Absolute Force, i. e., this "Ultimate" of Mr. Spencer is a "correlative" or a "correlate" of something else; still more, if it is the "necessary" correlate of that something else, is it not evident that by the fact of this necessary relation to something which is not itself, the Absolute ceases to be Absolute? But it may be said in reply that Mr. Spencer is himself the first to admit these incongruities, which are, as he says, but the necessary outcome of the limitations of human thought; and that it is therefore not fair to tax him with inconsistency on this head. If Mr. Spencer is inconsistent with himself, he may plead that at least he is no worse than other thinkers; he may avail himself of the old argument "tu quoque." Forbearing, therefore, to press this point further, let us pass on to our second and closing question :-Is Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Absolute as the Absolute is in itself-we do not say, adequate, (for who can adequately expound the Infinite and Supreme Reality?) but, so far as it goes, or in the extent to which it goes, satisfying? "So far as it goes,"-in this phrase, as we conceive it, lies just the point at issue. For our contention is, that in the account which he has given of the Absolute, Mr. Spencer either goes too far, or he does not go far enough. He admits the Absolute to be Power, as we have seen. Not only so, he also admits the Absolute to be not merely Power, but Cause. He is, however, unwilling to speak of the Absolute as a Person, on account, as it appears, of the limitations and apparent contradictions with which our thought is confronted when we endeavor to apply personal terms, or in fact, human conceptions of any kind, to the Absolute and Infinite Being. But are these difficulties, (the existence of which we, for our own part, by no means deny), confined to the category of Personality? Do they not also confront us in connection with the category of Unity, for example? While Mr. Spencer's construction of things in general is unitary, other thinkers, like Professor James, of Harvard, contend that philosophers must in future deal mere seriously with the pluralistic hypothesis than they have been doing.' 14 Again, is not the conception of Force, whether as Absolute or relative, beset with metaphysical difficulties? Yet we have seen 14 "The Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 526. Mr. Spencer freely attaching this conception to his idea of the Absolute. Once more,—are there no metaphysical difficulties bound up with the conception of Causality? Rather does not the slightest study of the history of human thought exhibit to our view the category of Causality as the very point where the battles of the metaphysicians have ever raged most fiercely? Yet we have seen Mr. Spencer conceding that the Absolute is a Cause. Why, then, should Mr. Spencer stop here, and decline to advance further? Why should he draw the line at Consciousness, and decline to construe the Absolute in terms of the Personal? Mr. Spencer, as we have seen, speaks of the Absolute as being also the Unknowable. He uses these two terms indifferently to describe the Ultimate Reality. But inasmuch as we have seen Mr. Spencer attaching metaphysical predicates to his Absolute, we are, I contend, justified in holding that, to that extent, Mr. Spencer's Unknowable has already ceased to be unknowable; to that extent it has, in effect, become knowable. Let us see, then, what is the extent of Mr. Spencer's admissions. He admits, in the first place, that the Absolute exists; that there is such a thing as the Absolute. That is, Mr. Spencer construes the Absolute according to the metaphysical category of Being. In the next place, Mr. Spencer admits that the Absolute is Power,-and Infinite Power, at that. Mr. Spencer, therefore, feels himself justified in attributing to his Absolute not only existence, but quality or potency. But, as we have seen, he does not stop here. He goes further, he speaks of the Absolute as Cause,-still another metaphysical category; and one about which, as we have observed, there has been endless controversy among philosophers. And now let us pause a moment, and ask ourselves what we mean by these metaphysical predicates which we have found Mr. Spencer using, and applying to the Absolute, these predicates of Being and Unity and Potency and Causality. Whence do we derive the content which we put into these abstract terms, by which they become to us concrete and charged with meaning? Is it not from our own personal experience that we draw the content by which we fill out and vitalize these abstractions, so that they become real to our thought? I apprehend the meaning of the term "existence" be cause, and in so far as I myself exist. I understand what is meant by power for the very reason that I am conscious of myself as having exerted, or as exerting, or as being able to exert power by my will. I interpret to myself power in terms of volition, and not merely in terms of "muscular strain" or of the "objective correlate" of the latter. Once more, I apprehend what is meant by Causation for the reason that I am conscious of myself as a cause. I am able through the intelligent and self-directed exercise of Will to produce certain intended and desired effects, and thereby to vindicate, both to myself and also to others my possession of this high prerogative of causality. In the words of Dr. Rashdall of Oxford: "It is this union of power with purpose which satisfies my idea of Causality. And such a union can be found only in a consciousness In our experience of volition, and in that experience alone, we are conscious of actually exercising Causality. There alone we find a content for the bare abstract notion of 'Cause'."'15 There is one step more in this line of thought. It is not, of course, a mathematico-physical, or, in the narrower sense of the word, a "scientific" proof; it is not claimed for it that it is a strict, deductive chain of reasoning. Rather is it an argument by way of analogy. The line of thought, then, as I shall endeavor to sum it up in a few words, is as follows: In my consciousness of myself as exercising Causality there is involved the knowledge of myself as a person. For it is precisely in these facts of Consciousness which we have noted,—the facts, namely, of self-conscious being and self-directed activity,— that personality is involved. As we have just seen, it is only as I take my stand upon the basis of consciousness that I find myself in a position and at a point of view from which I can at all apprehend the meaning of Causality. And Causality, as so understood, involves and means, personality. If this be true, then is it unreasonable for me to add to those other predicates which Mr. Spencer attaches to the Absolute this predicate of Personality? Does not the scope and drift of the argument, indeed, 15 See his Essay on "The Ultimate Basis of Theism," in Contentio Veritatis, PP, 30, 31. lead us to conclude, with Mr. Spencer's philosophical mentor, Dean Mansel, that "it is our duty to think of God as personal, while it is our duty to believe that He is Infinite?" The true outcome of our scientific and philosophical, as well as of our religious thinking is in Theism;-in the doctrine not only of the Absolute as the Ultimate Power and Cause, but in the Personal God, who is the Creator and Upholder of all things. WILLIAM S. BISHOP. The University of the South. SWINBURNE'S POETIC THEORIES AND PRACTICE The essential principles of poetry, as laid down by Mr. Swinburne, are briefly : . . imagination and harmony the primary elements of poetry"; "it requires a perceptible but indefinable charm"; . . "poetry must do nothing that can be 1 formulated, it must simply elude." In illustration of these chief ideas the following excerpt from "Atalanta in Calydon" possesses something of an "indefinable charm," and perhaps affords the best example, for present purposes at least, of the poet's definition : Bind on thy sandals, O thou most fleet, Over the splendor and speed of thy feet; For the faint east quickens, the wan west shivers, In Mr. Swinburne's essay, entitled "Whitmania," we are told, that "in poetry, perhaps above all the other arts, the method or treatment, the manner of touch, the tone of expression, is the first and last thing to be considered." This manner is certainly characteristic of Mr. Swinburne's method. He makes the element of rhythm the basis of his poetic art. As a result the element of thought becomes a secondary consideration. But it is true that the spirit of mysticism, in consequence of this seemingly illusive thought-element, makes for certain not well-defined poetic charms. The musical quality produces upon this condition an even more augmented effect. The choice of theme, too, has much to do with the spirit of mysticism in Swinburne's poetry. Our poet finds much inspiration in those things of the Middle Ages, and even in classical lore, that lend themselves to poetic treatment. He seeks inspiration in the romantic myths and legends of the past. And not only is Mr. Swinburne's classicism noticeable in his choice of themes, but it appears even to a more marked degree in his adaptation of classical metres. His method, however, is purely one of imitation; and these imitations are "frankly accentual with no effort to introduce fixed quantities into English." 1 Mr. 1R. M. Alden: "English Verse: Specimens illustrating its principles and history," N. Y., 1903. |