.

scope of his charge, agreeing with the verdict, and regarding the result arrived at by the jury as the right one under the circumstances, we should have desired his Lordship also to state that if the jury were convinced, beyond all doubt, that the prisoner was not, at the time he committed the act, able to control his passions through an absence of will, and if that inability to control his passions was the result of disease, then the crime was not murder. The verdict would have been the same had that question been put to the jury, but the advantage of having a clear and full explication of the principles of the law, which are, as we have seen, somewhat darkly contained in the test of responsibility, would have been very great. In the Chelsea murder, moral insanity was again set up unsuccessfully for the defence. From an examination of all the circumstances, we think the jury were right in rejecting the plea. The accused, the Rev. J. Selby Watson, a clergyman, was seventy years of age, a man of undoubted acquirement, of extensive and accurate knowledge, and he was tried for the murder of his wife. It appeared that his wife had been provoking during her lifetime, and that the accused had suffered much and deeply from her petulance and violence. The defence set up the theory that these circumstances had produced moral insanity, and that by reason of such insanity the accused was irresponsible for the act. Byles, J., said that the real and only question was whether the prisoner, at the time he committed the act, was legally responsible for it, and whether he was a responsible agent? That depended upon a question on which the counsel also agreed: "Did he, at the time he committed the act, know what he was doing? If not, of course he was not criminally responsible. Did he also know that what he was doing was wrong? He was perfectly aware that doubts on the universal applicability of this rule had been expressed by many eminent persons for whose opinions he had the greatest respect. But if it was to be altered at all, it must be altered by act of Parliament." The jury found the prisoner guilty, and he was sentenced to death. On account partly of his age, it is believed, this sentence was commuted to penal servitude for

See "Times," 13th January, 1872.

life. Another sensational case came before the Courts at almost the same time. Christina Edmunds was tried at the Central Criminal Court before Martin, B., in January, 1872.1 She was a woman of forty-three years of age, had moved in a respectable sphere of society, and was charged with the murder of a boy at Brighton, on the 12th of June, 1871. The deceased ate some chocolate creams, purchased at a confectioner's shop, and died a short time after eating them, with symptoms of poisoning with strychnia. Upon examination, strychnia was found in the stomach. It was proved that the prisoner had, by means of a little boy, procured chocolate. creams from the shop of the confectioner Maynard, had deliberately poisoned them with strychnia, which it was proved she had procured, and had returned them to the shop upon some pretext, and it was in consequence of eating some of these sweets that the deceased died. It also appeared that she had herself, on various occasions, left poisoned sweets about in shops, and it was impossible to discover how many persons had suffered in consequence of her cold-blooded and reckless acts. It did appear in evidence, however, that she had attempted to poison the wife of a medical man (Dr. Beard) sometime before, and that she had imputed the illness of Mrs. Beard to the carelessness of the confectioner. The guilt was brought home to her, and it was shown that she had exhibited a great deal of cunning in connection with the crime. She had procured a large quantity of strychnia upon four different occasions, under false pretences, and had borrowed the poison book of a druggist and torn out the leaves to conceal the fact that she had purchased the poison. The defence was insanity, but there was no indication of intellectual insanity about her. She had shown great skill in carrying out her abominable plan, and in using the most clever means to escape detection and to throw the suspicion upon another person. The medical men thought her moral sense deficient, but the weight of their evidence went to the fact that many of her relations had been insane, and not to the issue of her responsibility or irresponsibility. The Judge said: “A poor person was seldom inflicted with insanity, and

'See "Times" of 17th January, 1872.