vouring to explain our own, we shall have to refer to the opinions of more recent as well as of previous writers.

Amongst the definitions of instinct mentioned by Mr. Spence, we find the following:

1st. That of Addison, who, with some others, believes" that instinct is an immediate and constant impulse of the Deity." The objection raised to this theory is, that "animals in their instincts are sometimes at fault, and commit mistakes, which in the above case could not happen."

2nd. Dr. Darwin, whose opinion is founded upon the views of Pythagoras, Plato, and others, believes that "instinct in animals is the same as reason in man, and that all the actions of animals, however complicated, are, like those of the human race, the result of observation, invention, and experience." This theory Mr. Spence refutes, by showing that as soon as the Bee has emerged from the pupa-case, she at once betakes herself to the collecting of honey or the fabrication of a cell," which operation she performs as adroitly as the most hoary inhabitant of the hive," and this he presumes would denote in the Bee the absence of those reasoning powers which can only result with time.

At the same time we must add that, although Mr. Spence refuses thus to confound instinct and reason, he does not deny, but attributes a certain amount of the latter quality even to some of the insect races.

3rd. The theory of "sensation," in which instinct is represented as "a predisposition to certain actions,

where certain sensations exist," is passed over very lightly by this authority; and he shows that, although some of the actions of insects are attributable to the effect of appetites, there are others that can certainly not be thus accounted for.

And then, having combated these various theories or methods by which instinct is defined, and rejected others as absurd and unworthy of consideration, Mr. Spence sums up his observations by characterizing this quality in the lower animals as "those unknown faculties implanted in their constitution by the Creator, by which, independent of instruction, observation, or experience, and without a knowledge of the end in view, they are impelled to the performance of certain actions tending to the well-being of the individual, and the preservation of the species."

Having thus endeavoured to cull from the valuable work in question the four definitions of instinct most at variance with each other, we will now turn to the pages of another able authority, namely Dr. Carpenter, in whose treatise on Comparative Physiology we find it stated as his opinion, that the instinctive actions of animals are "performed (as it would appear) in immediate respondence to certain sensations without any intentional adaptation of means to ends on the part of the individual*."

His view of instinct appears to be, that it is a propensity or "propensities called into action by sensations," and accords, therefore, to some extent with

* Comparative Physiology,' 4th edit. p. 693.

the theory treated so lightly by Mr. Spence, which defines instinct as "a predisposition to certain actions where certain sensations exist."

And Dr. Carpenter, whose acquaintance with the whole kingdom of organic life gives to his views of animal nature an additional claim upon our earnest consideration, endeavours also to ascribe some kind of limits to instinct, and in his summary of the various phases of animal life he attributes this quality more especially to those races of animals included in the invertebrate series, commencing with the higher Radiata (e. g. the Star-fish), and ending with the Hymenopterous group of insects, whereof we know our little Hive-Bee to be a prominent member: in this group the quality of instinct attains, according to his views, the highest development.

In the creatures, on the other hand, that rank higher and lower in the scale than those just referred to, he traces a gradual disappearance of instinct, which, in the lower, is supplanted by "contractility," or the mere mechanical action accompanying organic life, and in the higher by those psychical or mental faculties known as reason and intelligence*. To these views we shall refer again hereafter. But, reader, although these naturalists and physiologists thus circumscribe the character and operations of instinct, there have been metaphysicians in all ages who were disposed to accord a wider range and significance to the term; and, as a typical illustration of the opinions enter* Comparative Physiology,' 4th edit. p. 704.

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tained by such men, we shall quote that of John Tillotson, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died towards the close of the 17th century, and shall leave you for the present to judge how far it recommends itself to your approval, without adding any criticism of our own.

"God hath discovered our duties to us," he says, "by a kind of natural instinct, by which I mean a secret impression upon the minds of men, whereby they are naturally carried to approve some things as good and fit, and to dislike other things as having a native evil and deformity in them; and this I call a natural instinct, because it does not seem to proceed so much from the exercise of our reason, as from a natural propension and inclination, like those instincts which are in brute creatures, of natural affection and care toward their young ones. And that these inclinations are precedent to all reason and discourse about them evidently appears by this, that they do put forth themselves every whit as vigorously in young persons as in those of riper reason; in the rude and ignorant sort of people as in those who are more polished or refined. For we see plainly that the young and ignorant have as strong impressions of piety and devotion, as true a sense of gratitude, and justice, and pity, as the wiser and more knowing part of mankind :—a plain indication that the reason of mankind is prevented" (that is to say, anticipated) "by a kind of natural instinct and anticipation concerning the good or evil, the comeliness or deformity

of these things. And though this do not equally extend to all instances of our duty, yet as to the great lines and essential parts of it, mankind hardly need to consult any other oracle than the mere propensions and inclinations of their nature; as, whether we ought to reverence the Divine Nature, to be grateful to those who have conferred benefits upon us, to speak the truth, to be faithful to our promise, to restore that which is committed to us in trust, to pity and relieve those that are in misery, and in all things to do to others as we would have them do to us."

You will no doubt be puzzled when you come to consider these different views and theories, all propounded by men of high intellect, to arrive at a clear conception of the psychical or mental quality of which they treat; but from this maze of ideas, all of which appear to possess some element of truth, we shall now endeavour to extract something like a definite notion of what instinct really is, bearing in mind that we are not dealing with an object that we can touch, handle, and measure, but with an abstract metaphysical question, which will probably ever remain more or less a mystery to the human understanding.

For this purpose, let us first state the various views of instinct as definite inquiries, passing over, for the present, that of Tillotson.

1. Is instinct in animals the same as reason in man?

2. Is it an immediate and constant impulse of the Deity?