6

gion, and what does The Prince' say more? Let The Prince' be burnt, answered, abused, or commented upon, it is all one with respect to the government of princes. By an unhappy and fatal necessity, their politics set themselves above morality. All of them do not confess it, yet, they all think like Achilles, Jura negat sibi nata.' It was from my firm conviction of the incompatibility of kingly government with the happiness of the people that I endeavoured to make them disgusted with it, by describing it as necessarily connected with crimes, by painting it in all the native ugliness of its features. If I have conveyed my instructions to the people, under a veil of irony, under the color of instructing princes, it is because I had no other way of addressing them, because my real undisguised sentiments would not have been tolerated by the usurpers, who then tyrannised over my country."

Indeed, the great wonder is that any one acquainted with the life of Machiavel, should have mistaken the man, whose republican patriotism drew upon him the persecution of the Medici, for the teacher of tyranny and usurpation; that any one acquainted with his character should have thought so respectable a man serious in his applause of the two execrable Borgias; that every one, who has read his works with any kind of attention, should not have discovered that his 'Prince' is meant to be a scare-crow. If any further proof than what has been already given be required, The Prince' abounds in internal evidence of the opposition of Machiavel's ironical precepts, to his real sentiments. In the 8th chapter, speaking of Agathocles, he says, it cannot be called virtue to slay fellow-citizens, to betray friends, to be faithless, to throw off the social affections, to be without religion; these crimes, conduct indeed to empire, but not to true glory.' The fifteenth chapter is, however, of the most importance, it treats Of such things as render men, and more especially princes, the objeets of blame or praise.'

·

'It remains now to show,' says Machiavel, what ought to be the conduct of a prince, towards his friends and his subjects, but since so many others have treated this matter, I fear the mode in which I shall treat it will be thought presumptuous; since in the discussion, I shall depart so widely from the maxims of my predecessors. But my intention being to write what may be really useful to those who understand my drift, it appears to me more proper to go directly to the real truth, than to arause the imagination with visionary models of republics and principalities, as others

have done. Now, in my opinion, the actual conduct and the duty of princes are so far asunder, that he, who should abandon the former for the sake of the latter, would be ruined rather than benefited. For a prince who should in every instance square his conduct according to the rule of right, must necessarily fail of success, when all his crowned brethren act on opposite principles. Hence it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself on his throne, to know how to swerve from the right path, and to pursue or deviate from it as circumstances may require.* Leaving, therefore, whatever is imaginary, and confining myself to what is strictly and actually the existing state of things, I say, that men in general, and princes in particular, from being in a more conspicuous situation, are noted for some particular quality, which redounds either to their praise or dishonor. For instance, one is esteemed liberal, another parsimonious; one generous, another rapacious; one cruel, another merciful; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another rough and courageous; one affable, another haughty; one libidinous, another chaste; one ingenuous, another artful; one inflexible, another pliable; one serious, another full of levity; one religious, another incredulous; and so on. No doubt it would be highly praise-worthy in a prince to possess of the above mentioned qualities, only those which are good; but as this cannot always be the case consistently with the nature of human institutions, all that is necessary for him is to be sufficiently prudent, to avoid the infamy of those vices which would weaken his power. With respect to the other vices which do not affect his interest, he is to avoid them if he can; but if he cannot, he has little reason to fear indulging in them. He need not be at all anxious about the infamy attached to those crimes, which are necessary for the preservation of his power; for when the thing is maturely considered, it will appear, that the practice of virtue will be attended with the ruin of the prince, and that security and advantage will result from the perpetration of crimes."

This is a very important chapter of The Prince.' Machiavel says in direct terms, that, for a king to reign securely, it is absolutely necessary he should occasionally be a bad man. There is a Spanish proverb which says the same thing in fewer words. Vicio es del principe no del hombre. Surely Machiavel speaks plain enough; "essendo l'intento mio scrivere cosa utile a chi l' in

* Plutarch says "that if the undeviating practice of every virtue and a strict adherence to justice in all cases could not be dispensed with in a kingly government, even Jupiter himself would not be able to rule the

world."

tende," it being my intention to write what may be useful to those who understand my drift. What an important lesson to the people is contained in the conclusion of this chapter. It may be said that he ought to have entitled his work Il Tiranno instead of Il Principe, yet in what does the original acceptation of tiranno differ from that of principe in an Italian democracy?

The extracts which I have taken from the works of Machiavel, have been such as were rather calculated to show the real tendency of his writings, than to display his ingenuity and eloquence. With both one and the other, his writings abound; but I am obliged to content myself with laying before the reader, the following ingenious explanation of the reason why Chiron, the preceptor of Achilles, is painted by the ancients under the form of a Centaur. "It is necessary for a prince to be a beast, as well as a man. This necessity has been communicated to princes by the writers of antiquity, under a veil; for they tell them that Achilles and many other princes were given to the Centaur Chiron to be educated. Now what is meant by a preceptor, half beast and half man, but that princes should partake of the nature of both, without which their power will not be durable.”*

The first systematic attack on The Prince' was the Anti-Machiavel of Gentillet, a very contemptible performance. Gentillet clearly did not understand Machiavel, slanders him in many things, and is a very wretched scribbler. Clement VIII. censured the work at the instigation of the jesuit Poissevin, who declaimed violently against it. It is a certam and curious fact, which can be proved by the strongest internal evidence, that Poissevin never read The Prince' of Machiavel; the very work which he condemns. In the first place, he supposes The Prince' to be divided into three books: "Hæc quidem sceleratum illud satanæ organum prioribus duobus libris, quibus de principe agit, insipienti mundo obtrusit;" and in the margin, he refers to book the third. Now, the fact is, that Gentillet's Anti-Machiavel is in three books; and therefore Poissevin, who never read the original work, but only the answer to it, supposed its division to have been the same. In the second place, this jesuit charges Machiavel with several opinions which he never published, such as that paganism Del Principe, c. xviii.

*

VOL. VII.

is better than christianity, and that the doctors of this last are not to be regarded. Nothing in the least resembling this is to be found in Machiavel; on the contrary, he goes much further than most catholics, for he says, in the eleventh chapter of The Prince' "That the papal power subsists not by human means but by some uncommon influence, and the particular favour of God." The Jesuit brings many other equally groundless charges. The fact is, that in the Anti-Machiavel, Gentillet censures these erroneous opinions, though not as belonging to Machiavel; and Poissevin, who borrowed all his knowledge of Machiavel, not from his own writings, but from the Anti-Machiavel of his enemy, was so clumsy as even to mistake the latter. The other writers who have attacked Machiavel are Paulus Jovius, whom I have already noticed; Varillas, a French historian, of little credit; Raynaudus, a jesuit of the 17th century; Clasen, the anonymous author of 'The Alarm against Massacre;' Lucchesini, an Italian jesuit; Voltaire and the late king of Prussia. Of these antagonists, some have been candid enough to confess they never saw his works, and from the literal construction which others have put on them, it is plain they did not understand them. Leaving however the consideration of the works of the greater number of these antagonists, for fear of being too diffuse for the nature of the work in which these observations appear, I shall confine myself to a few remarks on the two last.

Amongst the numerous writers who have attacked Machiavel the late king of Prussia holds a distinguished rank. He published a French translation of The Prince' with a refutation, chapter by chapter, and servilely imitating Gentillet, prefixed to the whole the title of Anti-Machiavel. It may appear extraordinary that one who squared his conduct in a pretty exact conformity with the principles laid down in this work of Machiavel should have undertaken its refutation. He either perceived not the drift of The Prince' or thought that princes could use it more effectually if it had an ill name with the people. If the royal author was really so dull as not to see the drift of Machiavel, he should have applauded and not have attacked the work of his preceptor: but whatever may be the opinion of posterity concerning the moral character of Frederic, they will not accuse him of want of discernment. It is very clear that he did discover the veil in

which the salutary lesson conveyed in Machiavel's Prince' was enveloped, but this veil it was his interest to draw still closer; he therefore published his Anti-Machiavel for the purpose of making Machiavel appear a hateful monster, for the purpose of deterring the people from reading his works, and benefiting by the salutary lesson they contain. It is extremely curious to examine this Anti-Machiavel of the king of Prussia, and to compare his conduct with the sentiments therein contained. In the preface the royal author says, that The Prince' is with regard to morality, what Spinosa's works are with regard to faith. Spinosa sapped the foundations of faith, with a design to subvert religion, and Machiavel by corrupting politics, has struck at the very root of true morality. The royal critic would have said better that Machiavel, by tearing off the veil from the actions of kings, has struck at the very root of king-craft. No wonder the king of Prussia calls him a monster and regards' The Prince' as the most dangerous work ever published. It is indeed dangerous, but to whom?

The king of Prussia in his remarks on the first chapter of ‹ The Prince,' principally blames Machiavel for not having treated of the origin of kingly government, which the royal author thinks was instituted for the protection of mankind, and for the destribution of equal justice. Possibly kings of very antient times, such for instance as good king Arthur, may have acted on principles like these, but as far as authentic history reaches we have very few of these examples. His majesty concludes his remarks on this chapter by saying, that there are but three justifiable modes by which dominion can be obtained. First, lineal and established succession. Secondly, election by the people. Thirdly, conquest in consequence of a war justly undertaken. Leaving the first of these just methods of acquiring dominion to withstand as well as it can, the forcible attack which Thomas Paine in his different works, and more especially in his last,* has made on all hereditary institutions, I shall confine myself to the last. Now this last maxim thus seriously given, and interwoven with what is really good, is as pernicious as any thing which Machiavel has enjoined ironically. It admits of a boundless extension of domi

* On the Origin of Government.