dividual of that capacity which is commensurate with responsibility?—are distinct. As to its existence, let us examine the evidence. 1. It is asserted by many of the ablest writers upon insanity. 2. There are many cases in which the motiveless character of the act done, the past history of the individual, the carelessness as to whether the commission of the crime be discovered or not, lead to a belief in the existence of insanity. We almost invariably find that this form of insanity is said to be accompanied by what are called 'depraved impulses," and that it is asserted by many that "defective volition," and "perverted emotions" are mental symptoms of the presence of this form of disease. Now, as ordinary criminals have depraved impulses, as their wills must be defective to some extent, and as their reasoning powers must, through this deficiency, have led to their detection; as, further, the emotions of criminals are not generally of a very perfect human type, it would seem necessary clearly to understand what is meant by the assertion of those who pretend to know something about the subject.

167. Peculiarities of the Cognitive Faculties.-Before doing so we may state our belief that, through various circumstances to be afterwards alluded to, a man may reason correctly concerning one set of phenomena, while he is incapacitated from reasoning concerning other sets. We find in ordinary life that Reason does not seem to be current coin, but a sort of local issue-that the very familiarity with the logical sequence in relation to a certain class of facts renders the individual unable to appreciate the same identical sequence in relation to facts of a different nature-that there seem to be men who can reason concerning the dry-bone facts of science, and are utterly unable to grasp the sappy facts of human science. A very limited knowledge of abnormal conditions will serve to convince one of the truth of the fact that this is much more prominent in connection with disSo that at this stage it would be wrong to deny that a mind, because it shows shrewdness and ingenuity with relation to many intellectual matters, may, at the same time, be unable to appreciate the relation of acts to personality [110]looked at in their moral relation, just as there are many

ease.

perfectly sane persons who can never come to regard virtue as an end in itself, which must ever be one of the crowning advantages of all true morality; for, as Mr. Mill observes, "there is this difference between it (the love of virtue for its own sake) and the love of money, of power, or of fame, that all these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue." We proceed, then, to inquire what this "impulsive insanity" may be. As for the literature of the subject, so far as it has come under our notice, it is simple assertion, together with reports of some cases in which impulse was supposed to be present; and we may say here, that if medical gentlemen would, instead of clamoring for the recognition of irresistible insane impulses in courts of law, devote themselves to the proof of their existence, their time might be more profitably spent.

168. Insane Impulse considered. We know how intimately all our feelings are connected with thought, and how much thought is influenced by feelings. Well has Bacon said "The light of the understanding is not a dry light, but drenched in the will and affections;" and it is well, in further explanation, to add that thought is, as it were, the skeleton of our mental life, while feelings and desires are the muscles and nerves which clothe it. Under such circumstances it is impossible to see in what way the one set of faculties, so to speak, can be affected without the other. If a man does not know right from wrong he reasons badly. If he is unable to restrain desires by the leash of thought, or by fear of consequences, again he reasons badly. If the ordinary motives have no influence over the mind of an individual, we say he is a fool, or he is mad. Now, there are very various ways in which a man may lose control over his actions. If you tickle the sole of a sensitive foot during sleep the leg is withdrawn by what is sometimes called "involuntary" retraction. If acts are repeated very often they become what is popularly

Utilitarianism, 2d edit., p. 57.

called "second nature," that is to say, they become as involuntary as any of the actions which are performed during infancy, or as any of those habits which are the heritage of the race. Many actions in this way pass beyond the range of will or motives, for every act 1111tends, by repetition, to become easier, and to pass out of the dominion of wilful choice into that of automatic origination. Every one knows the influence of habit. Hamlet says to his mother:

"Refrain to-night,

And that shall lend a kind of easiness

To the next abstinence: the next more easy,

For use almost can change the stamp of nature."

One ethical philosopher has well said, "Do right, and trust to God to make it easy." So it is that many acts become so easy in the doing, require so little effort of consciousness, that they are said to be done unconsciously, or, in other words, out of the ordinary relation to thought in point of time. These acts we may call automatic or impulsive. The constant, modified exercise of any of the muscles will, in the time to come, tend to the same modified exercise under the influence of a comparatively insignificant exciting cause. And thus in all the manifestations of mind, whether they be connected with impressions on the senses, with the result of the processes of thought, or with one's actions as a moral agent, there is a liability to pass partially out of the power of will or motive-for we are using these two words in the same sense-a liability to recur under the influence of what would in time past have been an inadequate stimulus, and to become what may be called involuntary or impulsive. But this is much more speedily done under the influence of disease than in the conditions of health. The infinite variety of the actions that one is called upon, while in a healthy state, to perform, protects the individual from the effects that follow habitual action in one direction. But it can easily be understood that the presence of a delusion must greatly modify many of the relations of motives to conduct; and the same effects will be produced by the influence of unrestrained habit, or of hereditary tendency. So powerful is hereditary tendency that we may be said to inherit ready-made habits; so powerful is it that a father may weaken the power of will,

or weaken those powers by which men judge of motives, in his offspring. It is stated as a fact that Oxford, the regicide, believed that he was St. Paul, and that his grandfather had done the same. An interesting example of an hereditary propensity to steal-which descended from a real thief, who could refrain from pilfering when paid to do so, to his son and grandson-is given in Dr. Julius Steinau's very excellent work on [112]" Hereditary Disease," and other examples of a similar tendency to the reproduction of morbid propensities will be found in Mr. F. Hill's "Reports on Prisons." We find voices, features, even acquired skill, modified by the past, so that the handwriting of one individual member of a family has in some cases been found to resemble that of some ancestor whose writing he had never had an opportunity of seeing. All this seems to us to explain what we mean by the "depraved impulse," as present in many cases of moral insanity, and what, in this relation, we understand by defective volition. That disease has the power of withdrawing certain acts from the influence of will, and that in many cases it so much incapacitates the individual as to place him so thoroughly under the influence of one set of motives as to make any action arising therefrom rapid and unhesitating, is, we believe, the only true explanation which can be given of those diseased impulses which find place in the minds of the insane; and we are further inclined to interpret the apparently motiveless character which belongs to such impulsive actions as, in truth, due to the strength of the motive to which they owe their existence.

169. The Psychology of Healthy Choice. In this life our course is not a clear one. Duty is often difficult to do. We have the choice of Hercules at every turning point of our life. The more one knows of the possibilities of the future, the more careful will one be in fashioning the actualities of the present. And Shakespeare says:

It is to the ignorant that choice is easy: it is to the wise that

P. 19, No. 21. See also Hill on Crime, p. 55.

choice is difficult. A child finds no difficulty in choosing between a bank-note and a lollipop, and from the impulsive way which it grasps at the latter, we think it is uninfluenced by motives, the fact being that it is influenced by the motives of actual enjoyment powerfully, and by those of remote contingency not at all. So it arises that an overwhelmingly powerful motive has, to the eyes of those who are in the habit of connecting choice of motives with struggle, the same appearance as no motive at all. Our idea of choice is the swaying of the scales, not the kicking of the beam by one of the scales; so that we have, in thought, connected actions which spring from a very strong motive with the expression “motiveless," because struggle, resistance, is the sign of humanity in the hands of cause, while yielding is the sign of inanimate matter under similar circumstances.

ease.

170. Irresistible Impulse: Pathology of.-It may be useful to add one or two remarks as to the pathology of impulse. We are familiar with the quiet, slow, gradual processes of health, and with the more sudden manifestations of disWe have pointed out that a healthy man makes up his mind slowly. "Think twice" is the rule of wisdom. But looking merely at physical actions of men, we see that these are gradual. Energy flows through their voluntary muscles. In many cases of disease this is reversed. The physical conduct of men is broken. Their actions are "spurts." Energy jerks itself through them. Thus it is in chorea, hysteria, and epilepsy. The nerve force is belched forth into act in entire independence of volition. But what is true with regard to muscles may be true. with regard to brain. The ordinary and healthy condition of thought is to follow in the wake of sensation. A man sees something beautiful, and he admires: he sees something menace, and he feels fear: he sees something disgusting, and he experiences loathing. But they are mental epilepsies. In disease, the feeling is independent of the thought. You have night terrors without knowing why you are afraid; feelings of comfort and joy when all outward circumstances would suggest grief and misery. There are, then, discharges of energy through ideas just as through muscles-convulsions of mind as well as of body. And you